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I. INTRODUCTORY COMPARISON OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE
UNITED STATES AND IN THE SOVIET UNION
In the United States, the Constitution guarantees that "[iin all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' The United
States Supreme Court has construed the sixth amendment guar-
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
NUMBER 31
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antee to apply to the "critical" stages of criminal proceedings.2
The accused must be advised of his right to counsel before he is
placed in a line-up or subjected to in-custody interrogation. 4 It
is increasingly customary to provide counsel for the indigent at
either the initial appearance or the preliminary examination, al-
though neither has been consistently termed a "critical stage" by
the Supreme Court.5 The accused has a constitutional right to
retained or appointed counsel at the arraignment,6 at trial, and on
appeal,7 but the Court has not yet indicated whether the right to
counsel extends to the sentencing stage.8 During those stages
which have been termed "critical," the accused must be informed
of his right to counsel. Unless he makes an "intelligent waiver"
of his sixth amendment right, the proceeding may not be con-
ducted until an attorney is present.9
In the Soviet Union, "the accused is guaranteed the right to
defense" under article 111 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. As
defined by the 1958 Principles of Criminal Procedure of the U.S.S.R.
and the Union Republics [hereinafter referred to as the Principles
of Criminal Procedure], the right to defense is broader than, but
2 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). "[I]n addition to
counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not
stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or
informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the
accused's right to a fair trial." Id. at 226.
3 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
5 In White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), the Court reversed the con-
viction of a man whose unnecessary plea of guilty (taken at the prelim-
inary hearing when he was not represented by counsel) was introduced in
evidence at the trial. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Court
held that White was not controlling due to the differences in state pro-
cedures, and refrained from deciding whether the preliminary hearing was
always a "critical stage" of criminal proceedings. Instead, it ruled more
narrowly that failure to appoint counsel where testimony taken at the
preliminary hearing was subsequently admitted at the trial constituted a
denial of the accused's right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.
6 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
7 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 The Court did rule, in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948),
however, that there had been a denial of due process when an uncounseled
defendant was sentenced "on the basis of assumptions concerning his crim-
inal record which were materially untrue." The federal courts, relying on
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), have held that the sixth amendment
guarantee extends to the sentencing stage because a lawyer is needed to
call the court's attention to mitigating circumstances as well as to counsel
the accused on the advisability of an appeal.
9 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). The alternatives
to appointing counsel during an in-custody interrogation are to refrain
from conducting the proceeding or to provide an equally effective guarantee
of the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights. Id.; United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
[VOL. 1968:806
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inclusive of the right to counsel.1 0 Strictly speaking, the right to
counsel in the Soviet Union is therefore a statutory, not a constitu-
tional guarantee.
The Soviet criminal process, patterned after the system developed
in Continental European countries, consists of the following
stages: initiation of the case; inquiry or preliminary investiga-
tion, during which investigatory agencies gather evidence both for
and against the accused by interrogating experts, witnesses, and
the accused as well as by conducting searches, seizures, examina-
tions, and views of the scene of the crime; bringing to trial, which
is a judicial review of the conclusion to indict; trial, during
which evidence gathered at the pretrial investigation plus any
supplemental evidence is presented to the court for a determina-
tion of guilt or innocence; cassation, which is an appellate review
of both the facts and the law; and supervisory review, which is an
appellate review of the law after the judgment has taken legal
effect.1 1 Perhaps the two most distinctive features of the Soviet
system are its emphasis on pretrial investigatory activities and the
active participation of the court in eliciting evidence at the trial.1 2
The Soviet system therefore differs considerably from that famil-
iar to American lawyers. Nevertheless, there is a striking simi-
larity between the pattern of development of the right to counsel
in the United States and in the Soviet Union. In both countries,
primary emphasis was first placed upon the right to counsel
during the trial. In 1920, the All-Russian Central Executive Com-
mittee decreed that if a state or social accuser participates in a
trial, the accused has an obligatory right to counsel, meaning
that counsel must be appointed if he is not retained by the ac-
10 The right to defense, secured to the accused by article 19, is defined
in article 21 as follows:
The accused shall have the right: to know what he is accused
of and to give explanations concerning the accusation presented to
him; to present evidence; to submit petitions; to become acquainted
with all the materials of the case upon completion of the preliminary
investigation or inquiry; to retain defense counsel; to participate in
the judicial examination in the court of first instance; to submit chal-
lenges; and to appeal from the actions and decisions of the person
conducting the inquiry, the investigator, procurator, and court.
Analogous provisions can be found in the republic codes of criminal
procedure. E.g., R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 19, 46. Throughout
this comment, reference will be made to the R.S.F.S.R Code of Criminal
Procedure unless otherwise indicated An English translation of the Code
is now available. SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES
(H. Berman & J. Spindler transl. 1966) [hereinafter cited as SOVIET CRIM-
INAL LAW AND PROCEDURE].
11 For a fuller description of the Soviet system see Hazard, Soviet Crim-
inal Procedure, 15 TUL. L. REV. 220 (1941). Although written prior to
1958, this is still an accurate description of the stages of Soviet criminal
proceedings.
12 H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 302-03 (1963). These features
are not unique to Soviet criminal procedure; they are also characteristic of
Continental European legal systems.
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cused, although he may subsequently be dismissed at the accused's
request.'8 Since then, the obligatory right to counsel has been
extended to cases in which the defendant is a minor, physically
or mentally incapable of defending himself, or without command
of the language in which the proceedings are conducted; cases in
which there are two or more defendants whose interests conflict,
one of whom has defense counsel; and cases in which the death
penalty may be imposed.14 The accused may waive his right to
counsel unless he is a minor or unable to conduct his own defense
due to physical or mental defects, but the waiver must be volun-
tary.15 A recent decision by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court stipulates
that no waiver is voluntary unless (1) the defendant is informed
of his right to counsel, and (2) counsel is present at the time of
the waiver. 6 This is a more complete guarantee of the right to
counsel than that granted to American defendants by Gideon v.
Wainright!
As in the United States, efforts by legal theorists to advance
the right to counsel to the pretrial stages of Soviet criminal
proceedings have met with considerable opposition from members
of the investigatory and law enforcement agencies. A compro-
mise solution was finally incorporated into the 1958 Principles
of Criminal Procedure. Counsel is now permitted to assist the
accused in becoming acquainted with the materials gathered during
the preliminary investigation and to petition the collection of addi-
tional evidence prior to the drafting of the indictment. 7 The
investigator must inform the accused of his right to counsel upon
termination of the preliminary investigation, but the right may be
waived, and counsel need not be present at the time of the
waiver.' 8 Only minors and persons physically or mentally unable
to defend themselves enjoy an obligatory right to counsel from
the moment an accusation is presented at the beginning of the
preliminary investigation. 9 When an inquiry is held in lieu of a
13 Decree of Oct. 21, 1920, art. 47, [1920] 83 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. Item 407.
14 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 49. Counsel is also obligatory when-
ever the accused requests the appointment of counsel in the Uzbek and
Moldavian Republics. B. GALKIN, SOVETSKII UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NYI
ZAKON (Soviet Criminal Procedure Law) 201 (1962). Failure to provide
counsel constitutes grounds for vacating a conviction and remanding the
case for a new trial. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 342, 345(4). For a
summation of the circumstances under which counsel was obligatory prior
to 1958 see Bekeshko, Zashchita kak protsessual'naia funkstiia v sovetskom
ugolovnom protsesse (Defense as a Procedural Function in the Soviet Crim-
inal Process), in VOPROSY UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA I PROTSESSA (Problems of
Criminal Law and Procedure) 247-48 (1958).
"3 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 50.
' Karapetian, [1966] 4 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 26 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.
1966).
17 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 22; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 47.
Is R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 50, 149, 201.
19 Id. art. 49.
[VOL. 1968:806
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preliminary investigation, the accused is denied all right to counsel
until the case is brought to trial.20 There is currently a sharp
division of opinion on whether counsel may participate in the
bringing to trial when the accused has not been represented
during the investigatory stages.21 If counsel takes part in the
preliminary investigation, however, he is permitted to appear at
the bringing to trial when summoned by the court.22
Unlike the American system of sentencing, Soviet judges an-
nounce both the verdict and the sentence at the close of the trial,
during which the accused enjoys an obligatory right to counsel.23
At the cassational stage, on the other hand, counsel's participation
is permitted, but not required,24 and counsel is barred from the
supervisory review except "when necessary," and then only if
summoned by the court.2 5
Recently, pressure has been mounting to extend the right to
counsel to the beginning of the preliminary investigation and to
make counsel's presence mandatory during the appellate stages of
the proceedings.26 Clearly this indicates that Soviet jurists, at least,
consider counsel's presence an essential element of the accused's
constitutional "right to defense." On the other hand, on the
basis of such political proceedings as the Great Purge trials, West-
ern observers have often concluded that Soviet lawyers are more
interested in defending the interests of the state than in defending
the interests of their client. This dichotomy of opinion reflects
not only a lack of information on the part of Western observers,
but also a failure to appreciate the impact of Soviet legal and
political institutions upon the right to counsel. In an effort to
foster a clearer understanding of the importance of counsel's assist-
ance to the average Soviet defendant, this comment will de-
scribe the structure and duties of the practicing bar, discuss the
Soviet lawyer's concept of his duty to defend, depict counsel's
present functions during each stage of the criminal process, and
suggest his future role in Soviet criminal proceedings. Whenever
possible, reference will be made to the actual, as opposed to the
theoretical functioning of the Soviet criminal process. Soviet re-
search materials tend to focus on the law in books, however, and
it is very difficult for Western commentators to obtain meaningful
20 Id. art. 47.
21 For a fuller discussion of this controversy see text accompanying notes
465-68, infra.
22 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CIIM. PRO. C. art. 223; Vydria, Obespechenie podsudi-
momu prava na zashchitu po novomu UPK RSFSR (Guaranteeing the Ac-
cused the Right to Defense under the New RSFSR Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure), [1961] 4 Sov. IUST. 16.
23 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 303.
24 Id. art. 335.
25 Id. art. 377.
26 Shafir, Pravo na zashchitu v sovetskom ugolovnom sudoproizvodstve
i vozmozhnosti ego rasshireniia (The Right to Defense in Soviet Criminal
Proceedings and the Possibilities for its Expansion), [1967] 2 S.G. I P. 47.
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information concerning the operation of Soviet law in action.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SOVIET PRACTICING BAR
Lawyers appearing as defense counsel in the Soviet Union are
drawn from that segment of the legal profession known as "advo-
cates. '27  Collectively, they are referred to as the advokatura
(practicing bar) and are organized into "colleges of advocates,"
which are voluntary, self-governing associations of persons en-
gaged in legal practice.28 On rare occasions, "jurisconsults" (law-
yers employed by state enterprises, collective farms, and other
institutions or organizations as house counsel) are called upon to
act as defense counsel for members of the organizations on whose
staffs they serve as legal advisers.2 9 Near relatives or legal repre-
sentatives of the accused and other persons to whom the accused
entrusts his defense may also be permitted to serve as defense
counsel during the trial by ruling of the court, but such persons
cannot take part in the preliminary investigation. 0 Since the
vast majority of defendants are represented by advocates, this
comment will concern itself solely with that segment of Soviet
defense lawyers.
A. Early History of the Advokatura
The advokatura has had an interesting, if somewhat complex
history. The Imperial bar was abolished immediately after the
Revolution, as were all other existing judicial institutions of the
27 Advocates correspond roughly to private practitioners in the United
States. Friedman & Zile, Soviet Legal Profession: Recent Developments in
Law and Practice, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 32. In addition to serving as defense
counsel, they also act as representatives of plaintiffs and defendants in
civil suits. Law of July 25, 1962, Statute on the Advokatura of the
R.S.F.S.R., art. 1, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
The Statute on the Advokatura has been translated and annotated by Fried-
man & Zile, supra.
28 Law of Oct. 27, 1960, Law on the Court Organization of the R.S.F.S.R.,
art. 23, [1960] 40 Ved. Verkh. Soy. R.S.F.S.R. Item 593; Law of July 25,
1962, art. 1, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
The phrase "voluntary" is used to distinguish colleges of advocates
from state organizations. Dubkov, Demokraticheskie osnovy organizatsii i
deiatel'nosti sovetskoi advokatury (Democratic Foundations of the Organ-
ization and Activities of the Soviet Advokatura), [1962] 6 S.G. I P. 108,
109. It tends to be misleading, however, because private practice has been
abolished and only members of the college may work as advocates. See
text accompanying notes 68-72, infra.
29 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 22; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 47; NAUCHNO-PRAKTICHESKII KOMMENTARII K
UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NOMU KODEKSU R.S.F.S.R. (Scholarly-Practical
Commentary to the Criminal Procedure Code of the R.S.F.S.R.) 118-19
(V. Boldyrev ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII];
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 118-19.
30 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 47; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 119.
In practice, defense lawyers are almost exclusively advocates. M. CHEL'TSOV,
SOVETSKII UGOLOVNYI PROTSESS (Soviet Criminal Proceedings) 102 (1962).
[VOL. 1968:806
HeinOnline  -- 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 812 1968
SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Russian Empire. 31 The first revolutionary decree on judicial ad-
ministration did acknowledge the continuing need for legal rep-
resentation of persons charged with the commission of crimes, how-
ever, and provided that any citizen of either sex of good character
and with full civil rights could act as defense counsel.3 2 Al-
though the underlying intent was to eliminate the members of
the Imperial bar from the legal profession, many former lawyers
continued to serve as defense counsel.3 3 In 1918, recognition was
given to the need for an organized bar. Only persons elected to
the "colleges of persons dedicated to advocacy" could practice for a
fee.34 The fee was paid to the advocate, but was then turned over
to the college for distribution among the members. 35 In an effort
to curb the unregulated practice of law, the right to appear without
a fee was subsequently restricted to relatives of the accused and
representatives of state or social organizations. 6 The Decree on
the People's Courts of the R.S.F.S.R. placed the colleges under the
control of the executive committees of the local and provincial
soviets and introduced the concept of a salaried practicing bar.37
Client's fees were collected by the courts and credited to the
budget of the People's Commissariat of Justice. 38  Advocates were
paid a salary equivalent to that received by the people's judges.3 9
Dissatisfied with the salaried bar, the government instituted the
"labor duty" system in October 1920.40 The local soviets drew up
lists of citizens capable of acting as defense counsel, and whenever
a person was summoned to duty, his employer was obligated to
free him temporarily from his employment while continuing to
pay him his regular wages.41 The labor duty system marked the
nadir in the history of the advokatura, for it led to the practice of
31 Decree of Dec. 5 (Nov. 22), 1917, arts. 1, 3, [1917] 4 S.U. R.S.F.S.R.
Item 50. For other accounts of the history of the advokatura see Bilinsky,
The Lawyer and Soviet Society, 14 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 62 (March-
April 1965); Friedman & Zile, supra note 27; Hazard, Law Practice in
Russia: The Organized Bar in the U.S.S.R., 35 A.B.A.J. 177 (1949); Ku-
cherov, The Legal Profession in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Russia, 5 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 443 (1956); Lapenna, The Bar in the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 631 (1963); Malone, The Soviet Bar, 46 COR-
NELL L.Q. 258 (1961); Razi, Legal Education and the Role of the Lawyer in
the Soviet Union and the Countries of Eastern Europe, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 776
(1960).
32 Decree of Dec. 5 (Nov. 22), 1917, art. 3, [1917] 4 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. Item
50.
33 Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 33; Hazard, supra note 31, at 177.
34 Decree of March 7 (Feb. 22), 1918, arts. 24-25, [1918] 26 S.U.
R.S.F.S.R. Item 420 (All-Russian Central Executive Committee).
35 Kucherov, supra note 31, at 454.
36 Hazard, supra note 31, at 178.
37 Decree of Nov. 30, 1918, arts. 40-42, [1918] 85 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. Item 889
(All-Russian Central Executive Committee).
38 Id. art. 48.
39 Id. art. 42.
40 Decree of Oct. 21, 1920, art. 43, [1920] 83 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. Item 407.
41 Id. arts. 43, 48.
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law by persons with no continuing legal experience. 42  When
they refused or failed to appear, salaried legal advisers con-
nected with the local departments of justice had to appear in
their stead.43
In the early 1920's, the New Economic Policy was introduced
in an effort to rebuild the country's war-torn economy. The
state maintained control of the "commanding heights" (large-scale
industry, transportation, finance, etc.), but permitted private en-
terprise to operate in the spheres of small-scale industry, trade,
and agriculture. To provide the legal and economic stability neces-
sary for the encouragement of private enterprise, codes regulating
civil and criminal substantive and procedural law were enacted
and the Soviet bar was rejuvenated and organized into "colleges
of defenders. ' 44 When the mixed economy of the 1920's was sup-
planted by a socialist economy in the 1930's, the 1923 R.S.F.S.R.
Code of Criminal Procedure and the 1922 "colleges of defenders"
were retained by the Soviet government. The bar was not reor-
ganized until the Statute on the Advokatura of the U.S.S.R. was
passed in 1939, following the adoption of a new all-union Constitu-
tion in 1936. 4r The 1936 Constitution also called for the enact-
ment of an all-union code of criminal procedure, but none was
ever adopted.46  Following Stalin's death, a new wave of legal
reforms swept the Soviet Union, including the passage of the
all-union Principles of Criminal Procedure in 1958 and the republic
statutes on the Advokatura in the early 1960's, which marked a
shift in control over the Soviet bar from the federal to the re-
public governments.4
7
B. Recent History of the Advokatura
Although the Soviet bar has thus been reorganized twice since
1922, its basic structure has remained unchanged, making it pos-
sible to describe the present-day organization of the advokatura
in the context of its historical development since the establish-
ment of the first colleges of defenders under NEP.
42 Hazard, supra note 31, at 178.
43 Decree of Oct. 21, 1920, art. 44, [1920] 83 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. Item 407
(All-Russian Central Executive Committee); Kucherov, supra note 31, at
455.
44 R.S.F.S.R. 1923 CrIM. PRO. C.; Decree of May 25, 1922, [1922] 69 S.U.
R.S.F.S.R. Item 902 (All-Russian Central Executive Committee).
45 Decree of Aug. 16, 1939, [1939] 49 S.P. S.S.S.R. Item 394.
46 U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 14(u). The provision was amended in 1957. The
all-union government is now authorized to establish fundamental principles
of criminal procedure; the republic governments are to formulate codes
of criminal procedure reflecting the all-union principles, but developing
the procedures to be followed by the republic legal institutions in greater
detail.
47 E.g., Law of July 25, 1962, [1962] 15-16 Sov. IUST. 31 (Supreme Soviet
U.S.S.R.).
[VOL. 1968:806
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1. ORGANIZATION OF THE COLLEGES OF ADVOCATES
The colleges of advocates are termed "self-governing" institutions
by Soviet jurists.4 The general assembly of members, which con-
venes at least once a year, is the highest governing body of the
college. It is empowered to elect the other two governing bodies
(the presidium and the financial auditing commission) as well as
to make decisions on questions concerning the work of the college.49
It has been suggested that the general assembly is the legislative,
and the presidium the executive branch of the college. However,
the presidium's powers are more extensive than those normally
granted to an executive organ. Elected every two years, the pre-
sidium admits and expels advocates from membership in the col-
lege; directs the activities of the consultation offices (the individual
law offices into which the college of advocates is divided); exer-
cises control over the quality of work of the advocates; and
takes disciplinary measures against persons who have failed to
comply with the internal regulations of the college.50
The self-governing character of the college of advocates is sig-
nificantly limited, however, by the control which governmental
agencies are permitted to exercise over it. Administrative authori-
ties at the governmental level at which the college is established
are empowered to organize, direct, and control the activities of the
college.51 In addition, general supervisory control is exercised over
the colleges in the R.S.F.S.R. by the Juridical Commission of the
R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers. 52 Both the commission and afore-
mentioned administrative authorities may expel an advocate for
demonstrated unsuitability in the performance of his duties,
systematic violation of the college's internal regulations, miscon-
duct which brings discredit upon the calling of an advocate, and
the commission of a crime.53 The administrative authorities also
have the right to exclude an advocate from admission to the
college within one month of the date they are notified of his
acceptance; 54 reverse the decision of the college's presidium re-
fusing to admit an applicant or expelling a member;55 and reverse
decisions of the general assembly or the presidium which do not
conform to the law or to the Statute on the Advokatura of the
48 Dubkov, supra note 28, at 110-11.
49 Law of July 25, 1962, arts. 16-17, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.).
50 Id. arts. 18-19.
51 Id. art. 5; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 121. In Russian,
kontrol' means supervisory, not operative control.
52 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 5, [1962] 15-16 Sov. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.); Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 44.
53 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 13, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IusT. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.).
5 Id. art. 11.
55 Id. art. 14.
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R.S.F.S.R.56 Similar forms of governmental control were exer-
cised over the advokatura under the 1922 and 1939 statutes, al-
though in 1922 the colleges were placed under the general super-
vision of the provincial courts, rather than the Ministry of Jus-
tice.5 7
2. INCREASED PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE ADVOKATURA
Since 1922, there has been a steady trend toward an increased
professionalization of the advokatura, as evidenced by the rising
standards for admission to the college of advocates.58 In 1922, a
person was eligible to become an advocate if he had two years of
legal practice or academic legal training.59 The standards were
raised in 1939 to admit only persons with four years of legal
training; two years of academic training plus one year of practical
experience; or three years of practical experience as a judge, pro-
curator, investigator, or jurisconsult. 60  In 1962, the qualifica-
tions were again tightened, admitting only "citizens of the U.S.S.R.
who have had a higher education in law and not less than two
year's experience in legal work." 61 Persons with a higher legal
education but without two years of legal experience may be ac-
cepted as candidates to the college on a six-month probationary
basis. In exceptional cases, persons with at least five years of
legal experience, but without a legal education, may be admitted
by permission of the administrative authorities.62 Today, over 80
percent of the Russian Republic advocates have a higher legal
education.65  There are also other signs of the advokatura's in-
creasing prestige. Of the 7,000 advocates in the R.S.F.S.R., ap-
proximately 4,400 are members of the Communist Party.64 While
it might be expected that these persons would hesitate before pre-
senting a vigorous defense, Feifer reports that "[a]s often as not,
the best defenses [are] made by Communists."'6 5 Twenty-six advo-
cates were elected to local soviets in the Russian Republic in 1962;
105 advocates were chosen as delegates in the 1967 elections.6 And
56 Id. art. 20.
57 Hazard, supra note 31, at 179-80.
5s For a discussion of the professionalization of the advokatura see
Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 34-39.
59 Hazard, supra note 31, at 180.
60 Decree of Aug. 16, 1939, arts. 6-7, [1939] 49 S.P. S.S.S.R. Item 394;
Kucherov, supra note 31, at 457.
61 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 9, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.).
62 Id.
63 Kukarskii, Sovetskoi Advokature-45 Let (Soviet Advokatura-45
Years Old), [1967] 10 Sov. IUST. 1. The educational qualifications of advo-
cates immediately after World War II are discussed in Kucherov, supra
note 31, at 459.
64 Kukarskii, supra note 63, at 1.
65 G. FEIFER, JUSTICE IN Moscow 238 (1964).
66 Kukarskii, supra note 63, at 1. This sharp increase would seem to
indicate that for the first time, a significant number of lawyers are taking
[VOL. 1968:806
HeinOnline  -- 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 816 1968
SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
while it has traditionally been the pattern for Soviet judges to
become advocates, in 1967 over 90 advocates were elected to pre-
side over people's and regional courts in the R.S.F.S.R.67 This
evidence of the advokatura's increasing prestige is of particular
importance in studying the role of defense counsel in Soviet
criminal proceedings because an advocate who does not feel a
strong sense of professional responsibility is not apt to conduct a
vigorous defense, nor is he apt to command the respect of the court.
3. ABOLITION OF PRIVATE PRACTICE
Private law practice, permitted during the period of the New
Economic Policy, was increasingly restricted during the period of
industrialization and collectivization in the early 1930's.68 In
1939, private practice was abolished except for the few instances
when it was permitted and regulated by the People's Commissar
of Justice.6 9 Today, private practice is unauthorized, and it is only
the members of the colleges of advocates who are permitted to per-
form an advocate's functions.7 0 Since there are no private practi-
tioners in the Soviet Union, an accused person (or persons acting
on his behalf) must go to a consultation office in order to secure
the services of a defense lawyer. The accused may request to be
represented by a particular advocate whose reputation is well-
known or who has been recommended to him by a friend.71 But
if that advocate is unavailable or overburdened, the manager
of the consultation point is empowered to assign another.72
4. ESTABLISHMENT AND COLLECTION OF FEES
Fees for legal services used to be collected by the advocates,
who then placed a certain percentage of their fees into a general
fund for the maintenance of the college and operation of the con-
sultation offices. The state regulated the fee paid by industrial
workers and employees, but all other clients were free to negotiate
a fee with their advocates. 73 In 1939, the system was revised.
Fees were fixed by the manager of the consultation office in ac-
an active role in politics in the Soviet Union. See Berman, The Struggle
of Soviet Jurists Against a Return to Stalinist Terror, 22 SLAvic REV. 314,
320 (1963).
67 Kukarskii, supra note 63, at 1. Writing in 1964, Feifer remarked that
there was a tendency for judges to become trial lawyers-the new job gave
them less prestige, but more money. He asserted that the reverse rarely
happened. G. FEIFER, supra note 65, at 234.
68 Kucherov, supra note 31, at 456; Lapenna, supra note 31, at 634;
Mironenko, Counsel for the Defense, 10 INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE
U.S.S.R. BULLETIN No. 9, at 37, 38 (Sept. 1963).
69 Decree of Aug. 16, 1939, art. 5, [1939] 49 S.P. S.S.S.R. Item 394; Fried-
man & Zile, supra note 27, at 34, 44; Hazard, supra note 31, at 180.
70 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 4, [1962] 15-16 Sov. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.); Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 43-44.
71 G. FEIFER, supra note 65, at 234.
72 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 25(b), [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.).
73 Hazard, supra note 31, at 180.
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cordance with regulations issued by the U.S.S.R. People's Commis-
sariat of Justice establishing upper limits for each type of legal
service rendered.7 4 Payment was made to the consultation office,
which retained a fixed percentage for the maintenance of the col-
lege and the office and paid the balance earned to each lawyer at
the end of the month.75  No compensation was received for
services rendered gratuitously. In fact, the system encouraged
paid work while unpaid work was slighted or avoided.76 In essence,
each lawyer worked for state-regulated rates adjusted by the
manager in accordance with the lawyer's skill, the difficulty of
the task assigned, and the client's ability to pay. The result was a
great inequality among the advocate's earnings, coupled with a dis-
proportionate desire to serve the affluent client.77
Nothing was done on an all-union basis to change the fee system
until 1965, when the State Committee on Labor and Wages and
the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions adopted a Stand-
ard Regulation on Remuneration for the Work of Attorneys 78 and a
Standard Instruction on the Procedure for Remunerating Legal
Assistance Provided by Attorneys to Citizens, Enterprises, Insti-
tutions, State Farms, Collective Farms and Other Organizations.
79
In an effort to alleviate the disparity between earnings and to
eliminate the advocate's dependence on his client's wealth, the
standard regulation provides that each attorney shall receive a
minimum salary of 75 rubles per month.8 0  In addition, a ceiling
is set on the maximum amount to be received by each attorney
at the end of the month. Initially, an attorney may receive a
maximum monthly remuneration of 140-60 rubles after no more
74 Decree of Aug. 16, 1939, art. 25, [1939] 49 S.P. S.S.S.R. Item 394.
75 Hazard, supra note 31, at 265. By rule of thumb, the percentage
could not exceed 30% of the fee. This limitation was specifically set forth
in the Law of July 25, 1962, art. 44, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.).
76 Lapenna, supra note 31, at 639 & n.15. In recent years, however,
emphasis has been placed upon the importance of rendering free legal
services. Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 46.
77 Barkan, Right to a Defense or to a Defender, Izvestia, April 18, 1964,
at 3, transl. in 16 C.D.S.P. No. 14, at 27, 28 (1964); Friedman & Zile, supra
note 27, at 45.
Several attempts were made by individual colleges to alter the system.
In Rostov, the income of the college was divided among all advocates pro-
portionately to the amount and quality of their work, including services
rendered gratuitously by the college. Lapenna, supra note 31, at 639 n.15.
In Gomel, guaranteed salaries were set for defense attorneys based on their
qualifications, seniority, and experience. Barkan, supra at 28.
78 Changes in Remuneration for the Work of Attorneys and the Legal
Assistance they Provide to the Population, Enterprises, and Organizations,
[1965] 20 Soy. IUST. 12, transl. in 4 Soy. L. & GOV'T No. 4, at 55 (1965).
70 Id. On the basis of the standard regulation and the standard instruc-
tion, the councils of ministers of the union republics are to adopt republic
regulations on remuneration for the work of attorneys. Id.
80 Id.
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than 30 percent of his fees has been paid to the college of advo-
cates. Should the advocate's fees exceed that amount, he may
receive 50 percent of the remaining sum, but no more than an
additional 70-80 rubles (one-half of his monthly remuneration).s"
If an advocate appears on behalf of an indigent client who has
an obligatory right to counsel, he is remunerated from the funds of
the presidium within the limits of the sums appropriated for
these purposes.A2
The evils against which the 1965 regulations were directed have
been eliminated, but equally perplexing problems have arisen in
their stead. Disgruntled advocates have charged that the new
regulations reward the lazy and punish the ambitious, highly suc-
cessful defense attorneys whose hard earned fees are retained by
the consultation office and paid out to advocates unable to earn
the minimum salary on their own. 83 Furthermore, the regulations
take into account neither an advocate's education, nor the length,
amount, and quality of his service.8 4 It has been pointed out that
this makes the standard regulations inconsistent with the spirit
of the 23rd Party Congress, which emphasized the importance
of material incentives to the point of approving the unabashed
pursuit of profit.85
It is possible that the standard regulations will be revised to
reflect the dictates of the 23rd Congress. In the meantime, Soviet
advocates will undoubtedly continue the long-established practice'
of accepting a monetary remuneration from their clients "on the
side"-a bonus which is not reported to the college, but which
usually equals and often exceeds the advocate's legitimate fee. 6
The custom originated in 1918, when lawyers were first placed on
salaries.8 7 It has remained in vogue ever since, despite the fact
that the practice of MIKST (Maximum Exploitation of the Client
Above the Fixed Charge) has been declared illegal and is grounds
for expulsion from the college under the 1962 Statute on the
81 Id. at 55-56. An advocate receives 20 rubles for participating in a
preliminary investigation, and if his participation lasts for more than two
days, he receives up to 7 rubles for each additional day. Up to 25 rubles
may be charged for the handling of a criminal case in the court of first
instance. If the trial lasts more than one day, up to 40 rubles may be
charged, with an additional charge of up to 10 rubles per day when the
trial lasts for more than three days. An appeal costs 7 to 15 rubles, with
an additional charge for complex cases. Id. at 56-57. A ruble is the equiva-
lent of $1.11 (U.S.).
82 Id. at 56.
83 Chetunova, The Right to Defend, Literaturnaia Gazeta, Sept. 22, 1966,
at 2, transl. in 18 C.D.S.P. No. 38, at 19 (1966).
84 These factors were taken into account by the colleges that introduced
the salary system in Gomel. Barkan, supra note 77, at 28.
85 Chetunova, supra note 83, at 19.
86 G. FEIFER, supra note 65, at 234-35; Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at
45-46.
87 Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 45-46; Hazard, supra note 31, at 178.
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Advokatura of the R.S.F.S.R.8 8 Feifer reports that while he was
in Moscow in 1962, for example, a lawyer who had accepted large
sums of money "on the side" was charged with misuse of an offi-
cial position, but the charges were dropped before the case came
to trial.8 9 In all probability, such criminal sanctions would not be
applied today on the grounds that the present system of remuner-
ation does not provide adequate material incentives as defined by
the 23rd Party Congress. 0 Nevertheless, it would be desirable to
revise or remove the ceiling on maximum salaries in order to
legitimize the collection of fees in accordance with the lawyer's
skill and experience.
III. THE ADVOCATE'S CONCEPTION OF HIS DUAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE
CLIENT AND TO THE STATE
A. Institutional Influence of the College of Advocates
The trend toward an increased professionalization of the bar,
evidenced by the abovementioned reforms in the statutes govern-
ing the advokatura, has had a decided influence on the advocate's
conception of his duty to his client versus his duty to the state.
While it cannot be denied that the state's control over the lawyer
is greater in the Soviet Union than it is in the United States or
Western Europe, neither can it be denied that the Soviet advocate
has a professional responsibility to the accused as well as to the
state.9 1 This dual responsibility is reflected in the description of
his duties contained in the 1962 Statute on the Advokatura of the
R.S.F.S.R. On the one hand, he is to serve the state by helping to
strengthen socialist legality and by actively participating in prop-
aganda for Soviet law-a task which entails the reading of numer-
ous public lectures.9 2 On the other hand, he is "to make use of all
ways and means recognized by law in defense of the rights and
legal interests of citizens . . who seek his legal assistance. '9 3
The fact that this provision has no equivalent in prior law sug-
gests the increasing importance of counsel's responsibility to the
accused in Soviet criminal proceedings."
88 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 13(c), [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.); Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 70; Kucherov, supra note 31, at
460-61; Izvestia, Feb. 24, 1961, transl. in 13 C.D.S.P. No. 8, at 34 (1961).
89 G. FEIFER, supra note 65, at 235.
90 Cf. Agranovsky, A Trial and a Cause, Izvestia, June 4, 1967, at 5 and
June 8, 1967, at 8, transl. in 19 C.D.S.P. No. 23, at 17 (1967).
91 Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 35-36; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 124.
92 Law of July 25, 1962, arts. 2, 30, [1962] 15-16 Sov. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.); Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 42-43; Razi, supra note
31, at 798-99.
93 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 31, [1962] 15-16 Sov. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.).
94 Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 62.
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Defense counsel in any organized society can place primary em-
phasis upon serving the interests of his client only if he is a
member of an autonomous professional organization capable of
supporting him in resisting the pressures exerted by the state 5
The autonomy of the Soviet college of advocates is restricted
in that fees are regulated by the state and the college is sub-
ject to supervisory control exercised by administrative authori-
ties empowered to make or review decisions regarding the expul-
sion from or admission of members to the college.96 On the other
hand, the advokatura has become increasingly conscious of its need
for internal cohesion, as evidenced by the statutory mandate that
the advocate "be a model of strict and unswerving observance of
Soviet law, of moral purity, and of unimpeachable conduct, un-
der constant obligation to perfect his knowledge, [and] to in-
crease his ideological-political level and professional qualifications
S. ." To assist the advocate in complying with this provision,
many colleges hold monthly meetings to review and analyze their
members' work experiences.9 8 It has recently been suggested that
these sessions would do more to improve the quality of Soviet
advocacy if they gave greater recognition to persons who have
conducted a successful defense, and if they made a more pene-
trating analysis of the reasons for other advocates' failures.9 9 A
95 See Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 37.
96 See text accompanying notes 51-56, supra.
"A close analysis of the new legislation on the advokatura confirms
the impression that the state has been willing to grant professional auton-
omy only within rigidly prescribed limits." Friedman & Zile, supra note
27, at 38.
"The organization of the legal profession in collegia under the general
direction of the Ministry of Justice of each Soviet Republic and the fact
that attorneys practice their profession not individually, but in collectives
facilitates control by the state." Razi, supra note 31, at 795.
"[B]y giving the executive committees [of Soviets] the right to nullify
the decisions made by the collegium presidiums and to present demands
concerning the admission or expulsion of collegium members-thereby
turning the defense counsel into a chinovnik [a low-level official or clerk
in the bureaucracy.-Transl.]-the new regulations adopted in some repub-
lics essentially hinder the defense from becoming an independent side in
criminal proceedings." Chetunova, supra note 83, at 19.
97 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 30, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.); Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 62.
98 Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 62. For a first-hand account of a
monthly meeting held by the criminal section of the Moscow Collegium
of Lawyers see G. FEIFER, supra note 65, at 94-95.
99 Sukharev, Pressing Problems Facing the Soviet Legal Profession,
[1964] 10 S.G. i P. 3, transl. in 3 Sov. LAW & GOV'T No. 4, at 40, 43 (1965);
Sukharev, Zashchishchat', no ne vygorazhivat' (To Defend, but not To
Shield [the Accused from his Just Punishment]), [1967] 18 Soy. IUST. 15.
"[The colleges of advocates] often neglect to send an observer to the
court when a member attorney is pleading a case, and consequently are
unable to hold group critiques of the manner in which the attorney con-
ducted the defense." Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 70.
The presidium is empowered to reward especially outstanding advo-
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greater emphasis has also been placed on the importance of train-
ing young advocates in the art of conducting a skillful defense. 10 0
The college of advocates has not merely played an educational
role in assisting counsel to fulfill his professional responsibility
to his client. It has also sought to protect him against interfer-
ence by the state in the performance of his duties. In his daily
work, the advocate confronts "the state" in the persons of the
judge and the procurator (the prosecuting attorney at the trial
who is also charged with the "general supervision of socialist
legality").101 Professionally and institutionally, the advocate is
independent of the court and procuracy by virtue of his member-
ship in the college of advocates. 10 2  Nevertheless, in many in-
stances the judge and procurator have been known to interfere
in the work of the advokatura. In one typical instance, the proc-
urator's office (exercising its supervisory powers) sent a letter
to the college of advocates in Kuibyshev accusing three defense
attorneys of protecting "known criminals."'0 3 In another, the court
directed a special ruling to the college of advocates objecting to
the conduct of one of its attorneys who had requested the ac-
quittal of a man ultimately convicted by the court. 0 4 In such
cates by means of commendation, a bonus, or a valuable gift. Law of July
25, 1962, art. 39, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.). It
has been suggested that this power be extended to the managers of the
consultation offices. Sukharev, Zashchishchat', no ne vygorazhivat', supra
at 15.
100 Sukharev, Zaschishchat', no ne vygorazhivat', supra note 99, at 15.
101 Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 69.
"The Soviet jurist does not look upon the prosecutor as the sole repre-
sentative of the State. He sees in the judge a similar agent, specializing
in the settling of disputes and in the punishment of criminals." Hazard,
Legal Education in the Soviet Union, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 562.
For a more complete discussion of the procurator's functions see text
accompanying notes 271-75, infra.
102 Dubkov, supra note 28, at 111-12; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE 124.
103 Chetunova, supra note 83, at 18.
104 Sukharev, Uluchshit' rabotu advokatov po osushchestvleniiu zash-
chity grazhdan na predvaritel'nom sledstvii i v sude (The Work of Advo-
cates in Carrying Out the Defense of Citizens at the Preliminary Investiga-
tion and in Court Should be Improved), [1965] 12 Soy. IusT. 16, 18.
As Sukharev points out, article 321 of the 1960 R.S.F.S.R. Code of
Criminal Procedure does not empower the court to issue a special ruling
concerning an advocate's position regarding the guilt or innocence of his
client. Sukharev, supra at 18. As a matter of fact, neither the Code nor
the Commentary makes any reference to the advocate as a potential re-
cipient of a court's special ruling. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 579-80. It has
been suggested, however, that a special ruling could appropriately be di-
rected to an advocate if he violated the rules of procedure or conducted
himself in a disrespectful manner during the trial. R. RAKHUNOV, UCHAST-
NIKI UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NOI DEIATEL'NOSTI (Participants in Criminal
Procedure Activities), 217-18 (1961); Sukharev, supra at 18; Taylor, Soviet
Courts in the Social Complex, 23 RUSSIAN REV. 49, 55 (1964).
Chetunova reports one instance in which a special ruling criticized
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cases, the college is able to serve as a buffer between the advocate
and the state. It conducts an investigation to determine whether
the advocate actually used illegal methods of defense (i.e., con-
tacting witnesses to influence them in favor of the accused, dis-
torting evidence collected by the investigating agencies, filing un-
founded motions, etc.). 1°5 If the charges are unfounded, as
they were in the above two cases, the advocate's name is cleared. 0 6
If the advocate has violated the internal regulations of the college,
shown a "negligent or bad faith attitude toward the fulfillment of
his duties," or committed "other acts which bring discredit on the
calling of an advocate," he may be subjected to disciplinary pro-
ceedings before the presidium of the college.1'07 Penalties normally
range from reproof, reprimand, or severe reprimand to expulsion. 08
The disciplinary decision must be reached in the presence of the
advocate and may be appealed to the administrative authorities
supervising the college's activities.10 9
The power of the college to protect its members against state
interference is limited, however, because disciplinary proceedings
may also be instituted by governmental agencies-the administra-
tive authorities supervising the college's activities or the Juridi-
cal Commission of the Russian Republic." 0 When this procedure
is followed, the presidium is deprived of its power to serve as an
initial buffer between the advocate and the state; it cannot refuse
to conduct a disciplinary hearing on the grounds that the charges
are not well-founded. On the other hand, the presidium does'
preside over the hearing and, under the appropriate circumstances,
it could impose a light penalty or no penalty at all. The admin-
defense counsel for failing to exhaust all means and methods for introduc-
ing evidence tending to acquit the accused or to mitigate his responsibility.
Chetunova, supra note 83, at 18. This use of the special ruling is sanctioned
by the Commentary. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 68. Soviet jurists maintain
that the accused's interests are not so seriously affected by counsel's failure
to defend as to require the reversal of a judgment because the court,
procurator, and investigator have a responsibility to ascertain circumstances
tending to acquit the accused or mitigate his guilt. U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 14; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 68.
105 Chetunova, supra note 83, at 18. Although advocates are often criti-
cized merely for providing a vigorous defense of their client's interests,
there are also some advocates who do use illegal methods of defense.
Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 69-70; Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 36-37.
106 Chetunova, supra note 83, at 18; Sukharev, supra note 104, at 18. In
the case described by Sukharev, the appellate court reversed the lower
court's decision, but did not repeal the special ruling. Several advocates
have urged that appellate tribunals repeal unfounded special rulings to
clear the advocate's name. Stetsovskii, 0 protsessual'noi samostoiatel'nosti
advokata-zashchitnika (On the Procedural Independence of an Advocate-
Defense Counsel), [1966] 16 Sov. IUST. 12; Sukharev, supra note 104, at 18.
107 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 40, [1962] 15-16 Sov. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.).
10s Id. art. 41.
109 Id. art. 42.
110 Id.
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istrative authorities would be powerless to appeal the decision,
but if they considered an advocate's errors sufficiently grave,
they could expel him from the college under article 13 of the 1962
Statute on the Advokatura of the R.S.F.S.R."n
B. The "Great Debate" on the Role of Defense Counsel in
Criminal Proceedings
The college of advocates therefore does provide a certain measure
of institutional and professional support in assisting its members to
resist state interference in the performance of their duties.
Nevertheless, the advocate who vigorously champions the interests
of his client in confrontations with the state accepts a substantial
risk-particularly when the case has political overtones. It is per-
haps for this reason that Soviet lawyers have heatedly debated
the nature of their duty to defend the accused in criminal pro-
ceedings. The phrases "flung back and forth" have changed over
the decades, but the opposing camps have remained essentially
the same: those who emphasize the advocate's duty to the state
versus those who stress his duty to the client. The changes in
the language of the debate have not been insignificant, however,
for with each alteration in phraseology, the debaters have moved
a little closer to regarding the advocate as an active opponent
of the prosecution in adversary proceedings conducted before a
neutral magistrate.
1. "AIDE TO THE COURT" VS. "REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CLIENT"
When the debate opened in the 1940's, Chel'tsov maintained
that defense counsel's primary duty is to serve as an "aide to
the court.11 2 In the Soviet Union, it is the function of the court
in criminal proceedings "to secure the correct application of the
law, so that every person who commits a crime shall be subjected
to a just punishment, and not a single innocent person shall be
criminally prosecuted or convicted."113 Chel'tsov considered it
counsel's duty to assist the court in attaining this goal by pre-
senting all the facts which tend to prove the accused's innocence
or mitigate his guilt. His focus, however, was not upon counsel's
conduct of a vigorous defense, but upon the ascertainment of the
objective truth. He believed that counsel has a duty to reveal
the facts of the case to the court even if they are detrimental to
his client's position.114
111 Id. art. 13. Only the advocate can appeal a decision of the presidium.
Id. art. 42.
112 M. CHEL'Tsov, ADVOCAT V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE (Advocate
in the Soviet Criminal Process) 53 (1954); R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at
60.
113 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 2; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 2.
114 M. CHEL'TSOV, supra note 112, at 17, 63; M. CHEL'TSOV, supra note 30,
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Strogovich conceded that an advocate serves as an aide to the
court, but denied that this is his primary function. Rather, he
regarded the advocate as a "representative of his client" whose
foremost responsibility is to defend the legal interests of the
accused. 115 To support his theory, he stressed the fact that an ad-
vocate is selected, paid, and dismissed by his client-not by the
court. 116
The hypothetical situation used to illustrate the fundamental
differences between the two schools of thought was that of an
advocate who believes his client guilty despite the latter's plea of
innocence. This particular situation was used because it hypothe-
sizes an advocate faced with a difficult decision: Should he argue
for the accused's acquittal against the dictates of his conscience, or
should he drop the defense of his client or admit his client's
guilt and simply plead mitigating circumstances? (The latter
alternative is available in the Soviet Union because the trial con-
tinues despite a plea of guilty; counsel may argue for an acquittal
in such a situation, or merely plead mitigating circumstances in
an effort to reduce the sentence.) The proponents of the advocate
as an "aide to the court" maintained that counsel could withdraw
from the defense of the accused under the hypothetical situation,
for to argue in favor of the client's acquittal would only obstruct
the court in its search for objective truth. If the advocate con-
tinued as defense counsel, he could admit his client's guilt and
plead mitigating circumstances, provided he found them present
in his client's case." 7
Strogovich objected vehemently to the contention that counsel
could drop the defense of the accused. It was one thing for a
at 104. Chel'tsov's views have been summarized in Bilinsky, supra note 31,
at 67-68; Kucherov, supra note 31, at 466.
Vyshinsky was also a proponent of the theory that counsel is an "aide
to the court." Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 65, 67.
L11 Strogovich, Protsessual'noe polozhenie zashchitnika v sovetskom
ugolovnorn protsesse (Procedural Position of Defense Counsel in Soviet
Criminal Proceedings), in ZASCHCHITA PO UGOLOVNYM DELAM (The Defense
in Criminal Cases) (1948).
116 Strogovich, Protsessualnoe polozhenie zashchitnika v sovetskom
ugolovnom protsesse (Procedural Position of Defense Counsel in Soviet
Criminal Proceedings), [1959] 3 SoTs. ZAK. 25. Strogovich's views have
been summarized in N. POLIANSKII, OCHERK RAZVITIA SOVETSKOI NAUKI
UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA (Essay on the Development of Soviet Scholarship on
Criminal Procedure) 119 (1960); Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 67; Kucherov,
supra note 31, at 463.
117 M. CHEL'TSOV, supra note 112, at 64; Kucherov, supra note 31, at 461-
62. Chel'tsov was forced to abandon his theory following the passage of
the 1958 Principles of Criminal Procedure. In 1962, he wrote that an ad-
vocate may neither withdraw from the defense of an accused nor announce
to the court that he is in complete agreement with the accusation and that
he has no arguments in favor of the accused. M. CHEL'TSOV, supra note 30,
at 103. He still maintains that counsel's duty to the state takes precedence
over his duty to his client, however. Id.
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procurator to drop the charges against a person he considered
innocent; it was quite another for an advocate to abandon the
defense of a person charged with committing a crime, even though
his client might not be innocent. Counsel should continue to
represent a man regardless of the weight of the evidence against
him."8  He should also actively defend the "legal interests"
of the accused." 9 Strogovich thus advocated a more vigorous role
for defense counsel in Soviet criminal proceedings. But since he
defined the defendant's "legal interests" as the right to be ac-
quitted when he was innocent and to receive a just sentence when
he was guilty, Strogovich differed from Chel'tsov primarily in that
he felt the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt.120
If counsel were uncertain of his client's guilt, he should argue for
his acquittal; if he were convinced of :his client's guilt, he should
make no reference to facts detrimental to his client's position.
Instead, he should make a persuasive plea for a reduced sentence
based on mitigating circumstances, which Strogovich believed were
present in any criminal case.' 2'
2. COUNSEL AS A PROCEDURALLY INDEPENDENT FIGURE VS. COUNSEL AS A
FIGURE PROCEDURALLY ALLIED WITH HIS CLIENT
Following Stalin's death, a renewed emphasis was placed on so-
cialist legality in an effort to prevent a return to Stalinist terror. 22
Chel'tsov's theory was denounced because it required an advocate to
prejudge his client's guilt. If he found his client at fault, he was
to become a "second accuser," admitting his client's guilt and limit-
ing his defense to a discussion of mitigating circumstances. 23
Strogovich's conception of the advocate as a "representative of his
client" was also criticized on the grounds that defense counsel
does not appear in court "in place of" his client, as in civil pro-
ceedings. Rather, he serves as an assistant to the accused, who
must be present during the trial and who is entitled to take an
active part in the proceedings. 2 4
118 Strogovich, supra note 115, at 35-36.
119 Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 68.
120 R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 212; Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 68.
121 Kucherov, supra note 31, at 463.
122 Berman, supra note 66, at 314.
123 Sinaiskii, Osnovnye voprosy zashchity v ugolovnom protsesse (Fun-
damental Problems of Defense in Criminal Proceedings), [1961] 5 S.G. i P.
70, 72; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, Rol' i zadachi advokatury v sviazi s
dal'neishei demo kratizatsiei sovetskogo ugolovnogo protsessa (The Role and
Duties of the Advokatura in Connection with the Further Democratization
of Soviet Criminal Proceedings), in NOVOE SOVETSKOE ZAKONODATEL'STVO I
ADVOKATURA (New Soviet Legislation and the Advokatura) 22 (1960).
124 B. GALKIN, supra note 14, at 200; R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at
214-16; A. TsYPKIN, SUDEBNOE RAZBIRATEL'STVO V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM
PROTSESSE (The Judicial Examination in Soviet Criminal Proceedings) 28-
29 (1962); Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarshenets, supra note 123, at 22; Ul'ianova,
Protsessual'noe polozhenie advokata v sovetskom ugolovnom protsesse
[VOL. 1968:806
HeinOnline  -- 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 826 1968
SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
It might have been thought that the passage of the Principles
of Criminal Procedure in 1958 would end the debate over the role
of defense counsel in Soviet criminal proceedings. Article 23 pro-
vides that "an advocate shall not have the right to withdraw from
the defense of an accused after he has accepted it.' 25 It also states
that "defense counsel shall be obliged to make use of all means
and methods of defense indicated in the law for the purpose of
explaining the circumstances tending to acquit the accused or to
mitigate his responsibility, and to render the accused necessary
legal aid. 1 2  Nevertheless, the debate continued, the focus being
upon the proper interpretation of article 23.
Having rejected the theories that counsel is an "aide to the
court" or a "representative of his client," a new school of thought
headed by Ul'ianova, a Soviet advocate, proposed that counsel is a
procedurally independent figure-independent of the court and
prosecution, on the one hand, and of the accused, on the other. 12 7
While counsel can participate in a case only with the consent of
his client, he is not a "servant or slave to the accused"' 2s -not a
"machine for the defense programmed by the defendant.' 1 29 He
is the subject of independent procedural rights,'3 0 and is therefore
free to select his own methods of defense. He must take his cli-
ent's requests into consideration, but he is not bound by them; 13' he
is subordinate only to the law and to his own conscience. 13 2 Were
it otherwise, he would not be able to fulfill his dual responsibility
of defending his client and assisting the court in the administration
(The Procedural Position of an Advocate in Soviet Criminal Proceedings),
[1958] 9 SOTS. ZAK. 36.
125 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 23.
126 Id. In 1962, Perlov thought that the passage of the R.S.F.S.R. Stat-
ute on the Advokatura would "put an end to the argument as to whether
the lawyer is merely the representative of his client and whether, in de-
fending his client, he is required to assist the court in the proper solution
of the case." Perlov, Problems of Further Development of Democratic
Principles of Criminal Procedure in the Light of the Program of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, [1962] 4 S.G. I P. 86, transl. in 1 Soy.
L. & GOV'T No. 2, at 48, 58 (1962).
127 Ul'ianova, 0 protsessual'nom polozhenii advokata i ego pozitsii po
delu (On the Procedural Status of the Advocate and his Position in a Case),
[1966] 3 SOTS. ZAK. 60. The writers of the R.S.F.S.R. Commentary adopted
Ul'ianova's theory in explicating article 51 of the 1960 R.S.F.S.R. Code of
Criminal Procedure, which is essentially the same as article 23 of the Prin-
ciples of Criminal Procedure. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 126.
128 Natanzon, 0 printsipakh ugolovnoi zashchity (On the Principles of
Criminal Defense), [1958] 5 SOTS. ZAK. 53-54; Ul'ianova, supra note 124,
at 36, 39.
129 Tsubin, Ob effektivnosti sudebnoi zashchity (On the Effectiveness of
Legal Defense), [1966] 7 SOTS. ZAK. 65, 67.
130 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 23; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 51.
131 Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 123, at 23-24; Ul'ianova,
supra note 124, at 36.
132 Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 123, at 24.
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of justice.133
In developing her theory, Ul'ianova might have placed primary
emphasis upon counsel's independence from the prosecution and
upon the value of adversary proceedings in helping the court to
ascertain the objective truth.134  Instead, she stressed the im-
portance of counsel's independence from the client. This is illus-
trated by her views concerning counsel's duty to use "all means
and methods of defense indicated in the law." She interpreted
article 23 as meaning that an advocate has no right to employ ille-
gal defense methods, nor does he have a right to use legal methods
in defense of the client's illegal interests. 13 5 Since Ul'ianova de-
fined "illegal interests" as an accused's desire to escape the just
measure of punishment for committing a crime, she had actually
reverted to Chel'tsov's earlier theory that counsel must prejudge
his client's guilt before selecting an appropriate method of defense,
and that he may seek an acquittal only if he is convinced of his
client's innocence. 13  Ul'ianova did differ with Chel'tsov on one
point. If an advocate should find his client at fault, Ul'ianova did
not recommended that he only admit his client's guilt or with-
draw from the defense of the accused. Instead, she suggested
that counsel remain silent on the issue of guilt and confine his
remarks to a discussion of the mitigating circumstances. 1 3  A few
133 Id. at 27; Ul'ianova, supra note 127, at 60.
334 Indeed, this was one of the original tenets of Ul'ianova's theory, but
it was soon overshadowed by the undue emphasis placed upon counsel's
independence from his client. Ul'ianova, supra note 124, at 38. Recently,
Matvienko has made an effort to restore the original emphasis on counsel's
procedural independence from the prosecution. E. MATVIENKO, SUDEBNAIA
RECH' (Forensic Speech) 21-24 (1967).
135 Ul'ianova, supra note 124, at 38-39.
136 Ul'ianova, supra note 127, at 61; Ul'ianova, supra note 124, at 39.
It was implicit in Ul'ianova's theory that counsel has the right "to
evaluate the evidence in accordance with his inner conviction." Although
article 17 of the Principles of Criminal Procedure grants this right only to
the court, procurator, and investigator (persons charged with the respon-
sibility of deciding whether to terminate the case), several of Ul'ianova's
followers maintained that counsel would have nothing to say to the court
if he did not evaluate the evidence and determine his position regard-
ing his client's guilt prior to the trial. Alekseev, Osnovy ugolovnogo
sudoproizvodstva Soiuza SSR i soiuznykh respublikh i dal'neishee razvitie
ugolovno-protsessual'nogo zakonodatel'stva (The Principles of Criminal
Procedure of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics and the Further Devel-
opment of Criminal Procedure Legislation), [1959] 2 PRAVOVEDENIE 95;
Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 123, at 25-26.
137 Ul'ianova, supra note 127, at 60; Ul'ianova, supra note 124, at 37;
accord, T. NEISHTADT, SOVETSKrI ADVOKAT (The Soviet Advocate) 19 (1958);
Grekov, Pozitsiia advokata v protsesse dolzhna byt' osnovana na zakona
(The Position of the Advocate in Legal Proceedings Should Be Founded
in Law), [1965] 10 SOTS. ZAK. 55-56; Nanikishvili, Pozitsiia advokata v
ugolovnom protsesse (The Position of the Advocate in Criminal Proceed-
ings), [1965] 6 SOTS. ZAK. 35; Natanzon, supra note 128, at 53; Vydria,
Obespechenie podsudimomu prava na zashchitu po novomu UPK RSFSR
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of Ul'ianova's followers, on the other hand, did adhere to Chel'tsov's
theory. They asserted that if an advocate becomes absolutely
convinced of his client's guilt after making every effort to dis-
credit the prosecution's case, he may acknowledge his inability
to refute the accusation in his closing speech.1 3 8
A similar rift arose between Ul'ianova and her followers con-
cerning counsel's right to withdraw from the defense of an accused.
They agreed that counsel may obtain a substitute when he is un-
able to continue in the service of his client due to circumstances
beyond his control, such as illness.1 39 But Ul'ianova denied coun-
sel's right to withdraw from the defense of his client under any
other circumstances,'1 40 whereas a few of her followers main-
tained that prior to the trial, a truly independent lawyer should
be able to drop the defense of a "guilty client who insists upon
his innocence.' 4' Nanikishvili, another advocate, assumed the
most extreme position, arguing that if the evidence gathered prior
to trial proves the accused's guilt, the accused confesses, counsel
agrees to defend him, and the accused then unexpectedly denies
his guilt during the trial, counsel has the right to inform the court
of his withdrawal from the case.' 42
Because Ul'ianova's theory could be carried to such extremes, a
number of Soviet jurists, including Sinaiskii and Stetsovskii, sought
to denounce her conception of the advocate as a procedurally inde-
pendent figure. They noted that all too often a "procedurally
independent" advocate would acknowledge his client's guilt only to
have the court of first instance or the appellate tribunal find his
client innocent. 143 They did not take issue with Ul'ianova's con-
tention that defense counsel is independent of the prosecution,
nor did they dispute her view that the advocate who endeavors
to assist the court often unwittingly turns into a second accuser. 144
They agreed that counsel has a dual responsibility to defend the
accused and to assist in the administration of justice, but felt that
if counsel directed his efforts toward skillfully representing his
client, he would automatically promote the administration of jus-
tice by assisting the court to ascertain the objective truth.145  In
(Guaranteeing to the Defendant the Right to Defense under the New Code
of Criminal Procedure of the R.S.F.S.R.), [1961] 4 Soy. IUST. 16-17.
138 Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 123, at 25-26.
139 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 128; Vydria, supra note 137, at 17.
140 Ul'ianova, supra note 127, at 60; accord, T. NEISHTADT, supra note 137,
at 18-19; Alekseev, supra note 136, at 101; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets,
supra note 123, at 27.
141 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RosSEL'S, ZASHCHITNIK V SOVETSKOM SUDE
(Defense Counsel in the Soviet Court) 103-04 (1960).
142 Nanikishvili, supra note 137, at 36-37.
143 Sinaiskii, Advokat dolzhen zashchishchat' (An Advocate Must De-
fend), [1966] 11 SOTS. ZAK. 64, 65; Stetsovskii, supra note 106, at 13-14.
144 Sinaiskii, supra note 143, at 64; Sinaiskii, supra note 123, at 70-71.
145 Sinaiskii, supra note 123, at 70-71, 74; Sukharev, supra note 104, at
17.
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denunciation of Ul'ianova's theory, they argued that counsel cannot
possibly be regarded as fully independent because he participates
in the case only with the consent of the accused and may not
withdraw from the case once he has accepted the defense.14 6 Em-
phasis should therefore be placed not upon counsel's "indepen-
dence" from his client, but upon the "solidarity" of the bond be-
tween the advocate and the accused. 1
47
Sinaiskii and Stetsovskii objected to the view that an advocate
has the right to drop the defense of a client who refuses to admit
his guilt because it (1) contradicts the plain language of article 23
of the Principles of Criminal Procedure,148 and (2) violates the
accused's constitutional right to defense by conditioning his right
to retain an advocate upon his willingness to confess his guilt.149
They noted that counsel can never be certain of his client's guilt
until the court has rendered its final judgment. 150 This led them
to conclude that it is far better for counsel to risk defending the
guilty than to leave the innocent defenseless.' 5 '
Sinaiskii's and Stetsovskii's second criticism was directed against
Ul'ianova's statement that counsel can defend only the "legal in-
terests" of the accused. They argued that article 23 does not re-
strict an advocate's activities to the defense of his client's "legal
interests," as defined by Ul'ianova; it obligates counsel to employ
all legal means and methods to obtain the acquittal of an accused
or the mitigation of his sentence. 5 2 It does not entitle counsel to
prejudge his client's guilt, nor does it sanction counsel's public
acknowledgment of his client's criminal responsibility. 15 3 It there-
fore limits counsel's activities only in that it prohibits him from
using illegal defense methods, such as introducing false documents
146 Sinaiskii, supra note 143, at 65; Stetsovskii, supra note 106, at 12.
147 Sinaiskii, supra note 123, at 72; Tsubin, supra note 129, at 67.
148 "An advocate shall not have the right to withdraw from the defense
of an accused after he has accepted it." U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE art. 23. The R.S.F.S.R. Commentary indicates that Sinaiskii
and Stetsovskii correctly interpreted the above provision. R.S.F.S.R. KOM-
MENTARII 128.
149 Sinaiskii, supra note 143, at 65; Stetsovskii, supra note 106, at 13-14;
Stetsovskii, Otkaz advokata ot zashchity obviniamogo (Withdrawal of an
Advocate from the Defense of an Accused), [1967] 7 SOTS. ZAK. 59-60.
150 Stetsovskii, supra note 106, at 12.
151 Zaitsev, Voprosy morali v zashchite po ugolovnym delam (Ethical
Problems in Defending Criminal Cases), [1963] 22 Soy. IUST. 13, 14.
152 "Defense counsel shall be obliged to make use of all means and
methods of defense indicated in the law for the purpose of explaining the
circumstances tending to acquit the accused or to mitigate his responsibil-
ity, and to render the accused necessary legal aid." U.S.S.R. 1958 PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 23.
153 Sinaiskii, supra note 143, at 65; Sinaiskii, supra note 123, at 75.
Sinaiskii and Stetsovskii denied counsel's right to evaluate the evidence in
accordance with his inner conviction. Sinaiskii, supra note 143, at 65;
Sinaiskii, supra note 123, at 72; Stetsovskii, supra note 106, at 12-13; see
note 136 supra.
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or perjured testimony, lying, or distorting or juggling the facts of
the case.15 4  At the same time, it imposes a positive obligation
upon counsel to argue for his client's acquittal. 15 5 He should at-
tempt to refute the accusation by demonstrating that his client did
not participate in the commission of the crime or by attacking the
weak points in the prosecution's case to disprove the sufficiency
of the evidence.156 If his client's guilt has been convincingly es-
tablished during the trial, counsel need not argue for an acquittal
in his closing speech. But if his client still maintains that he is
innocent, counsel ought not to express a contrary opinion. 57 In-
stead, he should ask the court to consider the accused's testimony
in determining the issue of guilt, and if the court decides to con-
vict, request that it consider reducing the charges or mitigating the
sentence for reasons set forth by counsel in his closing speech.1
5 8
To support their interpretation of counsel's duty to defend, Sin-
aiskii and Stetsovskii cited article 47 of the 1960 R.S.F.S.R. Code of
Criminal Procedure, which states that "the same person may not
be defense counsel for two accused persons if the interests of one
of them conflict with the interests of the other." They argued
that article 47 would not be necessary if counsel were expected to
determine which of the two accused persons was guilty and then
advise the court of his decision. 59 The inclusion of article 47 in
the Code was rather premised upon the belief that counsel may
never take any action harmful to the position of his client-he
may never become a second accuser.160
Zaitsev, an adherent to Sinaiskii's theory, suggested that the
attorney-client privilege provides another justification for coun-
sel's remaining silent on the issue of guilt during the trial. Ac-
cording to article 33 of the 1962 Statute on the Advokatura of the
R.S.F.S.R., an advocate is not to divulge information communi-
cated to him by his client, nor is he to be interrogated as a witness
154 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RoSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 14; Sinaiskii,
supra note 123, at 72, 75. Intentionally prolonging, delaying, or interrupt-
ing the proceedings have also been termed illegal methods of defense.
R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 125; Sukharev, Pressing Problems, supra note 99,
at 41-42.
155 Sinaiskii, supra note 123, at 74.
156 Chaikovskaia, The Lawyers, Izvestia, March 22, 1963, transl. in 15
C.D.S.P. No. 12, at 28 (1963); Sinaiskii, supra note 143, at 65.
157 Sinaiskii, supra note 143, at 65.
158 Chaikovskaia, supra note 156, at 28; Sinaiskii, supra note 123, at 76;
Zaitsev, supra note 151, at 14.
159 Sinaiskii, supra note 123, at 74. Failure to provide more than one
advocate for two or more defendants with conflicting interests constitutes
grounds for a new trial. Chelondaev, Komakov & Aleshkov, [1967] 3 Bull.
Verkh. Suda R.S.F.S.R. 5 (Crim. Div. Sup. Ct. R.S.F.S.R. 1966).
160 T. NEISHTADT, supra note 137, at 20. An advocate must also defend
his client's interests without turing into a second accuser of the other de-
fendant. Nikiforov, Zashchita pri protivorechivykh interesakh podsudimykh
(Defense when Defendants have Conflicting Interests), [1964] 4 Soy. IUST.
13.
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concerning the circumstances of the case which became known to
him in connection with the fulfillment of his obligations as de-
fense counsel. 161 The provision does not literally prohibit counsel
from reporting otherwise than as a witness information which
was not communicated to him by his client.162 However, it does
explicitly prohibit an advocate from divulging the contents of a
confession which his client made to him in private. Zaitsev there-
fore felt that the attorney-client privilege, coupled with counsel's
obligation to defend the accused, justified his remaining silent
when the accused denied his guilt, even if counsel were aware of
facts tending to prove that his client had committed the crime.' 6'
C. Recent Trends: Counsel as an Adversary of the Prosecution
The debate continues, and the role of defense counsel has still
not been clearly defined. At best, one can point to the develop-
ment of two complementary trends: (1) the Soviet bar is be-
coming increasingly independent of the judiciary and procuracy,
as evidenced by the recent reforms in the statutes governing the
advokatura; and (2) the individual advocate is becoming more
closely associated with the procedural position of his client. In
fact, several jurists, including Strogovich and Sinaiskii, like to
refer to the "one-sided" or adversary character of counsel's role
in Soviet criminal proceedings. 1 4  Strogovich, in particular, has
endeavored to establish the concept of Soviet criminal proceed-
ings as adversary proceedings in which
the prosecutor upholds the indictment in court, the defend-
ant defends himself, the defense attorney defends him, and
the court makes an active and comprehensive examination
of the facts of the case, hears and takes into consideration
161 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 33, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.).
For a history of the attorney-client privilege see Kucherov, supra note
31, at 466.
For a history of article 33, see Friedman & Zile, supra note 27, at 63;
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 125-26.
162 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 126.
163 Zaitsev, supra note 151, at 15.
164 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RossEL's, supra note 141, at 15-16; E.
MATVIENKO, supra note 134, at 21; Bekeshko, Zashchita kak protsessual'naia
funktsiia v sovetskom ugolovnom protsesse (Defense as a Procedural Func-
tion in Soviet Criminal Proceedings), in VoPRosY UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA I
PROTSESSA (Problems of Criminal Law and Procedure) 243 (1958); Chet-
unova, supra note 83, at 18; Perlov, Alphabet of the Law, Izvestia, Jan. 12,
1967, at 4, transl. in 19 C.D.S.P. No. 2, at 32 (1967); Sinaiskii, supra note
143, at 65; Strogovich, Adversary Proceedings and Trial Functions in Soviet
Criminal Procedure, [1962] 2 PRAVOVEDENIE 1.06, transl. in 1 Sov. L. & GOV'T
No. 3, at 11, 12-13 (1962-63); Tsubin, supra note 129, at 67.
The Commentary, which adopts Ul'ianova's theory that counsel is
procedurally independent, concludes by stating that "the position of de-
fense counsel is characterized by the one-sided nature of his activities."
R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 126.
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the arguments offered by the parties, does not take sides
and does not confine itself to the data presented before it,
but employs all means to find the truth.165
1. POLITICAL TRIALS
Persons familiar with the recent political trials in the Soviet
Union might question the validity of characterizing Soviet crimi-
nal proceedings as adversary proceedings. At the Powers trial,
for example, the Soviet Union had an opportunity to demonstrate
to the Western world that the 1958 Principles of Criminal Proced-
ure effectively safeguard the rights of the accused. 16 6 Even so,
it has been suggested by Grzybowski, an American commentator,
that Power's counsel could have conducted a more vigorous de-
fense. 6 7 Likewise, according to the transcript available in the
West, the advocates for Siniavsky and Daniel (two Soviet writers
charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda 68 ) spoke hardly
a word throughout the entire trial. 69 It is possible that they
were taken by surprise when Siniavsky and Daniel, who had ad-
mitted their guilt during the preliminary examination, denied their
guilt during the trial. 70 For whatever reason, no witnesses were
165 Strogovich, supra note 164, at 12, 15-16.
166 Grzybowski, The Powers Trial and the 1958 Reform of Soviet Crim-
inal Law, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 425-26 (1960); Razi, supra note 31, at 804 n.98.
The Stalin regime had severely curtailed or abolished the procedural
rights (including the right to counsel) of persons charged with serious
counterrevolutionary crimes. Decree of Nov. 5, 1934, On the Special Board
under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, [1935] 11 S.Z. S.S.S.R.
Item 84; R.S.F.S.R. 1923 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 466-73 (Amendments based on
U.S.S.R. Laws of Dec. 1, 1934, and Sept. 14, 1937; repealed 1956); SOVIET
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 70-71.
"[O]nly a small number of attorneys were authorized to act as defense
counsels in political trials [under Stalin] .... When they did appear in
political trials, moreover, they were expected to give evidence of their
loyalty to the Bolshevik regime, often with the result that, instead of de-
fending the accused, they joined the prosecution in heaping accusations on
him." Bilinsky, supra note 31, at 66.
167 Grzybowski, supra note 166, at 427-31, 440.
168 "Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting
or weakening Soviet authority or of committing particular, especially dan-
gerous crimes against the state . . . or circulating or preparing or keeping,
for the same purpose, literature of such content, shall be punished by dep-
rivation of freedom for a term of six months to seven years .
R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRiM. C. art. 70.
169 ON TRIAL 27 (M. Hayward transl. 1966); Brumberg, Writers in
Prison, 15 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 65, 72, 75 (March-April 1966).
The trial opened on February 10, 1966, and lasted four days. ON TRIAL,
supra at 26.
170 ON TRIAL, supra note 169, at 28; Feofanov, Here the Law Reigns,
Izvestia, Feb. 11, 1966, at 4, transl. in 18 C.D.S.P. No. 6, at 3-4 (1966).
"[I]t was significant that for the first time political defendants were
not forced to plead guilty." Raymont, U.S. Experts See Rights Gain at
Soviet Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1966, § 1, at 9, col. 1. (quoting Harold J.
Berman).
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called by the defense and the advocates apparently reserved all of
their comments for the closing speeches, of which we have no
record. 171 Siniavsky and Daniel were thus left to conduct their
own defense. 172 Both men were convicted; Siniavsky was sentenced
to seven years of forced labor and Daniel to five. 173
Iosif Brodsky, a young Russian poet charged with violating the
anti-parasite laws, was somewhat more fortunate. His counsel,
Mme. Toporova, made a very concerted effort to obtain her client's
acquittal, despite the fact that the case had political overtones. 1 74
Advocate Toporova first requested a medical examination to deter-
mine whether Brodsky's health kept him from regular work.1 75
When the psychiatrist's report indicated that psychopathic traits
existed in Brodsky's character but that he was capable of regular
work, Toporova proved not only the quantity, but also the quality
of Brodsky's poetry and translations, and insisted that he was
neither living off unearned income nor leading an idle and para-
sitic way of life. In her closing speech, she dwelt upon the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence and charged that the procurator had re-
sorted to the use of impermissible methods in attempting to obtain
a conviction. 176 Despite counsel's efforts, Brodsky was sentenced
to five years of hard labor in 1964, but it was reported in 1966
171 ON TRIAL, supra note 169, at 2, 27; Feofanov, The Logic of a Fall,
Izvestia, Feb. 16, 1966, at 4, transl. in 18 C.D.S.P. No. 6, at 6 (1966).
172 To obtain a conviction under article 70 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal
Code, the prosecution had to show that the defendants intended to subvert
and weaken the Soviet system. ON TRIAL, supra note 169, at 22-23; The
Writer and Soviet Law, THE NEW LEADER, Feb. 14, 1968, at 13, 15. Siniavsky
and Daniel concentrated upon disproving intent. The transcript of the
trial has been translated in ON TRIAL, supra note 169. In Berman's opinion,
they were successful; he believes that the use of the statute against the
writers indicates the great concern of the Soviet authorities in maintaining
ideological unity. Raymont, supra note 170.
173 It has been suggested that the two writers received such severe sen-
tences because they refused to enter pleas of guilty. ON TRIAL, supra note
169, at 29; Raymont, supra note 170.
174 The anti-parasite law provides that persons "who avoid socially use-
ful work [or] derive nonlabor income from the exploitation of land plots,
automobiles, or housing" are subject to deportation from two to five years
if they fail to heed an initial warning concerning their parasitic way of life.
Edict of May 4, 1961, art. 1, [1961] 10 Soy. IUST. 25 (Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R.). Since the law is "principally a device
for getting rid of vagrants and putting them to work," its application to
a poet suggests that ideological considerations were of the utmost impor-
tance to the prosecution. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 85 (1963).
Brodsky was fortunate in being permitted the right to counsel. Since
the statute's sanctions are considered "administrative measures," the vio-
lator's trial is not governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right
to counsel is only granted subject to the court's discretion. Id. at 295.175 The Trial of Iosif Brodsky, THE NEW LEADER, Aug. 31, 1964, at 6-7.
176 Id. at 7-17. The account of counsel's closing speech is not verbatim
because the reporter was discovered just prior to the oral arguments and
ordered by the judge to cease writing. Id. at 15.
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that he was at liberty in his home city of Leningrad.177
The recent arrests of literally hundreds of Soviet intellectuals
on charges ranging from the distribution of anti-Soviet propa-
ganda to armed conspiracy have again raised the question of the
effectiveness of defense counsel in political cases.'7  Reports on
the trials in Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine indicate that
the accused persons have been granted the right to counsel, but it
is impossible to assess the skill and vigor with which they have
been defended because the trials have been closed to the public
or open only to a select audience. 1'7 9 Many of the defendants have
entered pleas of not guilty, but all have received heavy sen-
tences. 80 This may be an indication that the defendants have been
more willing than their advocates to oppose the constituted author-
ity of the Soviet regime. On the other hand, it may simply indicate
that the adversary process operates in form, but not in substance
during the trials of political dissidents; the formalities of the rules
governing criminal procedure are observed, counsel presents a vig-
orous defense, but the court's judgment is actually determined
prior to the trial. That the latter speculation is more accurate
is suggested by the fact that advocates for the four intellectuals
tried in Moscow were showered with roses by the waiting crowd as
they emerged from the courtroom.' 8 ' In either case, however, the
accused's right to defense is severely restricted, and it would seem
that the post-Stalin procedural reforms have not appreciably im-
proved the position of Soviet citizens charged with the commission
of political crimes.
177 Grose, Soviet Editor Appeals to Writers to Withstand Political
Crimes, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1966, § 1, at 10, col. 4; The Trial of Iosif
Brodsky, supra note 175, at 17.
"Soviet jurists have privately criticized the decision in the Brodsky
case from a legal point of view, since Brodsky was in fact working-that
is, in addition to writing his own (unpublished) poems he was translating
poetry for publication-and was not living on nonlabor income." The Writer
and Soviet Law, supra note 172, at 15.
178 Blake, This is the Winter of Moscow's Dissent, N.Y. Times, March
24, 1968, (Magazine), at 25; Kalb, The Soviet Trials, SATURDAY REV., Feb.
17, 1968, at 19.
In 1967, 150-300 persons were arrested in Leningrad and charged with
armed conspiracy. Since January 1966 more than 200 intellectuals have
been arrested and secretly tried in the Ukraine for distributing pamphlets
in defense of Ukrainian culture and of the use of the Ukrainian language
in the Ukrainian Republic. In September 1967 three young men were
tried for organizing a demonstration in Moscow against the arrest of some
literary figures a few days earlier. And in January 1968 four young intel-
lectuals were tried for circulating an underground magazine. Blake, supra
at 122, 124, 126; Kalb, supra at 21; Ukrainian Intellectuals Plead for Justice,
(1968) (Radio Liberty Research Paper No. 22).
179 Blake, supra note 178, at 124, 129; Ukrainian Intellectuals Plead for
Justice, supra note 178, at 11.
180 Blake, supra note 178, at 126, 129; Kalb, supra note 178, at 21.
181 Kalb, supra note 178, at 21.
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2. NONPOLITICAL TRIALS
On the other hand, the role of defense counsel in the Soviet
criminal process cannot be appraised solely upon the basis of the
political trials. Over 90 percent of the advokatura's case load con-
sists of nonpolitical cases, ranging from first-degree murder to
petty theft and hooliganism. 82 It is the functions performed by
the advocate during the preliminary investigation, trial and appeal
of these cases that most accurately describes the role of defense
counsel in Soviet criminal proceedings, although the biased atmos-
phere pervading the political trials may eventually erode the ad-
vocate's confidence and sense of professional responsibility during
the nonpolitical trials as well. The remainder of this comment will
therefore focus upon the activities performed by counsel during
the successive stages of the Soviet criminal process. The purpose
of each stage will be described, counsel's duties will be defined,
and the suggested reforms in the accused's right to counsel will
be evaluated. Throughout the discussion, one theme will be self-
evident: Soviet jurists have recently begun to appreciate the im-
portance of a vigorous defense; the current suggestions for new
reforms are all designed to enhance counsel's position as an ad-
versary in the trial of nonpolitical cases.
IV. INITIATION OF A CRIMINAL CASE AND THE CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY
A criminal case in the Soviet Union may be initiated by decree
of a procurator, investigator, agency of inquiry, or judge 8 8 when-
ever there exist "sufficient data indicating the indicia of a crime.1 8 4
Complaints may be brought by individuals, social organizations,
state enterprises, institutions, or officials. 85 Criminal proceedings
may also be initiated upon the basis of a confession or the direct
discovery of indicia of a crime by an agency of inquiry, investiga-
tor, procurator, or court. 86
A. Description of the Inquiry
Once a case has been initiated, it is the duty of an agency of
182 Scanlan, Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: "Star Chamber" or
Clinical Jurisprudence? 19 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 261, 268 (1947). Feifer gives
a first-hand account of several nonpolitical trials held in Moscow People's
Courts and City Courts in 1962. G. FEIFER, JUSTICE IN MOSCOW (1964).
183 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CraM. PRO. C. art. 112. The procurator must approve
the decree to initiate a criminal case rendered by an investigator or agency
of inquiry. Id. arts. 112, 116.
184 Id. art. 108. The Commentary indicates that both the character and
quality of the evidence must be considered when determining whether to
initiate a criminal case. There must be evidence of the commission of a
crime-there need not be a suspect. The evidence must provide an "objec-
tive basis" for believing that a crime has been committed. R.S.F.S.R.
KOMMENTARi 241.
185 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CraM. PRO. C. art. 108(1)-(3).
186 Id. art. 108(5)-(6). Cases initiated by the court or procurator are
referred for an inquiry or preliminary investigation. Id. art. 115.
[VOL. 1968:806
HeinOnline  -- 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 836 1968
SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
inquiry (normally the police) 8 7 to take measures to prevent or
suppress the crime, 88 and to conduct urgent investigative actions
to establish and preserve traces of the crime: view, search, seizure,
examination, detention and interrogation of suspects, and inter-
rogation of victims and witnesses.8 9 Normally, no measure of re-
straint (signed promise not to depart, personal surety, surety of
social organizations, confinement under guard' 90 ) is applied until
enough evidence has been gathered to support the presentation of
an accusation indicating the crime charged and the circum-
stances of its commission; i.e., no measure of restraint is applied
until the defendant becomes an "accused."'191 However, in two
circumstances a person may be held as a "suspect." First, when a
person suspected of committing a crime is caught in the act or
immediately thereafter; when eyewitnesses directly indicate the
given person as the one who has committed the crime; when obvi-
ous traces of the crime are discovered on the suspect or on his
clothing, either where he is or in his dwelling; and when the sus-
pect has attempted to escape, has no permanent place of residence,
or has not been identified, the person may be detained (confined
under guard) as a suspect for a maximum of 72 hours. 192 And
second, in "exceptional instances," a measure of restraint may be
applied against a person suspected of committing a crime for a
maximum of ten days prior to the presentation of an accusation.
1 98
B. Procedural Rights of the Suspect
A "suspect" has specific procedural rights of which he must be
187 In the R.S.F.S.R., agencies of inquiry include the police; commanders
of military units, heads of correctional labor institutions, and captains of
ocean-going vessels in cases of crimes committed by persons under their
supervision; and agencies of state security, state fire supervision, and
border protection in cases of violations of laws within their jurisdiction.
Id. art. 117.
188 Id. arts. 112, 118.
189 Id. art. 119. An investigator may also detain and interrogate a per-
son suspected of committing a crime. Id. art. 127.
190 Id. art. 89.
191 Id. art. 144.
192 Id. art. 122. Notice of the detention must be sent to the procurator
within 24 hours, and the procurator must sanction the confinement under
guard or free the person detained within 48 hours. Id. This provision is
necessitated by the constitutional guarantee that "no person shall be placed
under arrest except by decision of a court of law or with the sanction of
a procurator." U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 127.
193 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRuM. PRO. C. art. 90. The Commentary suggests that
the circumstances of the case and the personality of the accused must be
taken into consideration when determining whether to apply a measure of
restraint. For example, if an extended period of time were needed to ver-
ify the evidence gathered, and if there were reason to believe that during
that period the suspect might disappear or prevent the establishment of
the truth, a measure of restraint could be applied for a maximum of 10
days. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 215.
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informed by the agency of inquiry.9 4 Like an accused, he has the
right to challenge the interpreter and the person conducting the
inquiry," 5 present evidence, 19 6 give explanations, submit petitions,
and appeal from the actions and decisions of the person conducting
the inquiry, the investigator, or the procurator. 197  He may give
testimony concerning the circumstances which serve as the ground
for his detention or confinement under guard, and may also be
interrogated concerning other aspects of the case known to him.19 8
Unlike the accused, however, he has no right to counsel. 99
Interrogation of a suspect prior to the presentation of an ac-
cusation has been justified on the grounds that (1) it permits an
innocent person to clear his name before he is formally charged
with the commission of a crime,20 0 and (2) it enables law enforce-
ment agencies to obtain information essential to the apprehension
of criminals. 20 1 The justification is laudable, but in practice, agen-
cies of inquiry have tended to take advantage of a suspect by
questioning him as if he were an accused person without granting
him an accused's procedural rights. The most flagrant violations
occurred in the 1930's, when persons were detained as suspects
until the preliminary investigation had been completed and a
decision had been made to terminate the case or to draw up an
indictment. 20 2 A suspect was asked whether he considered himself
194 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 58, 123. The person conducting
the inquiry is also obligated to secure the possibility of the suspect's exer-
cising his procedural rights. Id.
195 Id. art. 64, 66. A challenge may be submitted if the interpreter or
person conducting the inquiry is (1) a participant in the case as a party,
witness, or legal representative; (2) a relative of a participant in the case;
or (3) otherwise personally interested in the case. Id. art. 59.
196 Id. art. 70.
197 Id. art. 52.
198 Id. art. 76. The interrogation of a suspect is narrower in scope than
the interrogation of an accused. A suspect is interrogated solely to enable
the agencies of inquiry to verify the evidence against him. More extensive
questioning must await the presentation of the accusation. Nevertheless,
a suspect's testimony can be submitted in evidence and may become the
basis for a court's judgment if it contradicts evidence subsequently given
by the same person at the preliminary examination or in court. Id. art. 69;
R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 179.
199 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 52, 120.
200 Schlesinger, The Discussion on Criminal Law and Procedure, 10
SOVIET STUDIES 293, 302 (1959).
Opponents of this theory maintain that no one should be questioned
until sufficient evidence has been gathered to support an accusation. Id.
201 B. GALKIN, SOVETSKII UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NYI ZAKON (Soviet
Criminal Procedure Law) 204-05 (1962); V. LUKASHEVICH, GARANTII PRAV
OBVINIAMOGO V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE (Guarantees of the Rights
of the Accused in Soviet Criminal Proceedings) 122 (1959).
202 B. GALKIN, supra note 201, at 221; V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 201,
at 120; Roshchin, Protsessual'noe polozhenie podozrevaemogo v sovetskom
ugolovnom protsesse (Procedural Position of the Suspect in Soviet Crim-
inal Proceedings), [1957] 9 S.G. I P. 69, 70. When this procedure was fol-
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guilty, how he had committed the crime, and who his accomplices
had been (questions normally asked of the accused), but he was
not informed of the charges against him, nor was he granted an
accused's right to refuse to testify or to give false testimony.20 3
Instead, he was treated as an ordinary witness and threatened
with criminal liability for perjury or for refusing to testify.20 4 In
1937, a circular by the General Procurator of the U.S.S.R. ordered a
halt to this practice, forbidding the questioning of suspects alto-
gether.2 0 5  Since the 1930's marked the nadir in the annals of
socialist legality, however, it is impossible to assess the extent to
which the mandate was actually implemented.
The drafters of the recent legislation on criminal procedure
sought to strike a compromise. Persons deemed "suspects" may
now be questioned, but the term is narrowly defined and a sus-
pect enjoys the procedural rights of an accused during the inter-
rogation. 20 6 Unfortunately, there are indications that the letter of
the law is not always complied with in practice. For example, the
law provides that a suspect must be informed of the crime he is
suspected of committing before the interrogation begins,20 7 but
the Commentary indicates that for tactical reasons, this informa-
tion may be withheld until the interrogation is well under way.20 8
Likewise, a suspect is not subject to criminal liability for know-
lowed, the suspect was presented with an accusation, interrogated as an
accused, and presented with the materials of the preliminary investigation
all in one day. Roshchin, supra at 70.
203 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 201, at 121; Roshchin, supra note 202, at
70.
204 B. GALKIN, supra note 201, at 220-21; V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 201,
at 114-17.
205 B. GALKIN, supra note 201, at 221; V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 201, at
121; Roshchin, supra note 202, at 71; Strogovich, 0 podozrevaemom (On
the Suspect), [1961] 2 SOTS. ZAK. 33, 37.
206 A suspect has no right to counsel during an interrogation, but nei-
ther does an accused unless he is a minor or incompetent to conduct his
own defense. See text accompanying notes 302-06, infra.
Prior to the adoption of the 1960 R.S.F.S.R. Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, it was suggested that "anyone suspected of committing a crime" be
deemed a suspect. Karneeva, Podozrevaemyi v sovetskom ugolovnom
protsesse (The Suspect in Soviet Criminal Proceedings), [1959] 4 SOTS.
ZAK. 35-36. Strogovich and Roshchin objected to this definition because
it was so broad that citizens could be questioned before any evidence had
been collected against them. Roshchin, supra note 202, at 75; Strogovich,
supra note 205, at 35. Strogovich's suggestion that the definition of a sus-
pect be limited to persons detained on suspicion of committing a crime or
to whom a measure of restraint had been applied prior to the presentation
of an accusation was adopted by the drafters of the Code. R.S.F.S.R. 1960
CRuM. PRO. C. art. 52; Strogovich, supra note 205, at 35-37.
207 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 123.
208 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARm 269. If a measure of restraint is applied,
the suspect will be informed of the charges against him prior to the inter-
rogation because the decree to apply the measure of restraint must be
announced to him and it indicates the crime which he is suspected of
committing.
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ingly giving false testimony 2 9 or for refusing to testify.210  But
nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure requires an agency of
inquiry to so inform a suspect, and the commentary indicates that
a person conducting an inquiry may "warn" the suspect that his
testimony will be "carefully verified, '211 thereby inducing him to
tell the truth.
The suspect's right to defense is certainly better protected under
the present Code of Criminal Procedure than it was in the 1930's.
Nevertheless, opportunities for abuse continue to exist, and as
long as a suspect is not permitted to have counsel inform him of
his procedural rights, it can be anticipated that agencies of inquiry
will be successful in obtaining coerced confessions and other infor-
mation which would not otherwise be readily available to them.
For this reason, it has been suggested by at least one Soviet
jurist that the right to counsel be extended to the interrogation
of suspects in serious criminal cases.212
C. Inquiry or Preliminary Investigation: Denial of the
Right to Counsel
Once an agency of inquiry has conducted urgent investigative
activities, including the interrogation of suspects, two courses of
action are open to it. In serious criminal cases, a preliminary
investigation is obligatory and the case must be transferred im-
mediately to an investigator. 213 Supplementary search and investi-
gative operations may be conducted by the agency of inquiry, but
only upon request of the investigator.2 14 In less serious cases, the
agency of inquiry retains jurisdiction over the case. It conducts
209 If a witness knowingly gives false testimony, he is subject to dep-
rivation of freedom for not more than one year. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CPlM. C.
art. 181.
210 If a witness refuses to testify, he may be punished by correctional
tasks for a term not exceeding six months, by a fine not exceeding 50
rubles, or by social censure. Id. art. 182.
211 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARI 269. On the other hand, it is a violation of
procedural law for an agency of inquiry to tell a suspect that he is crim-
inally responsible under articles 181-82 of the 1960 R.S.F.S.R. Criminal
Code. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 129.
212 Kovalev, Rasshirit' uchastie zashchitnika na predvaritel'nom sledstvii
(The Participation of Defense Counsel in the Preliminary Investigation
Should be Expanded), [1967] 23 Sov. IUST. 23.
213 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 119. A preliminary investigation
is also obligatory in cases involving minors or persons unable to conduct
their own defense. Id. art. 126. The case must be transferred to the inves-
tigator within 10 days. Id. art. 121.
For a discussion of the relationship between the inquiry and the pre-
liminary investigation see Shatilo, Sootnoshenie doznaniia i predvaritel'-
nogo sledstviia po novomu zakonodatel'stvu (Interrelationship of the
Inquiry and the Preliminary Investigation under the New Legislation),
[1961] 10 SOTS. ZAK. 34-36.
214 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 119.
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an inquiry, collecting the evidence which supports the conclusion
to indict and which subsequently constitutes the basis for consid-
ering the case in court. 215 The inquiry is generally governed by
the rules established for conducting a preliminary investigation.
There are two exceptions, however: (1) it must be conducted
within a shorter period of time,216 and (2) defense counsel is not
permitted to participate. 21 7
1. HISTORY OF THE DELIMITATION BETWEEN THE INQUIRY AND THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
The present delimitation between the inquiry and the preliminary
investigation was first made in prerevolutionary Russia, where an
inquiry constituted an "administrative" or "police" investiga-
tion.218 The rules of criminal procedure did not govern agencies of
inquiry, nor did the information obtained during an inquiry have
evidentiary value at the trial.2 19 A preliminary investigation, on
the other hand, was conducted in compliance with the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and the dossier compiled during the investiga-
tion did have probative value in court. 2 0  When the Bolsheviks
came to power, the two types of pretrial investigation were form-
ally retained, but the distinctions between them were largely elimi-
nated.2 21  Both proceedings are now governed by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and the data collected by agencies of inquiry
and by investigators have equal evidentiary weight.222
The retention of two distinct types of pretrial investigation has
been upheld on the theory that if "less serious crimes" requiring
the use of "less complex investigative techniques" are sent to agen-
215 Id. art. 120. An agency of inquiry may terminate the case or draw
up a conclusion to indict, depending upon the sufficiency of the evidence.
Id. art. 124.
216 An inquiry must be completed within one month unless special per-
mission is obtained from the procurator exercising supervision over the
case, in which case it may be extended one more month. Only in excep-
tional cases may the inquiry be prolonged indefinitely by the R.S.F.S.R.
Procurator, Chief Military Procurator, or U.S.S.R. Procurator General.
Id. art. 121. A preliminary investigation is to be completed within two
months, may be extended another two months, and may be prolonged
indefinitely only in exceptional circumstances. Id. art. 133.
217 Id. art. 120. There are two other exceptions, but neither affects the
defendant. Id.
218 N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, PREDVARITEL'NOE SLEDSTVIE V SOVETSKOM
UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE (Preliminary Investigation in Soviet Criminal Pro-
ceedings) 49 (1965); Grzybowskii, supra note 166, at 438-39; Perlov, supra
note 126, at 48. The prerevolutionary Russian delimitation between an
inquiry and a preliminary investigation was based upon the Continental
European pattern of pretrial proceedings.
219 Grzybowski, supra note 166, at 439; Perlov, supra note 126, at 48.
220 Grzybowski, supra note 166, at 439; Perlov, supra note 126, at 48.
221 N. ZHOcIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 49; Perlov, supra note
126, at 48.
222 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 120.
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cies of inquiry, persons conducting preliminary investigations will
be permitted to concentrate their energies on more difficult
cases.223 In 1962, however, Perlov voiced an objection to the "arti-
ficial demarcation" between the inquiry and preliminary investiga-
tion.224  He charged that the only difference between the two
proceedings was the name of the agency conducting the investiga-
tion, yet persons whose cases were handled by agencies of inquiry
were denied the right to counsel. 225 To eliminate this injustice and
to streamline the administration of pretrial proceedings, Perlov
suggested that all investigatory agencies be combined into a single
investigatory apparatus. If that were not immediately possible,
he proposed that the Code of Criminal Procedure be revised to
eliminate all remaining differences between the inquiry and the
preliminary investigation, thereby guaranteeing a suspect the
right to counsel during the inquiry.226
2. EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING THE
PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION
Neither of Perlov's suggestions was adopted, but in 1963 a step
was taken to extend the right to counsel to a greater number of
defendants during the investigatory phase of Soviet criminal pro-
ceedings. Investigators in the agencies of protection of public order
were empowered to conduct preliminary investigations227 and
were given jurisdiction over approximately 40 types of criminal
offenses for which they had previously conducted inquiries. 228
223 A. KOBLIKOV, PRAVO NA ZASHcHITU NA PREDVARITEL'NOM SLEDSTVfl
(Right to Defense at the Preliminary Investigation) 54 (1961); N. ZHOGIN
& F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 52, 56-57. It has also been suggested
that the operative-search measures undertaken by agencies of inquiry are
so different from the investigative techniques employed by investigators
that the two types of pretrial investigation should remain separated.
Strogovich, Kalenov & Gertsezon, The New Laws on the Judicial System,
the Criminal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation, [1961] 1 S.G. i P. 24, transl. in 1 Soy. L. & Gov'T No. 1, at 33,
41 (1962).
224 Perlov, supra note 126, at 50.
225 Id. at 48-49.
226 Id. at 50. Galkin approved Perlov's suggestion. B. GALKIN, supra
note 201, at 211.
227 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 125 (as amended by Edict of April
6, 1963). Prior to 1963, investigators of the agencies of protection of public
order only conducted inquiries. N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note
218, at 51.
228 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 126 (as amended by Edict of April
15, 1963). The decree reduced from 50% to 10-15% the number of cases
in which an inquiry is conducted. N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note
218, at 32. The reform was praised for permitting agencies of inquiry to
devote more time to their "police" functions by relieving them of their
investigatory duties. Id. at 52-53; Zhogin, Izmenenie zakona o podsledstven-
nosti i zadachi prokurorskogo nadzora za sledstviem i doznaniem (Change
in the Law on the Gathering and Scrutiny of Evidence and the Tasks of
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This increase in the number of cases in which a preliminary in-
vestigation was conducted automatically increased the number of
cases in which the accused was guaranteed the right to counsel.
In fact, counsel is now denied only in cases of relatively minor
criminal offenses, 229 and even then, a person charged with the
commission of such a crime may be given a preliminary investi-
gation upon order of a court or procurator.230
3. SUGGESTED REFORM: EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
TO THE INQUIRY
Despite the advances registered by the 1963 legislation, pressures
have continued to exist for a more comprehensive reform. It
has recently been suggested that a suspect be granted the same
right to counsel as that currently accorded an accused during the
preliminary investigation; i.e., the right to counsel upon completion
of the inquiry during the period that a suspect becomes familiar
with the materials of the case.281 Many cases handled by agencies
of inquiry are quite complex, and it is believed that counsel's
presence is essential to the realization of the suspect's right to
defense. In answer to objections that counsel's presence would in-
terfere with and prolong the conduct of an inquiry, it is asserted
that counsel would enter the case only after the inquiry had been
completed, and that counsel would probably not be requested unless
the case were so complex that the suspect would be unable to con-
duct his own defense.232
It is difficult to explain the failure thus far to adopt such a
reform, especially since it has been proven that counsel's presence
does not unduly obstruct the conduct of the preliminary investiga-
tion. Indeed, it would seem that an even more drastic reform
would be desirable: counsel should be permitted to enter the
case from the time that a suspect is informed of the charges
against him, rather than from the time that he is presented with
the materials of the inquiry. This would permit an advocate to
Procuratorial Supervision over the Investigation and Inquiry), [1963] 9
SOTS. ZAK. 3, 5.
229 The crimes subject to investigation by an agency of inquiry are de-
fined by the R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRiM. C. arts. 96 (para. 1), 97, 158, 162 (para.
1), 163, 168-69, 197-201, 206 (paras. 1 & 3), 209.
230 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 126; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 116.
231 Perlov, Nauka sovetskogo uolovnogo protsessa i sovershenstvovanie
zakonodatei'stva (Study of Soviet Criminal Proceedings and the Improve-
ment of Legislation), [1967] 11 SOTS. ZAK. 37, 42; Shafir, Pravo na zash-
chitu v sovetskom ugolovnom sudoproizvodstve i vozhmozhnosti ego ras-
shireniia (The Right to Defense in Soviet Criminal Proceedings and the
Possibilities for its Expansion), [1967] 2 S.G. i P. 47, 48.
232 Shafir, supra note 231, at 48; Shein, Zashchitnik na predvaritel'nom
sledstvii v sovetskom ugolovnom protsesse (Defense Counsel at the Pre-
liminary Investigation in Soviet Criminal Proceedings), [1962] 6 S.G. i P.
118, 120.
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advise the suspect of his procedural rights, particularly during the
interrogation by the agency of inquiry, and would also enable
counsel to assist his client in the presentation of evidence. Such
a right to counsel is currently enjoyed only at the preliminary
investigation by minors and persons physically or mentally unable
to conduct their own defense. It has been suggested, however,
that a similar guarantee be extended to all defendants. Until such
a reform has been instituted at the preliminary investigation, it is
highly unlikely that it will be advanced to the inquiry. There-
fore, a more complete discussion of the proposal will be reserved
for the section below on the preliminary investigation.233
V. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
A. Description of the Preliminary Investigation
The preliminary investigation is conducted by an investigator
who is expected to collect evidence both for and against the ac-
cused. 23 4  The investigation is supposed to be completed within
two months, but it may be prolonged an additional two months
with the permission of a procurator, and in exceptional cases it
may be prolonged indefinitely.23 5  A wide variety of activities
are conducted by the investigator. He is empowered to conduct a
view of the scene of the crime,23 6 to seize articles and documents
of significance for the case,23 7 and to conduct a search of per-
sons 238 or premises 239 if he has sufficient grounds to suppose that
instruments of the crime or other articles of significance for the
case will be uncovered. An accused, suspect, witness, or victim
may be examined to establish traces of the crime or particular
marks upon his body,240 and investigative experiments reproducing
the circumstances of the crime may be performed to verify and
specify data collected during earlier phases of the preliminary
investigation. 241 Ordinary citizens who are not interested in the
233 See text accompanying notes 393-443, infra.
234 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 14; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 20; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 65-66. The preliminary
investigation closely parallels the French instruction criminelle, described
in Anton, L'Instruction Criminelle, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 441 (1960).
235 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 133. In nonpolitical cases, an em-
phasis seems to be placed upon the importance of completing the prelimi-
nary investigation within two months. N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra
note 218, at 84.
236 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 178-80.
237 Id. art. 167. The seizure of postal and telegraphic correspondence is
also permitted with the sanction of a procurator or in accordance with a
ruling of a court.
238 Id. art. 172. The procedure for conducting all searches and seizures
is described in id. arts. 170-71.
239 Id. arts. 12, 168.
240 Id. art. 181.
241 Id. art. 183.
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case must be present as witnesses during the conduct of all the
above investigative activities. 242 If the investigation has been con-
ducted in compliance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and
if it has been accurately reported, the witnesses sign the record of
the investigative activity and testify in court should a dispute arise
concerning the propriety or impartiality of the investigative
activity. If the investigation has not been conducted as reported,
they may refuse to sign the record, and if procedural violations
have occurred, they may complain to the supervising procura-
tor.243 Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence indicating the
extent to which these witnesses actually do provide an adequate
safeguard of the accused's procedural rights in the absence of
counsel during the early phases of the preliminary investigation.
It can be speculated, however, that they rarely criticize the conduct
of the preliminary investigation, particularly since they have no
legal training and since they serve as witnesses on a short-term
basis only, taking a temporary leave of absence from their regular
jobs.
In addition to collecting real evidence, the investigator is em-
powered to interrogate the accused, 244 victim, 245 and other wit-
nesses 246 and to carry out a confrontation between two persons in
whose testimony there are substantial contradictions.247 A line-up
of persons or objects may be presented for identification to a
witness, victim, suspect, or accused, 248 and expert examinations are
frequently conducted during the preliminary investigation.249 It
is interesting to note that witnesses are not required to attend any
of the above investigative activities, although the need for a dis-
interested observer would seem to be at least as critical during a
line-up or interrogation as during the conduct of a search or
seizure.
On the basis of the evidence so collected, the investigator makes
a decision to terminate the case or to draw up a conclusion to
indict.250 If the case is brought to trial, the evidence gathered
during the preliminary investigaton also becomes the basis for con-
sideration of the case in court. The court is bound neither by the
scope of the preliminary investigation nor by the investigator's
242 Id. arts. 135, 169, 179, 183.
243 Id. arts. 135, 176, 182-83; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 287-88.
244 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 150-52. For a fuller discussion of
this investigatory activity see text accompanying notes 411-34, infra.
245 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 161.
246 Id. arts. 158, 160.
247 Id. arts. 162-63. It has been suggested that the confrontation of wit-
nesses serves the function of a cross-examination. Anton, supra note 234,
at 442.
248 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 164-66.
249 Id. arts. 184-94. For a fuller discussion of this investigative activity
see text accompanying notes 440-41, infra.
250 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 199.
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appraisal of the evidence collected, and the judgment is to be
founded only on evidence considered directly by the court during
the trial.251  However, it is primarily the evidence uncovered
during the preliminary investigation which actually forms the basis
for the court's judgment; very little supplemental evidence is either
requested or presented.25 2 Instead, the court verifies the evidence
collected during the preliminary investigation and interrogates the
defendant and the key witnesses called by the investigator.2 5 3 If
discrepancies arise between the testimony given during the pre-
liminary investigation and that given during the trial, the court
may conclude that the earlier testimony is more trustworthy and
adopt it as the basis for its final judgment.25 4  The significance
of the preliminary investigation should therefore not be under-
estimated, particularly with respect to the importance of protect-
ing the accused's right to defense. The outcome of the trial is very
apt to be determined by the evidence collected during the pre-
liminary investigation. If the investigation is properly conducted,
the dossier compiled will be so complete that very few innocent
persons will be convicted.255 To attain this result, however, either
the investigator must be absolutely impartial, or the defendant
must actively participate in the presentation of evidence. Since
it is highly probable that Soviet investigators have an accusatory
bias,256 it would seem desirable to permit counsel to assist the
accused in presenting evidence favorable to the defense during the
early stages of the preliminary investigation in all cases, not just
in those involving minors or persons physically or mentally unable
to conduct their own defense.
B. Unique Characteristics of the Preliminary Investigation
1. PRIVATE PROCEEDING
There are two unique characteristics of the preliminary investi-
251 Id. arts. 240, 301; N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 181.
Prior to the passage of the U.S.S.R. 1958 Principles of Criminal Procedure,
there was no provision requiring courts to base their judgment strictly on
evidence considered at the trial. B. GALKIN, supra note 201, at 213.
252 N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 86. The file (dossier)
of a case contains a written record of the investigative activities with real
evidence appended. It is presented to the court for its examination prior
to the trial. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRaM. PRO. C. arts. 141, 217. Parties to the case
may petition the presentation of supplemental evidence. Id. arts. 276, 294.
253 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRlM. PRO. C. art. 240; R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104,
at 119.
In Soviet criminal proceedings, the judge leads the interrogation of
witnesses and of the accused. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 280, 283.
At the end of the preliminary investigation, the investigator draws up a
list of witnesses to be summoned to the trial which is examined and ap-
proved by the procurator. Id. arts. 206, 216.
254 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 281, 286.
255 Anton, supra note 234, at 441, 456.
256 See text accompanying notes 265-67, 282-85, infra.
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gation: it is conducted in private and the proceedings are inquisi-
tional, rather than adversary in form. Divulgence of the data of
a preliminary investigation without permission of an investigator
or procurator is a violation of Soviet criminal law. 257 The purpose
of this prohibition is twofold: it makes it easier for the investi-
gator to obtain evidence, and at the same time, it protects the
accused against the release of prejudicial information prior to
the decision to indict.258
2. INQUISITIONAL PROCEEDING
a. Judicial or procuratorial supervision
Because the preliminary investigation is an inquisitional pro-
ceeding, the parties do not control the presentation of the evi-
dence. Instead, the investigator is charged with the responsibility
of adducing evidence for and against the accused. It is therefore of
the utmost importance that he be impartial, independent of both
the prosecution and the defense, and knowledgeable of the law.
During the early years of the Soviet regime, an effort was made to
meet these criteria by making the investigators officials of the
courts and by giving the courts supervisory powers over their ac-
tivities.259 In 1922, however, the procuracy (a prerevolutionary
Russian institution for the supervision of legality 26 0 ) was reestab-
lished and empowered to supervise the conduct of the prelimi-
nary investigation. 261 The investigators thus remained officials of
the courts, but came under the dual supervision of both the courts
and the procuracy.262 To eliminate the resulting inefficiency, it
257 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. C. art. 184; R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CraM. PRO. C. art.
139. These same provisions also apply to information collected during the
inquiry.
258 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 290; N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note
218, at 90-91. If the case is terminated at the end of the preliminary in-
vestigation, this prohibition prevents the release of information damaging to
the innocent person's reputation. The protection offered the accused is not
as complete as it is in France, however, because the Soviet press is per-
mitted to release information and evaluate the evidence prior to the trial.
Only recently has this prejudging of criminal cases been subjected to criti-
cism. See Anton, supra note 234, at 443.
259 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 75; Iasinskii, 0 protsessual'noi
samostoiatel'nosti sledovatelia (On the Procedural Independence of the
Investigator), [1964] 9 S.G. i P. 64; Zhogin, Isotriia razvitiia i sovershenst-
vovaniia predvaritel'nogo sledstviia v SSSR (History of the Development
and Improvement of the Preliminary Investigation in the U.S.S.R.), [1967]
1 SOTS. ZAK. 3, 4-6.
In France and Germany, an impartial judicial magistrate (a juge d'-
instruction or Untersuchungsrichter) presides over the preliminary investi-
gation and there is a right of appeal to the court if the accused's procedural
rights are abused. SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 75; Anton, supra
note 234, at 442-43.
260 H. BERMAN, supra note 174, at 240-41.
261 Id. at 242.
262 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 75-76; Grodzinskii, Protsessual'-
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was decided in 1928-1929 to transfer all supervision over the pre-
liminary investigation to the procuracy and to make the investiga-
tors officials of the procuracy. 26 1
It was said that supervisory control by the courts had proven
ineffective because judicial action could not be taken until the
investigation was completed. The opportunity for effective super-
vision was to be greatly enhanced by transferring the investi-
gators to the procuracy because it would locate the investigator
and the supervising procurator in the same office, thereby per-
mitting the procurator to observe the investigator in action.
2 64
The reform had one serious drawback, however. The procuracy
is also the prosecuting arm of the Soviet legal system, and by
transferring the investigators to the procuracy, the reform jeo-
pardized their impartiality.2 5 Many Soviet jurists maintain that
the investigators have not acquired an accusatory bias because the
function of the procuracy during the preliminary investigation is
to supervise the legality of the proceedings, not to uphold the
accusation.266 Western commentators, on the other hand, assert
that this is too formalistic an appraisal of the investigator's posi-
tion. Ultimately, it is the duty of the procuracy to prosecute.
This makes the investigator's position at best ambiguous, and at
worst deserving of the charge that it is tinged by the procuracy's
accusatory bias.267
b. Organization and functions of the procuracy
In order to analyze the two opposing viewpoints, it is necessary
to describe briefly the organization and functions of the procuracy.
The distinctive feature of the procuracy from an institutional stand-
point is its organizational unity. The procuracy is headed by the
Procurator General of the U.S.S.R., who is appointed by the Su-
preme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for a seven-year term (the longest
term of appointment in the Soviet governmental system) .268 The
noe polozhenie sledovatelia (Procedural Position of an Investigator), [1959]
6 SOTS. ZAK. 19; Iasinskii, supra note 259, at 65; Zhogin, supra note 259, at
6-7. The court had the final say because it retained jurisdiction over ap-
peals from participants in the preliminary investigation. The procurator
could only assume jurisdiction over appeals regarding the investigator's
illegal conduct, delays in the investigation, and improper application of
measures of restraint. Grodzinskii, supra at 19; Zhogin, supra note 259, at 7.
263 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 76; Grodzinskii, supra note 262,
at 20; Zhogin, supra note 259, at 7, 9.
264 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 76.
265 Iasinskii, supra note 259, at 65.
266 M. CHEL'TSOV, SOVETSKII UCOLOVNYI PROTSESS (Soviet Criminal Pro-
ceedings) 32 (1962); R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 119, 122, 127, 153.
267 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 93, 132; Ginsburgs, The Soviet Procuracy
and Forty Years of Socialist Legality, 18 AM. SLAVIC REV. 34, 56 (1959).
268 U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 114; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 109;
Ginsburgs, supra note 267, at 50.
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Procurator General appoints the republic and regional procurators
and approves the appointment of area, district and city procura-
tors by the republic procurator.269  The institution is therefore
completely centralized, and unlike other governmental agencies,
which are dually subordinated, it is free from local control.270 This
enables it to exercise one of its primary functions: supervisory
control over the execution of the laws and the observance of
legality by executive, administrative, and judicial agencies.271 It
is in this connection that the procuracy supervises the observance
of legality by agencies of inquiry and preliminary investiga-
tion.272 It must "strictly watch out that not a single citizen is
subjected to illegal or unfounded criminal prosecution or to any
other unlawful reservation of rights" and "watch over the undevi-
ating observance by agencies of inquiry and preliminary investi-
gation of the legally established procedure for investigating
crimes. '273 In addition to its supervisory functions, however, the
procuracy is also charged with the responsibility of instituting 274
and prosecuting criminal proceedings.275 It is therefore difficult
to determine whether an investigator attached to the procuracy
would be more or less impartial than one attached to the court.
To the extent that an investigator is influenced by the activities of
the prosecuting arm of the procuracy's staff, he is certainly not
capable of conducting an impartial, objective preliminary investi-
gation. But to the extent that the investigator is associated with
the organizational unity, independence, and authority of the super-
visory branch of the procuracy, he may well enjoy more prestige
and a better reputation for impartiality than he would as a court
269 U.S.S.R. CONST. arts. 115-16. SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 259, at 109; Ginsburgs, supra note 267, at 51.
270 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 109-10; Ginsburgs, supra note
267, at 50-51.
Most governmental agencies are dually subordinate to both local and
higher authorities. The exemption of the procuracy from dual subordina-
tion was intended to ensure the uniform application of the laws. The
procuracy is the "watchdog of legality" for, not against, the central authori-
ties, however. It is not independent of the Communist Party. SOVIET
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 110-11.
271 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 110-11. A historical account
of the development of the procuracy's various functions may be found in
Ginsburgs, supra note 267, at 34.
272 Edict of May 24, 1955, Statute on Procuratorial Supervision, art. 3,
[1955] 9 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. Item 22.
273 Id. art. 17.
"A procurator shall be obliged to consider, within the time established
by law, complaints addressed to him or received by him against actions of
agencies of inquiry and of preliminary investigation and to inform the
complainants of the decisions taken on their complaints." Id. art. 21.
The procurator's specific supervisory powers with respect to the pre-
liminary investigation are listed in R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 211.
274 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 211(1) (a).
275 Id. art. 248.
NUMBER 3]
HeinOnline  -- 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 849 1968
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
official. 21 6 Perhaps for this reason the drafters of the Principles
of Criminal Procedure decided to retain procuratorial supervision
over the preliminary investigation, but simultaneously sought to
increase the independence of the investigator's position vis-a-vis
the supervising procurators. 27 7
c. Increased independence of investigatory agencies
The R.S.F.S.R. Code of Criminal Procedure empowers investi-
gators of the procuracy, investigators of agencies of protection of
public order, and investigators of agencies of state security to
conduct a preliminary investigation. 278 All of the investigators are
subject to procuratorial supervision, but an effort has been made
to increase their procedural independence by (1) giving them
sole responsibility for making decisions concerning the course of
the investigation and the performance of investigative actions, 27 9
(2) authorizing them to give binding instructions directly to agen-
cies of inquiry concerning the conduct of search and investiga-
tive actions, 280 and (3) permitting them to disagree with the in-
structions of the procurator concerning the decision to prosecute a
person as the accused, the nature of the crime, the scope of the
accusation, and the decision to terminate the case or bring the ac-
cused to trial. In the event of a disagreement, the investigator
may submit the case with his written objections to a higher
procurator, and the higher procurator may not order the investiga-
tor to take any action against the dictates of his inner conviction
based on a thorough, complete, and objective consideration of all
the evidence in the case.28 '
The independence of the investigator is somewhat illusory,
however. In the event of a disagreement, the higher procurator
can terminate the case282 or, should he decide to indict, either
276 H. BERMAN, supra note 174, at 243; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE 76, 78.
277 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 30; N. ZHOrIN
& F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 59.
278 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 125.
279 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 30; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 127. An exception is made for instances when the
law requires that the procurator's sanction be obtained. The purpose of
the procuratorial sanction in these instances, however, is to protect personal
or property rights, not to curb the investigator's independence. R. RAK-
HUNOV, supra note 104, at 136.
280 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 127. Previously, the investigator
had to transmit his instructions to the agencies of inquiry through the
supervising procurator. N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 60.
281 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 71, 127; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII
276. On all other matters (primarily the illegality of particular investi-
gative actions) the procurator's instructions are subject to appeal, but are
otherwise binding on the investigator. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 276; R.
RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 141.
282 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 127, 211(2) (i).
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transfer the case to another investigator or conduct the pre-
liminary investigation himself . 2 3  The individual investigator
may not be forced to act against his inner conviction, but the
accused derives no benefit from the investigator's independence.
The outcome of the preliminary investigation still depends upon
the decision of a supervisory procurator. The question therefore
remains whether enough has been done to eliminate the real dan-
gers of abuse in placing the investigators under procuratorial con-
trol. Institutional reforms have been suggested to eliminate the
present organizational bond between the supervising procurator
and the investigator: it has been recommended (1) that the in-
vestigator's section be severed from the procuracy and established
as an independent agency; 2 4 or (2) that the administrative subor-
dination of the investigators to the supervisory section of the
procuracy be completely eliminated.2 5 A more effective step
toward protecting the accused against an investigator's accusatory
bias, however, would be the extension of the right to counsel to the
preliminary investigation.
C. Right to Counsel During the Preliminary Investigation
1. HISTORY
Immediately after the Bolsheviks came to power, counsel was
temporarily permitted to participate during the preliminary in-
vestigation. At first, defense attorneys enjoyed an unrestricted
right of participation, 26 but soon this was changed; counsel could
be excluded "in the interests of discovering the truth. '28 7 The
limitation was justified on the ground that many defense attorneys
were lawyers who had practiced under the Tsarist regime and who
therefore had a special interest in obstructing the ascertainment of
283 Id. arts. 127, 211(2) (c). To enhance the procedural independence
of the investigator, it has been suggested that the procurator should avoid
exercising his powers to conduct all or part of the preliminary investigation.
R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 154-55.
284 Iasinskii, supra note 259, at 72.
It might have seemed that the creation of an investigatory division
within the agency of protection of public order in 1963 would increase the
procedural independence of those investigators because they are not located
in the procuracy's offices. However, procuratorial supervision over these
investigators, who now conduct approximately 50% of the preliminary
investigations in the Soviet Union, has been extremely strict. Supervising
procurators are present in person during the conduct of many of their in-
vestigative activities. The investigators of the agencies of protection of
public order therefore enjoy no greater independence from the supervising
procurators than do the investigators of the procuracy. Id. at 69-70.
285 Id. at 72.
286 Decree of Dec. 5 (Nov. 22), 1917, art. 3, [1917] 4 S.U. R.S.F.S.R.
Item 50.
287 Decree of Nov. 30, 1918, art. 34, [1918] 85 S.U. R.S.F.S.R. Item 889
(All Russian Central Executive Committee).
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the truth.288 Finally advocates were barred altogether from at-
tending the preliminary investigation.28 9
Not until the late 1930's did the Soviets place enough confidence
in the loyalty of their advocates to once again consider permitting
them to participate in the preliminary investigation. 290 Prior to
the adoption of the Principles of Criminal Procedure in 1958, the
question was heatedly debated.29 1  It was generally agreed that
counsel should be admitted to the preliminary investigation. No
agreement could be reached, however, regarding the precise mo-
ment at which counsel should be permitted to enter the case.
292
Several jurists suggested that counsel be admitted from the be-
ginning of the preliminary investigation. They maintained that
without counsel, the accused's right to defense during the pre-
liminary investigation could not be realized because the defendant
did not know enough about the law to present pertinent evi-
dence. 293 Furthermore, counsel's presence was considered neces-
sary to protect the accused against the investigator's accusatory
bias 294 and to serve as a witness on behalf of the accused should he
charge the investigator with violating his procedural rights.
295
The opponents of this theory objected that counsel's presence
during the early stages of the preliminary investigation would not
only delay the proceedings, but also obstruct the investigator in
ascertaining the objective truth and in waging his fight against
crime.296 They proposed that counsel should not be admitted un-
til the preliminary investigation had been completed and the
accused presented with materials of the case.297 Counsel could
288 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 201, at 88.
289 R.S.F.S.R. 1923 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 250. Counsel was not permitted
to enter the case until the time of the trial. A. KoBLiKov, supra note 223, at
52.
290 Vyshinsky was the first Soviet jurist to suggest extending the right
to counsel to the preliminary investigation, and then he felt that counsel
should be excluded from political cases. N. POLiANSII, supra note 116, at
137.
291 Id. at 138.
292 Id. at 138-39; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 123, at 31.
293 Bekeshko, supra note 164, at 252-53; Kaminskaiia, 0 prave obviniae-
mogo na zashchitu v stadii predvaritel'nogo rassledovaniia (On the Ac-
cused's Right to Defense at the Stage of the Preliminary Investigation),
[1958] 9 S.G. I P. 97-98; Schlesinger, The Discussion on Criminal Law and
Procedure, 10 SOVIET STUDIEs 293, 302 (1959).
294 Bekeshko, supra note 164, at 253; Kaminskaiia, supra note 293, at 98-
99; Taras, Problems of Revision and Retrial-The Rights of the Defendant
in Light of the Draft Basic Principles of Soviet Criminal Procedure, 10
SOVIET STuIlES 213, 226 (1959).
295 Kaminskaiia, supra note 293, at 99; Schlesinger, supra note 293, at
302. It was also suggested that counsel could prevent the defendant from
bringing unfounded charges of abuse against the investigator. Kaminskaiia,
supra note 293, at 99.
296 Kaminskaiia, supra note 293, at 97; Perlov, supra note 231, at 39.
297 N. POLIANSKII, supra note 116, at 141; Bekeshko, supra note 164, at
253.
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then assist the accused in becoming acquainted with the materials
of the preliminary investigation and petition supplementary evi-
dence prior to the drafting of the conclusion to indict. The ac-
cused's right to defense would be adequately protected, and the
conduct of the preliminary investigation would not be unnecessar-
ily obstructed.298
A cogent rebuttal was advanced by those who thought that
counsel should participate from the beginning of the preliminary
investigation. They asserted that an advocate obligated to use
only lawful methods of defense would not obstruct the conduct of
the investigation.29 9 On the contrary, he would improve the com-
pleteness and objectivity of the evidence collected. And although
slight delays might occur, they would be counterbalanced by the
improved quality of the evidence. 30 0  Furthermore, in many in-
stances counsel's presence would shorten the length of the pre-
liminary investigation because he could prevent the investigator
from following up on false leads.3 0 1
Despite the persuasiveness of the rebuttal, the debate was won
by those who advocated that counsel not be admitted until the
accused is presented with the materials of the case at the end of
the preliminary investigation.302 Only minors80 8 and persons who
are physically3 0 4 or mentally incapable of conducting their own
defense 0  now enjoy an obligatory right to counsel from the
beginning of the preliminary investigation.30 6
298 N. POLIANSKII, supra note 116, at 141; Bekeshko, supra note 164, at
253.
299 Schlesinger, supra note 293, at 302. Counsel would only be ac-
quainted with those materials which the accused is permitted to see during
the investigation. Kaminskaiia, supra note 293, at 98.
300 Bekeshko, supra note 164, at 253; Kaminskaiia, supra note 293, at 99.
301 Schlesinger, supra note 293, at 302.
302 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROcEDURE art. 22; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 47.
The formula adopted by the drafters of the Principles of Criminal Pro-
cedure represented a compromise solution between the liberal jurists, who
wanted defense counsel to be admitted from the beginning of the prelimi-
nary investigation, and the procuracy, which wanted to exclude counsel
altogether. Bilinsky, The Lawyer and Soviet Society, 14 PROBLEMS OF COM-
MUNISM 62, 69 (March-April 1965).
303 Minors are persons under 18 years of age. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM.
PRO. C. art. 391.
304 Persons who are deaf, dumb, or blind are physically incompetent to
conduct their own defense. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 49(2).
305 Persons mentally incompetent to conduct their own defense are those
who are legally responsible for their acts (i.e., not legally insane), but who
lack the mental capacity to exercise their right to defense without the
assistance of counsel. It has been held that a person only slightly mentally
retarded does not enjoy a right to counsel from the beginning of the pre-
liminary examination. Moshkov, [1967] 2 Bull. Verkh. Suda R.S.F.S.R. 8
(Crim. Div. Sup. Ct. R.S.F.S.R. 1966).
306 US.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 22; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 47, 49. Since counsel is obligatory at the trial for
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2. VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Although in theory defense lawyers may now always be ad-
mitted from the end of the preliminary investigation, in practice,
advocates have actually participated in less than 50 percent of the
preliminary proceedings. 3 7 This has caused a great deal of con-
cern over the voluntariness of the accused's waiver of his right to
counsel. 30 Numerous errors have been discovered in the methods
by which investigators inform the accused of his right to counsel
during the-preliminary investigation. As the following discussion
will illustrate, there is a striking similarity between the means
by which Soviet investigators and American police officers dissuade
the defendant from employing the services of counsel during pre-
trial investigatory proceedings.
In the Soviet Union, a defendant must first be informed of
his right to counsel at the time he is presented with the accusa-
tion.30 9 If he is entitled to counsel from the beginning of the in-
vestigation, this information must be conveyed to him before he is
presented with the accusation so that counsel can attend the pre-
sentation and subsequent questioning of the accused.3 10 A de-
persons without command of the language in which the proceedings are
conducted, persons whose interests conflict and one of whom has defense
counsel, and persons charged with crimes punishable by death, it has been
suggested that counsel also be made obligatory for these persons from the
moment they are presented with the materials of the preliminary investiga-
tion. Id. art.. 49(4) -(6); Liakhovich & Itskov, Uchastie advokata v pred-
varitel'nom sledstvii (Participation of an Advocate in the Preliminary In-
vestigation), [1960] 5 SOTS. ZAK. 47-48; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra
note 123, at 34-35; Vorob'ev, Strogo sobliudat' prava obviniamogo na zash-
chitu (The Accused's Right to Defense Should be Strictly Observed), [ 1963]
17 Sov. IUST. 5, 6.
307 Shein, supra note 232, at 119. The figures in this article may be
somewhat low because they are for 1959-1960.
30s The waiver of the right to counsel must be completely voluntary,
and "shall be permitted only upon the initiative of the accused himself."
R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 50; R:S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARI 124. The ac-
cused's waiver is binding upon the investigator unless the accused is a
minor or unable to conduct his own defense due to physical or mental de-
fects. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CITM. PRO. C. art. 50.
309 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 149. More evidence is needed to
hold a person as an accused than to hold him as a suspect. An accusation
cannot be presented until evidence has been adduced indicating the event
of the crime, the identity of the perpetrator, the intent with which the
crime was committed, and the absence of circumstances excluding responsi-
bility for the criminal act. Id. arts. 143-44; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARI 294;
A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at 6; Karneeva & Genrikov, Osobennosti ot-
senki dokazatel'stv na raznykh etpakh predvarite'nogo sledstviia (Dis-
tinctive Features of the Appraisal of Evidence at Various Stages of the
Preliminary Investigation), [1966] 9 S.G. i P. 74, 76.
The procedure for summoning the accused is described in R.SF.S.R.
1960 CalM. PRO. C. arts. 145-47.
310 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARIr 301-02. If the accused's counsel cannot
appear within two days, a substitute (temporary or permanent) must be
appointed by the investigator. Id. at 302.
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fendant whose right to counsel arises at the end of the investiga-
tion must receive a second warning when the case has been
terminated and he is informed of his right to become acquainted
with the materials of the preliminary investigation.31'
In practice, the explanation of the accused's right to defense is
given orally, and a note to this effect is made on the decree to
prosecute, which is signed by the accused.3 12  There are certain
problems inherent in such a procedure, however. At the beginning
of the preliminary investigation, the accused is informed of a
wide range of procedural rights constituting his right to defense.313
If he subsequently alleges that he was never apprised of his right
to counsel, it is difficult to determine whether this information
was transmitted to him.3 14 A few investigators have therefore
had the accused's procedural rights printed on the decree to prose-
cute, which is signed by the defendant and immediately re-
turned to the investigator.3 15  This adequately verifies the fact
that the accused received formal notification of his right to counsel,
but does not indicate whether he read the statement and under-
stood its meaning. The latter is doubtful because the investigator
rarely supplements the written statement with an oral explana-
tion. Moreover, the accused is apt to be concentrating upon the
charges brought against him at the time that he reads and signs
the decree to prosecute. In an effort to solve the problem, it has
been suggested that the written explanation of the accused's right
to defense be printed in duplicate and that it list the address
and telephone number of the local consultation office. The ex-
planation could then be signed by the accused and the duplicate
copy given to him for future reference at a time when he would
not be preoccupied with the contents of the accusation. 16
Since the accused is normally informed orally of his right to
counsel, the investigator's attitude toward the advokatura tends
311 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CIM. PRO. C. art. 201.
312 Id. art. 149; Shein, Vstuplenie zashchitnika v delo na predvaritel'nom
sledstvii (Entrance of Defense Counsel into a Case at the Preliminary In-
vestigation), [1962] 20 Soy. IUST. 8, 9.
313 The accused must be informed of his right:
to know what he is accused of and to give explanations concerning
the accusation presented to him; to present evidence; to submit peti-
tions; to become acquainted with all the materials of the case upon
completion of the preliminary investigation or inquiry; to have de-
fense counsel from the moment provided by article 47 of the present
Code; to participate in the judicial examination in the court of first
instance; to submit challenges; and to appeal from the actions and
decisions of the person conducting the inquiry, the investigator, pro-
curator and court. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CIM. PRO. C. art. 46.
He must also be informed of the inviolability of his person (he may not
be subjected to arrest without sanction of a procurator) and of his right to
give testimony. Id. arts. 11, 77, 152.
314 Shein, supra note 312, at 9.
315 Id.
316 Id.; Shein, supra note 232, at 120.
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to color the tone and content of the warning. It is therefore sig-
nificant that a large percentage of investigators consider counsel's
presence a hindrance to the efficient performance of their duties. 17
This is reflected in the formalistic way in which they inform the
accused of his right to counsel. The language of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is uttered verbatim, but no effort is made to
explain its meaning. 18 If an inspector harbors a deep distrust of
the advokatura, he may actually recommend that the accused waive
his right to counsel, 19 asserting that an advocate can perform no
useful function during the preliminary investigation and that his
services are therefore a waste of money 20 If that does not dis-
suade the accused, the investigator may suggest that "things will
go better for him" if he does not request counsel until the
trial.321 Similarly, when an advocate has been retained by rela-
tives for a defendant confined under guard, the investigator may
"forget" to inform him of this fact, hoping that the accused will
decide to waive his right to counsel.322
317 Improvement of Investigative Work-An Important Condition for the
Further Strengthening of Socialist Legality, [1964] 11 S.G. i P. 3 transl. in
3 Soy. L. & GOV'T No. 4, at 23, 29 (1965). In reality, since counsel does not
enter the case until the end of the preliminary investigation, it is only a
poorly conducted investigation which will be hindered or delayed by coun-
sel's petitions after he becomes acquainted with the materials of the case.
A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at 48; Vorob'ev, supra note 306, at 6.
318 N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 289; Liakhovich &
Itskov, supra note 306, at 47; Vorob'ev, supra note 306, at 6.
319 N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 289; Aleshin & Furer,
Ne dopuskat' uschemleniia zakonnykh pray obviniaemogo i zashchitnika na
predvaritel'nom sledstvii (Infringement of the Legal Rights of the Accused
and Defense Counsel at the Preliminary Investigations Should Not Be
Permitted), [1965] 6 Sov. IUST. 24, 25; Shein, supra note 232, at 118, 119;
Uchastie zashchity v predvaritel'nom sledstvii-vazhnaia garantiia sobliu-
deniia sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v ugolovnom protsesse (Participation of
the Defense in the Preliminary Investigation-An Important Guarantee of
the Observance of Socialist Legality in Criminal Proceedings), [1960] 6
Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 30, 31.
320 N. IAKUBOVICH, OKANCHANIE PREDVARITEL'NOGO SLEDSTVIIA (End of the
Preliminary Investigation) 31 (1962); Kaganovich, Narushenia pray ob-
viniaemogo na zashchitu (Violations of the Accused's Right to Defense),
[1960] 3 SOTS. ZAK. 27; Shein, supra note 232, at 119; Vorob'ev, supra note
306, at 6.
321 Gershingorin, Strogo sobliudat' pravo obviniaemogo na zashchitu
(The Accused's Right to Defense Should Be Strictly Observed), [1961] 6
Soy. IUST. 22; Shein, supra note 232, at 119.
322 N. IAKUBOVICH, supra note 320, at 31; N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra
note 218, at 289; Gershingorin, supra note 321, at 22; Liakhevich & Itskov,
supra note 306, at 47; Stremovskii & Teplinskii, Polozhitel'nye rezul'taty
uchastiia zashchitnika na predvaritel'nom sledstvii (Favorable Results of
Defense Counsel's Participation in the Preliminary Investigation), [1961]
24 Sov. IUST. 13.
The defendant may still waive his right to counsel after being informed
that an advocate has been hired for him. Karneeva, Uchastie zashchitnika
v predvaritel'nom sledstvii (Participation of Defense Counsel in the Pre-
liminary Investigation), [1960] 10 Soy. IUST. 13, 14. However, it has been
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Every one of the above practices is a violation of the accused's
right to defense and constitutes grounds for remanding the case
for a supplementary investigation. 3 23  To comply with the re-
quirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the investigator
must not only recite the language of the Code, but must also ex-
plain its meaning and secure the possibility of the accused's ex-
ercising his right to defense.3 24 When informing the accused of
his right to counsel, he must describe the services performed by
an advocate during the preliminary investigation. If the de-
fendant is confined under guard, he must inform him of his right
to have his legal representative or relatives retain counsel for
him. 3 25  If the defendant is indigent, the investigator must tell
him that counsel may be appointed free of charge.326 And finally,
in the event that counsel is retained, the investigator must warn
the defendant that the presentation of the dossier can be post-
poned no longer than five days from the date the preliminary
investigation is terminated. 27 If the defendant's advocate is un-
able to appear within that length of time, the defendant must
obtain a substitute or waive his right to counsel during the pre-
liminary investigation.
328
suggested that the advocate should be present at the time of the waiver.
Aleshin & Furer, supra note 319, at 25.
323 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 232(2); A. KOBLIKOV, supra note
223, at 44; Liakhovich & Itskov, supra note 306, at 47.
Some courts merely issue a special ruling to the investigator directing
his attention to the violation. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 C iM. PRO. C. art. 321. The
special ruling does not adequately protect the accused's right to be ac-
quainted with the materials of the preliminary investigation with counsel's
assistance, however. Vorob'ev, supra note 306, at 6.
324 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CalM. PRO. C. arts. 58, 149, 201; A. KOBLIKov, supra
note 223, at 46; Gershingorin, supra note 321, at 22; Shein, supra note 312, at
9; Vorob'ev, supra note 306, at 6.
325 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CIUM. PRO. C. art. 48. If the defendant indicates a
desire to have counsel, the investigator must communicate this information
to the defendant's legal representative or relatives. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMEN-
TARII 121; Krzhepitskii, Predely i poriadok uchastiia zashchitnika v pred-
varitel'nom sledstvii (Limits and Procedure of Defense Counsel's Participa-
tion in the Preliminary Investigation), [1959] 7 SOTS. ZAK. 36.
326 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 48; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARI 121-
22. In confirming the voluntariness of the defendant's waiver of his right
to counsel, the investigator must ask him if he understands that counsel
can be provided free of charge. Id. at 124.
327 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 201; Shein, supra note 312, at 9.
328 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 48, 201; Karneeva, supra note 322,
at 13; Uchastie zashchity v predvaritel'nom sledstvii, supra note 319, at 31.
Substitute counsel may be appointed by the investigator at the defend-
ant's request, but it is a violation of the accused's right to defense for an
investigator to appoint a substitute before five days have elapsed. Shirokov,
[1965] 3 Bull. Verkh. Suda R.S.F.S.R. 12 (Crim. Div. Sup. Ct. R.S.F.S.R.
1964) (remanded for supplementary investigation). The defendant is en-
titled to have the originally retained advocate represent him at the trial.
Karneeva, supra note 322, at 13.
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A waiver of the right to counsel on the basis of all the above
information would most certainly be voluntary. However, in light
of the investigators' accusatory bias and lack of appreciation for
counsel's participation during the preliminary investigation, it can
be speculated that the accused seldom receives a full and impartial
explanation of his rights. It has therefore been suggested that a
member of the college of advocates be permitted to inform a de-
fendant of his right to counsel during the preliminary investiga-
tion. 29 Unless and until this suggestion is adopted, it would be
desirable to universalize the practice of a few investigators who
request the accused to sign a statement indicating that he volun-
tarily waived his right to counsel. 330  Such a statement would
provide a certain measure of protection against coercion, and would
also eliminate the courtroom squabbles between the investigator
and the accused (the only two witnesses to the action) as to
whether the accused requested or waived his right to counsel
during the preliminary investigation. 331
3. OBTAINING THE SERVICES OF AN ADVOCATE
If the accused decides to exercise his right to counsel, there are
three ways in which an advocate may be engaged. The accused
may contact the local consultation office and sign an agreement
there to retain counsel unless he is confined under guard.332 If
he is being held incommunicado, he may obtain counsel through
his legal representative, relatives, or friends.3 33 Should these per-
sons be unable or unwilling to assist him, or should the accused
be indigent, he may request the investigator to appoint counsel
for him.3 34 Such a request is not necessary when counsel is obliga-
tory; the investigator must appoint an advocate to represent the
defendant unless one is retained by the accused, his legal represen-
tative or relatives. 335 Gratuitous legal services are provided by
329 Shein, supra note 232, at 120. This procedure is followed when there
is an obligatory right to counsel during the trial. See text accompanying
note 502, infra.
330 A. VAsIuTIN & Iu. LivsHiTs, UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NYE AKTY DOZNA-
NIIA I PREDVARITEL'NOGO SLEDSTVIIA (Criminal Procedure Documents of the
Inquiry and Preliminary Investigation) 160 (1967); Shein, supra note 312,
at 9.
331 Shein, supra note 312, at 9.
332 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 48; A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at
52; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 13.
3.3 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 48; A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at
52; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 13.
334 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 48; A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at
52; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 13. The accused's request must be honored.
R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 121; N. IAKUBOVICl, supra note 320, at 37; A.
KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at 45; N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218,
at 290.
335 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 49; A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at
45; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 13. Failure to appoint counsel can result
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the college of advocates when the accused is indigent. 3 6 If coun-
sel is obligatory, the accused is not required to reimburse the
advocate for his services unless he is convicted, in which case a
"reasonable charge" for counsel's services will be included in
the court costs. 337
A technical reading of the Code of Criminal Procedure has led
at least one Soviet investigator to assert that counsel may only be
engaged at the precise moment the preliminary investigation is
terminated. 3 8  But most Soviet jurists disagree, asserting that a
more liberal reading of the Code works to the advantage of all
concerned: the accused is able to obtain the advocate of his
choosing; counsel can make plans to appear in advance; and the
investigator does not have to delay the presentation of the case
materials to the accused if counsel is retained prior to the termina-
tion of the preliminary investigation. 33
9
4. ACCEPTING THE DEFENSE OF AN ACCUSED
An accused is entitled to dismiss his lawyer at any time.340  A
replacement may be obtained or the accused may decide to conduct
his own defense.3 4' An advocate enjoys no parallel privilege, how-
ever. Once he has accepted the defense of an accused, he is not
permitted to withdraw from the case.3 42
in a reversal or remand of the case for a supplementary investigation.
R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 122.
336 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 121-22; N. IAKUBOVICH, supra note 320, at 37;
Uchastie zashchity v predvaritel'nom sledstvii, supra note 319, at 31; see
text accompanying note 82, supra.
337 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 107, 322; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII
581.
338 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 201; Dubovik, Iz praktiki oznakom-
leniia obviniaemogo i zashchitnika s materialami ugolovnogo dela v poriadke
st. 201 UPK RSFSR (From the Practice of Acquainting the Accused and
Defense Counsel with the Materials of a Criminal Case Under the Proce-
dure Prescribed by Article 201 of the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Criminal Proce-
dure), [1964] 23 Soy. IUST. 8. The statement does not refer to cases in
which the accused enjoys an obligatory right to counsel from the beginning
of the preliminary investigation.
330 Aleshin & Furer, supra note 319, at 24; Shein, supra note 312, at 10.
340 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 50.
341 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 124-25; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 14.
A case may be remanded for supplementary investigation or a new
trial if the person conducting the proceeding forces an accused to accept
the services of a particular advocate over his objection. Ramazanova,
[1966] 1 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 22 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R. 1965). A minor
or a person unable to conduct his own defense must have the assistance of
counsel, but it has been suggested that his request for a change of counsel
should be honored. Ul'ianova, Zashchita po delam o prestupleniiakh
nesovershennoletnikh (Defense in Cases of Crimes Committed by Minors),
[1966] 5 Soy. IusT. 12, 13.
342 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 23; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 51; Law of July 25, 1962, art. 34, [1962] 15-16 Sov.
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The major issue raised by this statutory mandate concerns the
circumstances under which counsel may decline to take a case.343
It has been suggested that counsel may refuse to accept the de-
fense of an accused if he is overburdened with other cases, suffer-
ing from illness, or planning to go on vacation.344 In certain
instances, he will be prohibited by law from accepting the defense
when there is a danger of a conflict of interests.3 45  It has also
been suggested that an advocate may decline to take a case if the
defendant insists on the use of illegal defense methods. To the
IUST. 31 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
The sanction for withdrawal is reproof, reprimand, or expulsion from
the college of advocates. Law of July 25, 1962, arts. 40-41, [1962] 15-16
Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.). It is generally felt that an advo-
cate who participates in the preliminary investigation should continue
through the trial. Some jurists suggest that counsel may withdraw from
a case between the trial and the appeal. Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets,
supra note 123, at 33; Sonin & Vaisman, Zashchita po delam nesovershen-
noletnikh (Defense in Cases of Minors), [1965] 1 SOTS. ZAK. 56, 57.
843 A secondary issue concerns the point in time at which the defense
has been accepted. It has been suggested that counsel accepts the defense
of an accused from the moment the manager of the consultation office
assigns him to a case. Stetsovskii, supra note 106, at 14; Ul'ianova, supra
note 127, at 61. Many advocates feel that this is too early, however. Nor
do they agree with those who say that counsel accepts the defense from
the moment he is formally admitted to the case by the investigator. R.
RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 218. This is a procedural act performed at
a time prescribed by law, and must necessarily take place only after an
advocate has been retained by the accused. Stetsovskii, supra note 149, at
60. Instead, they suggest that counsel accepts the defense from the time
that he meets with the accused, becomes acquainted with the case, and
signs an agreement to defend. Only at this point does he have enough
information to know whether he is prohibited by law or by his professional
code of ethics from conducting the defense. Friedman & Zile, supra note
27, at 32, 64; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, Rol' i zadachi advokatury v
sviazi s dal'neishei demokratizatsiei sovetskogo ugolovnogo protsessa (The
Role and Duties of the Advokatura in Connection with the Further Democ-
ratization of Soviet Criminal Proceedings), in NovoE SOVETSKOE ZAKONO-
DATEL'STVO I ADVOKATURA (New Soviet Legislation and the Advokatura)
33-34 (1960); Stetsovskii, supra note 106, at 14; Stetsovskii, supra note 149,
at 59-60. If counsel is appointed by the investigator, he accepts the defense
from the moment he is designated by the consultation office to appear in
the case. Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra at 34.
844 Stetsovskii, supra note 149, at 59; Ul'ianova, supra note 127, at 61.
345 The R.S.F.S.R. Statute on the Advokatura forbids an advocate to
handle a case (1) when he is related to an official taking part in the inves-
tigation; (2) when he has previously performed legal services for a person
whose interests conflict with the accused's; (3) when he has participated
earlier in the case as an official, expert, interpreter or witness; and
(4) when he has received information from other defendants in the case
in confidence and that confidence cannot be broken. Law of July 25,
1962, arts. 32-33, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IUST. 31 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.);
Stetsovskii, supra note 149, at 59. Similarly, the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Crim-
inal Procedure stipulates that the same person may not be defense counsel
for two accused persons if the interests of one conflict with the interests
of the other. R.S.F.S.R., 1960 CaiM. PRO. C. art. 47.
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extent that "illegal methods" means the falsification of documents
or the bribing of witnesses, it is generally agreed that such a de-
mand does constitute a valid basis for refusing to accept the de-
fense. 46 There are a few Soviet jurists, however, who maintain
that an advocate may also refuse to take a case if he considers the
accused guilty and the accused insists on pleading innocent.34T This
theory has been soundly denounced by the majority, who assert
that counsel may not prejudge the defendant's guilt before decid-
ing whether to represent him during the preliminary investiga-
tion. 48  Certainly the majority must continue to prevail if the
accused is to benefit from his constitutional right to defense in
the Soviet Union.
5. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY AN ADVOCATE WHO ENTERS A CASE FROM
THE END OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
When counsel enters the case from the end of the preliminary
investigation, his functions are threefold: to obtain supplementary
evidence favorable to the accused; to protect the accused's pro-
cedural rights; and to safeguard the accused's substantive rights.
Before counsel can perform any of these duties, he must first
become acquainted with the materials of the preliminary investi-
gation. Absolutely all the evidence in the case must be presented
to the accused and his lawyer in filed and numbered form.349
They may study the materials independently or together.3 50 Norm-
ally, since counsel is more familiar with the contents of a dossier,
he screens the materials first and points out pertinent evidence
to the accused.8 51 No limitation is placed on the time devoted to
346 Goldiner, On Defense Lawyer's Ethics, 10 S.G. i P. 95 (1965), transl.
in C.D.S.P. No. 12, pt. 2, at 2 (1966); Zaitsev, supra note 151, at 14. This
is a valid ground for refusing to accept the defense because the advocate
is prohibited by law from using illegal methods of defense during the con-
duct of a case. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 51. If the accused insists
on their use, he will have to dismiss the advocate and conduct his own
defense. Id. art. 50.
847 Nanikishvili is the leading proponent of this theory. Nanikishvili,
supra note 137, at 36.
38 Goldiner, supra note 346, at 3; Zaitsev, supra note 151, at 14. This
controversy reflects the opposing viewpoints expressed in the debate over
the role of defense counsel discussed in text accompanying notes 127-63,
supra.
349 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CmM. PRO. C. arts. 201, 202(2); R.S.F.S.R. KOM-
MENTARII 374.
850 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. CODE art. 201. Normally, counsel and the
accused study the materials independently in order to save time. N.
IAKUBOVICH, supra note 320, at 38; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 14. If the
materials are studied together, counsel must be sure that the accused
acquaints himself with them personally, and not through counsel. Kagano-
vich, supra note 320, at 28.
851 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 51, 201, 202(2). N. IAKUBOVIcH,
supra note 320, at 38; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 14.
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this final stage of the preliminary investigation,8 5 2 but if counsel
deliberately prolongs the examination of the materials as a delay
tactic, the investigator may fix a period within which the examina-
tion must be completed and submit it to the procurator for his
approval.353  On the other hand, the investigator must not impose
an unreasonable limitation, as when one investigator allowed the
accused only three hours to acquaint himself with a 347-page dos-
sier. The trial court held that this constituted a violation of the
accused's right to defense and remanded the case for a supple-
mentary investigation.35 4
Counsel may request to meet with the accused in private prior
to the presentation of the dossier or after the materials of the pre-
liminary investigation have been examined.3 5 In either case, the
primary topic for discussion will be the presentation of petitions
for supplementary evidence.35 6 The reason for requesting a private
meeting is to encourage free and full disclosure on the part of the
accused. 57  Investigators are prone to misinterpret the request
for privacy, however, and refuse to leave the room for fear the
meeting will obstruct the administration of justice.358 As Soviet
commentators point out, the investigator's fears are groundless and
it is a violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure to deny counsel
the right to meet with the accused alone. 59
Once counsel has become acquainted with the materials of the
preliminary investigation, he is able to determine what supple-
mental evidence is necessary to strengthen the case for the ac-
5 2 N. IAKUBOVICH, supra note 320, at 41; Shein, Protsessual'naia deiatel'-
nost' zashchitnika na predvaritel'nom sledstvii (Procedural Activities of
Defense Counsel at the Preliminary Investigation), [1963] 3 Soy. IUST. 11,
12.
353 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 374; N. IAKUBOVICH, supra note 320, at 41;
N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 291; Shein, supra note 352, at
12.
Special problems arise when a defendant dismisses three or four advo-
cates while becoming acquainted with the materials of the case. Each
advocate must be permitted to examine the entire file, and this substan-
tially delays the drawing up of a conclusion to indict. Dubovik, supra
note 338, at 9.
354 Minosian, [1966] 3 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 26 (Mil. Div. Sup. Ct.
U.S.S.R. 1965). Violations of this type are apt to occur when the investi-
gator does not allot sufficient time at the end of the investigation for
becoming acquainted with the materials of the case and then discovers
that his two-month period for conducting the investigation has almost
come to a close. Aleshin & Furer, supra note 319, at 25.
355 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 51, 202; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII
376; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 14; Uchastie zashchity v predvaritel'nom
sledstvii, supra note 319, at 32.
356 Karneeva, supra note 322, at 14.
357 R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 219.
358 Kaganovich, supra note 320, at 29.
359 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 375-76; Kaganovich, supra note 320, at 29;
Uchastie zashchity v predvaritel'nom sledstvii, supra note 319, at 30.
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cused. There is no limitation on the types of evidence which may
be adduced, and both counsel and the accused are empowered to
present supplemental evidence at the end of the preliminary in-
vestigation. 6 0  The primary problem facing the defense is there-
fore how to obtain the evidence. 61 Written documents and other
items of real evidence in the possession of the accused, his friends
or relatives may be turned over to defense counsel and presented
to the investigator.3 62 An advocate can also demand from state
and public organizations "certificates, character references and
other documents relevant to . . . [the case]" through the consul-
tation office.363  Only a limited amount of evidence can be ob-
tained in these ways, however. All other evidence must be pro-
cured by petitioning the investigator to interrogate additional wit-
nesses; obtain specified articles or documents; or conduct a sup-
plementary expert examination, confrontation, or investigative
experiment.3 64  This seriously limits counsel's ability to collect
evidence favorable to the defense because the investigator may,
and often does, deny petitions for supplemental evidence. Counsel's
360 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 46, 51, 70, 201, 202(4); Shein,
supra note 352, at 12.
361 Shein, supra note 352, at 13; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra
note 343, at 38.
362 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 165; Iakubovich, Uchastie advokate v
dokazyvanii po ugolovnornu delu (Participation of an Advocate in Present-
ing Proof in a Criminal Case), [1963] 11 SOTS. ZAK. 42, 43; Karneeva, supra
note 322, at 15; Shein, supra note 352, at 13.
363 Law of July 25, 1962, art. 26, [1962] 15-16 Soy. IusT. 31 (Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.); R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 165; Iakubovich, supra note 362,
at 43; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 15; Shein, supra note 352, at 13; Vydria,
supra note 137, at 17.
364 R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. PRO. C. art. 204; Kaliaev, Iz opyta uchastiia zashch-
ity v predvaritel'nom sledstvii (From the Experience of Defense Counsel
Participating in the Preliminary Investigation), [1964] 9 Soy. IUST. 16;
Karneeva, supra note 322, at 15; Liakhovich & Itskov, supra note 306, at 49;
Shein, supra note 352, at 13; Vatman & Kisenishskii, Rol' advokata v
osushchestvlenii prava obviniamogo na zashchitu (Role of an Advocate in
Effecting an Accused's Right to Defense), [1962] 8 Soy. IusT. 20.
Any evidence may be petitioned which has not been considered by the
investigator during the earlier part of the preliminary investigation and
which is relevant to the issues in the case. Iakubovich, supra note 362, at
44.
There are times when the accused and counsel disagree on the merits
of petitioning a particular item of evidence. Those who regard counsel as
a procedurally independent figure maintain that either counsel or the
accused may submit petitions in his own name over the objections of the
other. Id.; see text accompanying notes 127-42, supra. Those who em-
phasize the procedural alliance between counsel and the accused recom-
mend that the accused be permitted to submit petitions in his own name,
and that counsel be forbidden to denounce them, but that counsel not be
permitted to present a petition over the objections of the accused. If he
does, they suggest that he advise the accused of his right to obtain the
services of another advocate. Liakhovich & Itskov, supra note 306, at 50;
Shein, supra note 352, at 12; see text accompanying notes 143-63, supra.
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only recourse is to appeal the denial of the defense petition to the
supervising procurator.65 As unsatisfactory as this system may
seem to lawyers trained in the Anglo-American tradition that
evidence is procured by the parties, there are certain functions
of the investigator which will probably never be transferred to
the advokatura. For example, the summoning of experts and
witnesses will undoubtedly continue to be a privilege reserved
to the investigator as long as the preliminary investigation is
conducted as an inquisitional, not an adversary proceeding. On
the other hand, it is quite possible that in the future counsel
will be empowered to collect real evidence from individuals through
the consultation office of the college of advocates.3 66 The adoption
of such a reform would greatly enhance the accused's right to
defense because the evidence adduced at the preliminary investi-
gation is extremely critical to the outcome of the trial.
When counsel petitions supplemental evidence, he may be pres-
ent with the permission of the investigator during the performance
of the investigative activities.3 67 Apparently, it is a privilege
which is all too rarely exercised.368 When counsel does participate,
he is permitted to submit questions to the person being inter-
rogated and to observe the manner in which the investigative
activity is being conducted. Procedural violations may be brought
to the investigator's attention, and if they are not corrected im-
mediately, counsel may make a note of them in the written record
of the investigative action.3 6 9 Since errors in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation serve as grounds for reversing a convic-
tion and since counsel's interrogation of defense witnesses may
bring out information unsolicited by the investigator, counsel's
presence during these supplementary investigative activities is criti-
cal to the accused's exercise of his right to defense. It has there-
fore been recommended that Soviet advocates play a more active
role in the conduct of investigative actions petitioned by the de-
fense.870
The second function performed by counsel at the end of the
preliminary investigation is the protection of the accused's pro-
cedural rights. An advocate is specifically empowered to challenge
365 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 131, 218; Iakubovich, supra note
362, at 43, 45. For a discussion of the investigator's frequent failure to
grant defense petitions and counsel's problems in submitting appeals see
text accompanying notes 379-92.
366 Stetsovskii, Uchastie zashchitnika v dokazyvanii po ugolovnomu delu
(Participation of an Advocate in Presenting Proof in a Criminal Case), 6
Soy. IUST. 14, 15 (1967).
367 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CrIM. PRO. C. arts. 51, 202(7); A. KoBHLIov, supra
note 223, at 51; Iakubovich, supra note 362, at 43.
368 Vatman & Kisenishskii, supra note 364, at 20.
369 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 376; A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at 51.
370 A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at 52; Gershingorin, supra note 321, at
22; Iakubovich, supra note 362, at 42.
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an investigator, procurator, expert, or interpreter who has previ-
ously participated in the case in another capacity or who has a
personal interest in its outcome. 371 He may also "bring complaints
to the procurator against actions of the investigator which vio-
late or prejudice the rights of defense counsel or the accused. '372
Finally, a catch-all clause empowering counsel to submit petitions
with respect to "all other questions of significance for the case"
has been cited as authority for presenting petitions regarding such
procedural matters as a reduction of the measure of restraint and
the joinder or disjoinder of cases.3 73
The catch-all clause also serves to justify the performance of
counsel's third function: safeguarding the substantive rights of the
accused. In fulfilling this duty, counsel frequently presents peti-
tions requesting a change in the classification of a crime or de-
mands that the case be terminated.3 7 4 It is particularly important
that the latter request be made at the end of the preliminary
investigation, for if it is granted, the accused will be spared the
anguish of a public trial and the stigma which attaches to a
defendant after the conclusion to indict has been presented.
6. VIOLATIONS OF THE ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO DEFENSE
Despite the fact that investigators are obliged to grant well-
founded petitions,3 75 statistics show that no more than 80 percent,
and often as few as 40 percent of the defense petitions presented
in a given year receive favorable treatment.3 76 Partial blame for
this phenomenon can be laid upon defense counsel. Some peti-
tions are not well-founded; they are presented merely to delay the
371 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 23, 51, 63, 64, 66, 67, 202(5). For
a fuller discussion of the grounds for a challenge see note 195, supra. The
procedure for ruling on a challenge is described in R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM.
PRO. C. art. 130.
372 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 202(6).
373 Id. art. 202(4); R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 376; R. RAKHUNOV, supra
note 104, at 219; N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 95-96.
374 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 376; R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 221;
N. ZHOGrn & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 96; Kaliaev, supra note 364,
at 16; Shein, supra note 352, at 12; Shein, supra note 232, at 118; Vatman
& Kisenishskii, supra note 364, at 20. For a discussion of the circumstances
under which a case may be terminated see text accompanying notes 444-49,
i nra.
375 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 131, 204.
376 Gushchin, 0 zashchite na predvaritel'nom sledstvii (On the Defense
at the Preliminary Investigation), [1961] 22 Soy. IUST. 22; Kaliaev, supra
note 364, at 16; Stremovskii & Teplinskii, supra note 322, at 13. In Rostov,
in 1961, 57% of the petitions for supplemental evidence, 43% of the peti-
tions to terminate the case, and 37% of the petitions to change the classifi-
cation of the crime were granted. Kaliaev, supra note 364, at 16; Stremov-
skii, Advokaty uspeshno vynolniaiut svoi zadachi (Advocates Successfully
Carry Out Their Duties), [1962] 8 Soy. IUST. 7. Approximately 20% of the
petitions denied by investigators were subsequently recognized by the
courts.
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proceedings.377  And some petitions are not drafted until long
after the advocate has become familiar with the materials of the
case, making it difficult for the investigator to complete the pre-
liminary investigation within the allotted timeY8  Nevertheless,
the bulk of the blame must be placed upon the investigators.
They assume a formalistic attitude toward petitions presented
by the defense, often rejecting them without providing a reasoned
explanation for their action.370 When time is of the essence, they
deny a petition on the understanding that it can be presented again
in court.380  Almost inevitably they take advantage of a series of
loopholes in the Code of Criminal Procedure to cut off the accused's
right to appeal. 38 1 The Code sets no time within which an in-
vestigator must take action on defense petitions. The investiga-
tor's decision to deny a petition is therefore postponed until the
day that jurisdiction over the case is transferred to the procurator.
Several days later the accused is finally informed of the investiga-
tor's action. By the time he is able to present an appeal to the
procurator, the procurator has referred the case to court for a judi-
cial review of the conclusion to indict.38 2 Since the procurator no
longer has jurisdiction, the accused's right to appeal is effec-
tively cut off and the petition must be submitted again for consid-
eration by the court.3 3 The result is often a remand for a time-
377 Bilinsky, supra note 302, at 70; Gushchin, supra note 376, at 22;
Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 343, at 32.
378 Dubovik, supra note 338, at 9. The investigation must normally be
completed within two months. For a discussion of the possible extensions
see note 216, supra.
379 Kaliaev, supra note 364, at 17; Karneeva, supra note 322, at 15.
"If the investigator denies a petition, in whole or in part, he shall be
obliged to render a decree indicating the reasons for denial." R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 131; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARn 282.
380 N. IAKUBOVICH, supra note 320, at 50.
381 Kaliaev, supra note 364, at 17; Savitskii, Nuzhny garantii prava na
obzhalovanie postanovlenii sledovatelia (Guarantees of the Right to Appeal
the Investigator's Decisions Are Needed), [1965] 24 Soy. IusT. 19; Shafir,
supra note 231, at 49.
382 A procurator must refer a case to court within five days of the time
it is referred to him by an investigator. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRiM. PRO. C. art.
214.
383 "After referral of the case to court, all petitions and complaints in
the case shall be referred directly to the court." Id. art. 217. The appeal
can be cut off in this manner because "[u]ntil its resolution, the bringing
of an appeal shall not suspend the execution of the action appealed from,
if such is not found necessary by the . . . investigator, or the procurator,
as appropriate." Id. art. 218.
Although the procurator no longer retains jurisdiction to satisfy an
appeal, it has been pointed out that a procurator exercising his general
supervisory powers can reprimand the investigator and protest the court's
decision on appeal if it refuses to grant what the procurator considers to
be a well-founded petition.
Occasionally the defense petition can be considered by the court at the
bringing to trial. In many instance, however, the case will have been
brought to trial by the time counsel is notified that the procurator no
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consuming and disruptive supplementary investigation.38 4
It is not surprising that counsel's response has been to bypass
the procurator.3 15 In 1961, 41 percent of the petitions denied by
investigators in the Russian Republic were appealed to the pro-
curator; in 1962, it had dropped to 34 percent; and by 1964, it was
down to 14 percent.38 6  The result has been an increase in the
number of petitions presented to the court and a simultaneous in-
crease in the number of cases remanded for a supplementary in-
vestigation.3 7 Even more alarming, however, is the trend to by-
pass the investigator. Petitions for supplemental evidence are now
being presented for the first time to the court, partly as a delay
tactic, partly in hopes that they will receive more favorable con-
sideration, but partly because there is no actual right of appeal
from an investigator's decision.38 8
To eliminate the loopholes which have caused this chain reaction,
a four-step reform has been suggested by a number of Soviet jurists.
Their proposals are identical in broad outline; it is only in the
details that they differ. As a first step, it has been agreed that
article 218 of the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Criminal Procedure should be
revised so that a procurator cannot refer a case to court pending
appeal of an investigator's decision. 38 9 Secondly, a definite time
period for drafting defense petitions should be established. Twen-
ty-four hours from the time that counsel and the accused have
become fully acquainted with the materials of the case has been
suggested. 390  Thirdly, all investigators should be required to rule
on defense petitions within a specified number of hours-24 and 72
have been recommended.391 And fourthly, counsel should be given
approximately 48 hours to appeal the investigator's denial of his
petition.392 Adoption of such a reform would not only improve
the quality of the preliminary investigation, but would also
speed the administration of justice because all questions regard-
longer has jurisdiction over it. This postpones the presentation of the
appeal until the beginning of the trial in the court of first instance. Id.
arts 223, 226, 239; Savitskii, supra note 381, at 19.
384 Savitskii, supra note 381, at 19.
385 N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 96; Karneeva, supra
note 322, at 15.
386 Savitskii, supra note 381, at 19.
387 Karneeva, supra note 322, at 15; Savitskii, supra note 381, at 19.
388 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 126; Bilinsky, supra note 302, at 70; Kagan-
ovich, supra note 320, at 29; Shein, supra note 352, at 12; Sokolov, Tsubin
& Iarzhenets, supra 343, at 32.
389 Savitskii, supra note 381, at 20-21.
390 Id. at 20.
391 Kaliaev, supra note 364, at 17; Savitskii, supra note 381, at 21; Shafir,
supra note 231, at 49; Tsubin, Ob effectivnosti sudebnoi zashchity (On the
Effectiveness of Legal Defense), [1966] 7 SoTs. ZAK. 65, 67.
392 Kaliaev, supra note 364, at 17; Savitskii, supra note 381, at 21; Shafir,
supra note 231, at 49; Tsubin, supra note 391, at 67.
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ing the conduct of the preliminary investigation would be resolved
prior to the bringing to trial.
7. EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO THE BEGINNING OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
a. Suggested reforms
In addition to the specific reforms discussed above, proposals
for an extension of the right to counsel to the beginning of the
preliminary investigation are now being advanced with increasing
frequency. 93 The most liberal jurists are advocating counsel's
active participation in all cases during all phases of the prelimi-
nary investigation from the moment the accusation is presented.3 94
The more moderate jurists are suggesting that certain restrictions
be placed upon the right to counsel during the early stages of the
preliminary investigation. For example, Kovalev proposes that
counsel be admitted from the beginning of the investigation only
in serious or complex criminal cases.s 95 Lukashevich suggests that
counsel be permitted to enter the case only after the accused has
first been interrogated.8 96 And several jurists recommend that
counsel be permitted to attend only those investigative activities
which cannot be duplicated in court.39 7
There is certainly adequate precedent for extending the right to
counsel to the beginning of the preliminary investigation. In
France, lawyers play an active role during the instruction crimi-
nelle.398 In Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, and East Germany,
393 Perlov, supra note 231, at 39.
394 Chetunova, The Right to Defend, Literaturnaia Gazeta, Sept. 20, 1966,
at 2, transl. in 18 C.D.S.P. No. 38, at 18 (1966); Kuprishin, The Defense
Counsel and the Investigation, Izvestia, Sept. 15, 1967, at 3, transl. in 19
C.D.S.P. No. 37, at 23 (1967); Shein, supra note 232, at 120.
395 Kovalev, Rasshirit' uchastie zashchitnika na predvaritel'nom sledstvii(The Participation of Defense Counsel in the Preliminary Investigation
Should Be Expanded), [1967] 23 Soy. IUST. 23. More specifically, he sug-
gests that counsel participate from the beginning of the preliminary investi-
gation (1) when the accused is charged with a crime punishable by impris-
onment for five or more years, or (2) when an accusation is presented to
two or more persons in one case. Id.
396 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 201, at 90. Lukashevich's proposal re-
flects the French practice of permitting (riot requiring) the accused to
make a statement before counsel enters the case. A formal interrogation
is then held at which counsel does participate and during which the accused
may be closely questioned on the facts of the case. Anton, supra note 234,
at 448.
397 N. POLIANSKII, OCHERK RAZVITIIA SOVETSKOI NAUKI UGOLOVNOGO
PROTSESSA (Essay on the Development of the Soviet Scholarship on Crim-
inal Procedure) 139 (1960); Taras, supra note 294, at 225. Visits to the
scene of the crime, post-mortem examinations, and the interrogation of
witnesses who cannot appear at the trial are frequently cited as examples
of investigative activities which counsel should be permitted to attend. Id.
398 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 74; Anton, supra note 234, at
448.
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counsel is permitted to enter the case from the time the accusa-
tion is presented. 99 And in the Soviet Union, minors and persons
physically or mentally unable to conduct their own defense bene-
fit from a lawyer's services. 40 0
Sound arguments have been advanced by those who advocate an
extension of the right to counsel. They assert that the typical
defendant has no knowledge of the law and is therefore unable to
exercise his right to defense without counsel's assistance. 40 1 As-
suming the investigator has at least a slight accusatory bias,
40 2
they maintain that he should be confronted by an "equal adver-
sary"-a man legally trained and capable of evaluating the evi-
dence.408 If counsel were admitted from the outset, he could
assist in developing the case by petitioning the production of per-
tinent evidence.40 4 Like the investigator, he could submit a written
evaluation of the case materials and present a list of witnesses to
be summoned to the trial.40 5 Finally, if violations of the accused's
procedural rights occurred, counsel could object and request that
remedial action be taken immediately, thereby eliminating the
need for a supplementary investigation.
40 6
b. Established precedent: right to counsel from the beginning of
the preliminary investigation for minors and persons physically or
mentally unable to conduct their own defense
To appreciate the value of counsel's participation during the
early phases of the preliminary investigation, it is helpful to study
the role played by an advocate in cases involving minors and
persons unable to conduct their own defense. Counsel enters
these cases from the moment the accusation is presented.40 7 Prior
to that time, he may examine the materials providing a basis for
the decree to prosecute.40 8  This enables him to prepare for the
399 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 201, at 84-86.
400 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 22.
401 Kuprishin, supra note 394, at 23; Shafir, supra note 231, at 48-49;
Shein, supra note 232, at 120.
402 For a discussion of the controversy concerning the existence of an
accusatory bias among investigators see text accompanying notes 265-67,
282-85, supra.
403 Kuprishin, supra note 394, at 23.
404 Chetunova, supra note 394, at 18; Shafir, supra note 231, at 49.
405 Chetunova, supra note 394, at 18.
406 Id.
407 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIm. PRO. C. art. 47. Apparently, there have been
instances when an investigator has prevented the presentation of the accu-
sation until the end of the preliminary investigation by holding the accused
as a suspect during the early stages of the investigation. Sonin & Vaisman,
supra note 342, at 57.
408 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 51; L. KARNEEVA, PRIVLECHENIE V
KACHESTVA OBVINIAMOGO (Prosecution as the Accused) 67-68 (1962); Stet-
sovskii, Postanovlenie o privlechenii v kachestve obviniamogo i zashchita
ot pred" 'iavlennogo obvineniia (Decree to Prosecute as the Accused and
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presentation of the accusation and the subsequent questioning of
the accused. Counsel must be permitted to attend the presenta-
tion of the accusation so that he can observe the manner in which
the accused is informed of the charges brought against him and
of his procedural rights. 40 9 At this point, counsel can also deter-
mine whether to protest the severity of the measure of restraint.410
The interrogation of the accused takes place immediately after
the presentation of the decree to prosecute.41 1 The procedure for
interrogating the accused passes through three distinct stages. At
the outset, the investigator asks the accused whether he consid-
ers himself guilty. Then the accused is requested to give testimony
concerning the charges brought against him. This testimony is not
to be interrupted by questions from the investigator. When the
accused has completed his narration, the investigator poses ques-
tions to clarify and supplement certain portions of the testimony.41 2
Defense against the Presented Accusation), [1965] 19 Soy. IusT. 11, 12-13;
Uchastie zashchity v predvaritel'nom sledstvii, supra note 319, at 31.
409 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CpM. PRO. C. art. 51(1); R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 114;
Elesin, Prisutstvie zashchitnika pri pred"iavlenii nesovershennoletnemu
obvineniia i svidanie s obviniaemym (Defense Counsel's Presence at the
Presentation of the Accusation to a Minor and Meeting with the Accused),
[1963] VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO UNIVERSITETA, Seria 10, Pravo, 45.
410 It is the procurator who has primary responsibility for supervising
the application of measures of restraint. "No person shall be placed under
arrest except by decision of a court of law or with the sanction of a procu-
rator." U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 127. Nevertheless, counsel may present a peti-
tion requesting a reduction in the measure of restraint applied to his client.
R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CiM. PRo. C. art. 202 (4).
A measure of restraint may be applied "if there exists sufficient
grounds for supposing that an accused will hide from . . . a preliminary
investigation... , or that he will hinder the establishment of the truth in
a criminal case, or that he will engage in criminal activity .... Id. art.
89. Other circumstances considered when selecting a measure of restraint
are the gravity of the accusation, the personality of the suspect or accused,
the nature of his occupational activities, his age, the state of his health,
and his family situation. Id. art. 91.
The measures of restraint which may be applied include the following:
signed promise not to depart; personal surety; surety of a social organiza-
tion; confinement under guard. Id. arts. 89, 93-96.
The maximum period for confinement under guard is nine months.
Special permission must be obtained from a procurator to prolong confine-
ment under guard beyond the initial two-month period. Id. art. 97. "A
procurator shall be obliged to release immediately any person illegally
deprived of freedom or kept under guard for more than a term provided
by law . . . ." Id. art. 11.
411 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CraM. PRo. C. art. 150. The interrogation is held
immediately after the presentation of the accusation so that the accused
will not have time to fabricate testimony. N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra
note 218, at 227. A short recess can be taken for the accused to refresh his
memory, however. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 303; N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKUL-
LN, supra note 218, at 228.
412 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 150; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARir 304;
Elesin, supra note 409, at 46. The emphasis will be on free narration if
the defendant confesses, and on the subsequent interrogation if the accused
denies his guilt. N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 230-32.
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This same procedure is followed, regardless of whether the accused
admits or denies his guilt. The purpose of the interrogation is
to obtain additional evidence; it does not matter whether it is
favorable to the prosecution or the defense. 413
Counsel has a statutory right to be present at the interrogation
of the accused, 414 and when he does attend, his first duty is to
listen carefully to the accused's testimony so that he can correct
any errors in the written record of the proceedings. 415 If the
accused pleads guilty, counsel must determine whether the act to
which he confesses contains all the elements of the crime charged.
If not, counsel must call this to the investigator's attention.416
Counsel should also direct the investigator's attention to any
violations of the accused's procedural rights which may occur dur-
ing the interrogation.417 If no remedial action is taken, he may
complain to the procurator.418  Finally, with the investigator's
permission, counsel may direct questions to the accused. 419 This
permits him to bring out all the facts favorable to the defense at
an early stage in the proceedings. If the investigator feels that
counsel's questions are improper or irrelevant, he may forbid the
accused to answer, but he must enter the excluded questions in
the record.420
It would seem that counsel's primary concern at this stage of the
preliminary investigation would be to warn his client against the
dangers of confessing. It is true that an uncorroborated confession
can no longer be made the sole basis for a conviction in the Soviet
Union, as it was during the Great Purge trials of the 1930's in
cases involving certain counterrevolutionary crimes. 421  Corrobo-
ration is now required because the drafters of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure realized that an innocent person may confess under
duress,422 may confess to protect another,423 or may admit his guilt
413 N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 225-26.
414 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CIM. PRO. C. art. 51(1).
415 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 51(3), 151; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMEN-
TARII 127; Elesin, supra note 409, at 47.
416 Elesin, supra note 409, at 46.
417 Id. at 47; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 343, at 37.
418 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 202(6), 218; Rakhunov, Pred'-
iavlenie obvineniia i dopros obviniaemogo (Presentation of the Accusation
and Interrogation of the Accused), [1961] 4 SOTS. ZAK. 41, 43; Sokolov,
Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 343, at 37.
419 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CalM. PRO. C. art. 51(1); R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII
127; R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 220; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets,
supra note 343, at 37.
420 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CalM. PRO. C. art. 51; Rakhunov, supra note 418, at
43. Leading questions are improper. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 305.
421 H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 70-71 (1963); B. GALKIN, supra
note 201, at 182; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 92; Bilinsky, supra
note 302, at 67.
422 A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at 12-13; Strogovich, Judicial Error,
Literaturnaia Gazeta, May 23, 1964, at 2, transl. in 16 C.D.S.P. No. 39, at 23,
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out of ignorance of the law when in fact he has not committed an
act containing the elements of the crime charged. 424 Nevertheless,
a confession confirmed by the totality of the evidence in the case
may still be used as a basis for a conclusion to indict at the end of
the preliminary investigation or as a basis for a conviction at the
end of the trial.425 It is therefore interesting to note that counsel
rarely requests to meet with the accused in private prior to the
conduct of the interrogation.426 He seems to rely upon the investi-
gator to warn the accused of his right to remain silent. The ac-
cused is told that under the Code of Criminal Procedure he has
"a right," not "a duty" to testify,427 and that a refusal to testify
will not be regarded as evidence of his guilt.428  Apparently the
24 (1964). Investigators are now forbidden to obtain the accused's testi-
mony by 'use of force, threats, or any other illegal means. U.S.S.R. 1958
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 14; R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. C. art.
179; R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 20. However, psychological pres-
sures may still be exerted. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 305; G. FEIFER, supra
note 182, at 91-92. And after an accused has been confined under guard
for several months, there is little difference between the results obtained
through the use of psychological pressures and those obtained by means of
brute force-the accused will say what the investigator wants to hear. In
this connection it is interesting to note that prior to the adoption of the
Principles of Criminal Law, investigators sought to have "frank confes-
sion" included as a ground for mitigating criminal responsibility. This
would have enabled them to "reward" a defendant who confessed, regard-
less of his motives. Schlesinger, supra note 293, at 303-04. Instead, "sin-
cere repentance" is now listed as a circumstance mitigating criminal re-
sponsibility. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. C. art. 38(9).
423 Feofanov, Nikolaiev v. Nikolaiev, Izvestia, Oct. 5, 1967, transl. in 19
C.D.S.P. No. 40, at 33-34 (1967); Strogovich, supra note 422, at 24.
424 Nanikishvili, supra note 137, at 35-36; Sukharev, Pressing Problems,
supra note 99, at 41-42.
425 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 77; Decree of March 18, 1963, Strict
Adherence to Law by Courts in Criminal Trials, [1963] 3 Bull. Verkh. Suda
S.S.S.R. 3 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.), transl. in 2 Soy. L. & Gov'T No. 2, at 17, 20
(1963); Strogovich, Kalenov & Gertsezon, supra note 223, at 40. Failure to
corroborate a confession constitutes grounds for a remand to conduct a
supplementary investigation. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 232, 258;
Stetsovskii, supra note 408, at 12. A supplementary investigation was
ordered in the case of Mirzoian when the only evidence supporting the
indictment was a confession which Mirzoian alleged was coerced. Mirzoian,
[1963] 6 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 37, transl. in 1 Sov. STAT. & DEC. No. 4,
at 12, 14-17 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R. 1963).
426 See L. KARNEEVA, supra note 408, at 68; Elesin, supra note 409, at
49-50.
427 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 77; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 180.
The burden of proof is on the state to prove the defendant's guilt. U.S.S.R.
1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 14; R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO.
C. art. 20. For a discussion of the presumption of innocence in Soviet crim-
inal proceedings see text accompanying notes 481-94, infra.
Unlike the accused, witnesses may be prosecuted for refusing to answer
an investigator's questions. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. C. art. 182; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art 73.
428 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 181; V. KAMINSKAIA, POKAZANIIA OBVINI-
AMOGO V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE (Testimony of the Accused in
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investigator's warning alone is inadequate, however, because the
vast majority of Soviet defendants do take advantage of their "right
to testify. '429  It would therefore seem advisable for counsel to
request a private meeting with his client prior to the interroga-
tion in which he could encourage his client to remain silent as
opposed to confessing his guilt. The one exception to this rule
might be the case of a client whose guilt is so clearly proven that
it would be to his advantage to confess because "sincere repent-
ance" is one of the mitigating circumstances taken into considera-
tion by the court when selecting the measure of punishment.430
Should the accused decide to testify in his own defense, counsel
ought to warn him that it is better to remain silent than to lie.
A defendant bears no criminal responsibility for giving false testi-
mony in the Soviet Union,431 but such testimony has been used
as circumstantial proof of guilt if it was proven that the defendant
intentionally lied to escape criminal responsibility. 4 2  Likewise,
there are many Soviet jurists who believe that false testimony can
properly be regarded as an aggravating circumstance 433 despite
the fact that it has been termed a violation of the accused's
right to defense to increase his sentence for failing to tell the
truth.434
After the interrogation of the accused, counsel and his client
normally meet in private to discuss the nature of the charges, the
accused's procedural rights, and the evidence to be submitted on
behalf of the defense. 435 The investigator then begins to conduct
investigative activities which counsel is entitled to attend regard-
less of whether they are initiated by the prosecution or the de-
fense.436 If he cannot be present, he may request to be informed
Soviet Criminal Proceedings) 36, 43 (1960); A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V.
RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 130.
429 V. KAMINSKAIA, supra note 428, at 35-36. Apparently French defend-
ants also almost invariably make statements. Anton, supra note 234, at 448.
430 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. C. art. 38(9).
431 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 181; Kosogor & Smirnov (Crim. Div. Sup.
Ct. R.S.F.S.R. [no date]), in COLLECTION OF DECREES OF THE PLENUM AND
PRESIDIUM AND RULINGS OF THE JUDICIAL DIVISION FOR CRIMINAL CASES OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE RSFSR, 1961-63, at 75 (L. Smirnov ed. 1964),
transl. in 1 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 4, at 18, 19-20 (1963). Witnesses, on the
other hand, may be prosecuted for giving false testimony. R.S.F.S.R. 1960
CRIM. C. art. 181.
432 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 67-68; V. KAMINSKAIA, supra note 428, at 37-
39, 41; Petrukhin, Imeiut 1i dokazatel'stvennoe znachenie lozhnye pokazaniia
obviniaemogo (Does the False Testimony of the Accused have any Evi-
dentiary Value), [1965] 7 Soy. IUST. 15.
433 Petrukhin, supra note 432, at 17.
434 V. KAMINSKAIA, supra note 428, at 45; A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223,
at 24. False testimony is not listed as an aggravating circumstance in
R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. C. art. 39.
435 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 51; Elesin, supra note 409, at 50.
436 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 51(2); Karneeva, supra note 322,
at 14. It has been suggested that counsel may be excluded if his presence
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of the results. 43 7 When he does attend, he is permitted to inter-
rogate witnesses and victims (with the permission of the investi-
gator) and to observe the manner in which searches, seizures,
views, examinations, confrontations of witnesses, identifications,
and investigative experiments are conducted. 48s If procedural vio-
lations occur, or if the investigation is not conducted in an impar-
tial manner, he may request the investigator to take remedial
action or direct a complaint to the procurator. 439 Counsel's pres-
ence is particularly important during the conduct of expert exami-
nations. The accused is entitled to select or challenge an expert,
examine the expert opinion, attend the expert examination, and
submit supplemental questions.440 Since a certain amount of exper-
tise is required to read and evaluate an expert opinion and to
formulate intelligent questions, counsel's assistance is an ab-
solute prerequisite to the accused's exercise of these procedural
rights. 441
As a matter of fact, it is difficult to understand how a "healthy
adult" is able to conduct his own defense during the early stages
of the preliminary investigation. Proponents of the status quo
maintain that counsel's presence from the beginning of the investi-
gation would be superfluous for such adults because the investi-
gator and procurator are already obligated to assist the accused
in refuting the accusation. 442  Moreover, disinterested witnesses
are also available to ensure the impartial conduct of investiga-
tive activities and to report the occurrence of any procedural ir-
regularities violating the accused's right to defense. These argu-
ments are not convincing, however. In the first place, there is
good reason to believe that the agencies of investigation conduct
the preliminary investigation with an accusatory bias. Since the
ordinary defendant is totally unfamiliar with either substantive or
procedural criminal law, he is not equipped to conduct his own de-
fense without the services of an advocate. And secondly, since
the witnesses to investigative activities are laymen without any
legal training, they are not as well prepared as counsel to detect
procedural violations and to provide a check on the thoroughness
and impartiality with which investigatory proceedings are con-
would intimidate the person being interrogated (as in cases involving sex
crimes), if information might be divulged -which should not be made pub-
lic, or if the investigator is unable to inform counsel in advance of the time
and place for the investigative activity. Iakubovich, supra note 362, at 44.
437 Karneeva, supra note 322, at 14.
438 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRo. C. art. 51(2); Karneeva, supra note 322,
at 14; Sokolov, Tsubin & Iarzhenets, supra note 343, at 37.
439 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 51, 202(6).
440 Id. art. 185. The procedure for conducting an expert examination is
described in id. arts. 184, 186-94.
441 Id. art. 51(2); R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 347, 349, 361-62.
442 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 19; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 63-64,
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ducted. Furthermore, they are present at only a limited number
of activities-views, searches, seizures, investigative experiments,
and examinations-whereas counsel would also be present at the
interrogation of the accused, experts, and witnesses.
It is true that the preliminary investigation is an inquisitional
proceeding, and that counsel would therefore play a somewhat
limited role in the collection of evidence even if he were admitted
from the beginning of the investigation. However, the adoption
of the suggested reform to expand the types of evidence which
counsel can procure through the consultation office would place
him in an excellent position to improve the completeness and ob-
jectivity of the preliminary investigation. And even if the reform
were not adopted, counsel's presence during the early phases of the
investigation would serve as an important procedural safeguard of
the accused's right to defense. Requests could be submitted im-
mediately after the presentation of the accusation for a reduction
in the charges or a termination of the case. Counsel could detect
and object to procedural violations as they occurred, thereby elimi-
nating the need for many supplementary investigations. He could
elicit information which the investigator might otherwise never
solicit by cross-examining witnesses favorable to the prosecution
and by interrogating witnesses favorable to the defense. And if
he were permitted to evaluate the evidence collected during the
investigative activities, he could submit a brief for the court to
compare with the appraisal of the evidence submitted by the in-
vestigator. None of these activities would be inconsistent with
the inquisitional form of the preliminary investigation. They would
simply improve the quality of the evidence by introducing an
adversary figure charged with the limited responsibility of elimi-
nating any accusatory bias from the conduct of the investigatory
proceedings.
D. Conclusion to Indict or Terminate the Case
After the supplementary investigative actions requested by the
defense at the end of the preliminary investigation have been con-
ducted, the investigator signs a conclusion to indict or a decree to
terminate the case.443 Termination of a case may be ordered if the
accused is innocent, as when the act committed does not contain
the elements of a crime444 or "the participation of [the] accused
in the commission of the crime has not been proved, and .. .all
possibilities for collecting supplementary evidence have been ex-
hausted. '445 A case may also be terminated if the accused is
443 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 199, 207-09.
444 Id. art. 5(2). Termination may also be ordered "in the absence of
the event of the crime." Id. art. 5(1).
445 Id. art. 208(2). Since the phraseology of this provision does not
make it clear that the accused is innocent, a new ground for terminating
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guilty, as when the statute of limitations has run,446 the act com-
mitted or the person committing it has ceased to be socially dan-
gerous, 447 the accused has been pardoned, 44 or the defendant has
been released to a correctional agency for re-education.449 A copy
of the decree to terminate must be sent to the procurator. If the
decree assumes the accused to be guilty, it may be appealed to the
procurator within five days, thereby permitting the accused to
establish his innocence. 450
A conclusion to indict contains a summary description of the
evidence collected during the preliminary investigation, including
the arguments advanced by the defense and the results of their
verification. 45 1 The procurator has five days in which to examine
the materials, check for procedural violations, and decide whether
to return the case for a supplementary investigation, terminate
the case, or confirm the conclusion to indict (in which case he
may change the classification of the crime or the measure of
restraint) .452 If the procurator confirms the conclusion to indict,
the case is referred to the court that will conduct the bringing to
trial.45
3
a case has been suggested: "The accused did not commit the crime."
Savitskii, Po povodu ugolovno-protsessual'nykh garantii prava nevinovnogo
na reabilitatsiiu (Apropos of the Criminal Procedural Guarantees of the
Innocent Person's Right to Rehabilitation), [1965] 9 S.G. I P. 48, 52.
446 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CalM. PRO. C. art. 5(3).
447 Id. art. 6.
448 Id. art. 5(4).
449 Id. arts. 8-9. A case may also be terminated when it is transferred
to a comrade's court. Id. art. 7.
450 Id. art. 209. The Code permits an appeal from any termination, but
in reality, it is only persons who are seeking to establish their innocence
that take advantage of the Code's provision. Savitskii, supra note 445, at
55.
It has been recommended that the Code explicitly prohibit the termi-
nation of a case on the assumption that the accused is guilty if the defend-
ant expresses a desire to prove his innocence at trial. Savitskii, supra
note 445, at 53-54. Such a right is currently granted when a case is termi-
nated because the statute of limitations has run or because the accused has
been pardoned. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 210. It has also been
suggested that the accused be permitted to become acquainted with the
materials of a terminated case so that he can determine whether to appeal
the investigator's decree. Savitskii, supra note 445, at 55-56.
451 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 205. Appended to the conclusion
to indict is a list of witnesses which the investigator feels should be sum-
moned to the trial. Id. art. 206.
452 Id. art. 214-16. The procurator's supervisory powers are explicitly
set forth by the Code. Id. arts. 211-13. At this time, the procurator may
also consider appeals from actions of an investigator. Id. arts. 218-20.
453 Id. art. 217. The bringing to trial must be held within 14 days of
the date of referral. Id. art. 221.
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VI. BRINGING TO TRIAL
A. Description of the Bringing to Trial
The bringing to trial is a judicial review of the conclusion to
indict. The proceeding is conducted by a single judge, unless he
disagrees with the findings of the conclusion to indict or considers
it necessary to change the measure of restraint, in which case he is
joined by two people's assessors in an "administrative session. '454
The only evidence considered by the court is that collected during
the inquiry or preliminary investigation.4 55 The purpose of the
review is to determine whether a prima facie case has been made
out; i.e., whether the facts set forth would substantiate the ac-
cusation if subsequently proven at the trial.456 In determining
whether to bring the accused to trial, the court considers: (1)
whether it has jurisdiction over the case; (2) whether the evidence
gathered is sufficient for consideration of the case at trial; (3)
whether the procedural requirements of the Code have been met
during the inquiry and/or preliminary investigation; (4) whether
the criminal law is correctly applied to the acts imputed to the
accused; (5) whether the proper measure of restraint has been
selected; and (6) whether circumstances exist to warrant termi-
nation of the case.457 The court may decide to bring the accused
to trial,458 return the case for a supplementary investigation, 459
454 Id. arts. 221, 224. For a description of the people's assessors see text
accompanying notes 505-10, infra.
Between 1929 and 1934, the procuracy presided over the bringing to
trial. N. POLIANSKn, supra note 397, at 142. The theoreticians of the early
Stalinist era agreed that to assign this power to the court would imply a
lack of confidence in the procuracy, and that the court would then be
duplicating the procuracy's function of controlling the work of the inves-
tigatory agencies. Bilinsky, supra note 302, at 67. But in 1934, the judi-
ciary was again charged with the responsibility of reviewing the conclu-
sion to indict. The proceeding is conducted by the same judge that pre-
sides over the trial. Soviet jurists praise the procedure because it elimi-
nates poorly prepared cases and permits the judge to become acquainted
with the issues prior to the trial. Hazard, Soviet Criminal Procedure, 15
TUL. L. REV. 220, 229 (1941).
455 V. LUKASHEVIcH, GARANTII PRAY OBVINIAMOGO V STADII PREDANIIA SUDU
(Guarantees of the Rights of the Accused at the Stage of the Bringing to
Trial) 59-60 (1966); N. ZHOGIN & F. FATKULLIN, supra note 218, at 180.
456 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRo. C. art. 221; N. POLIANSKII, supra note 397,
at 146-47; Hazard, supra note 454, at 229; Tsypkin, Predanie sudu i pravo
na zashchitu (The Bringing to Trial and the Right to Defense), [1961] 4
PRAVOVEDENIE 92, 93.
457 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CalM. PRO. C. art. 222(1)-(8).
458 Id. arts. 226(1), 227. The court may reduce the charges sanctioned
by the procurator, but may not increase them without returning the case
for a supplementary investigation. R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 405-06.
459 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 226(2). A case may be returned
for a supplementary investigation if insufficient evidence has been gath-
ered, if the procedural requirements of the Code have not been met, or if
grounds exist for charging a more serious crime. Id. art. 232.
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refer the case to the proper jurisdiction, 4 0 or terminate the pro-
ceedings.4 61
B. Right to Counsel During the Bringing to Trial
In theory, the bringing to trial is a very important stage of the
criminal proceedings because it represents the first opportunity for
an impartial magistrate to review the findings of the preliminary
investigation. The court is to detect and remedy any procedural
violations evident in the written record of the investigative ac-
tivities. It should also seek to eliminate any accusatory bias mani-
fest in the materials gathered during the preliminary investigation.
In practice, however, the judicial review of the conclusion to indict
is normally formalistic and perfunctory.4 62 There are several
possible explanations for the judiciary's mechanistic approach to
the bringing to trial. The materials examined by the court have
already been reviewed by the procurator, and he has expressed
his belief that a prima facie case has been made out. The court's
review is therefore somewhat superfluous, particularly since the
same materials will be examined in greater detail at the trial. A
second possible explanation for the court's perfunctory review of
the indictment is that neither the procurator nor defense counsel
attends the bringing to trial unless he has presented a petition or
unless an administrative session has been called, in which case only
the procurator's presence is obligatory. 4 3 The court is therefore
reviewing the materials of a proceeding which it did not attend
without the benefit of evaluative comments by those who did par-
ticipate. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the
bringing to trial fails to perform the functions it was designed
to accomplish.
Defense counsel is not only excluded from the courtroom (with
certain exceptions) during the bringing to trial. He is also for-
bidden to accept the defense of an accused under certain circum-
stances during the conduct of this proceeding. If counsel has
460 Id. arts. 226(4), 231.
461 Id. arts. 226(5), 234. For a discussion of the reasons for terminating
a case see text accompanying notes 444-49, supra.
462 Decree of March 18, 1963, Strict Adherence to Law by Courts in
Criminal Trials, [1963] 3 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 3, 8 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.),
transl. in 2 Soy. L. & GOV'T No. 2, at 17, 20 (1963); Kirienko, Zus' & Daev,
Prava obviniaemogo:v stadii predaniia sudu (Rights of the Accused in the
Stage of the Bringing to Trial), [1967] 9 S.G. i P. 150; Radzhabov, Spornye
voprosy predaniia sudu (Controversial Problems of the Bringing to Trial),
[1967] 3 SoTs. ZAK. 35.
463 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRaM. PRO. C. arts. 223-24. The procurator's presence
is obligatory during an administrative session because such a session is
called only when the judge disagrees with the findings of the conclusion
to indict or considers it necessary to change the measure of restraint
approved by the procurator prior to the bringing to trial. Id. art. 221;
R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 402.
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been admitted to the preliminary investigation, he may participate
during the bringing to trial to advise his client on the presenta-
tion of petitions and appeals. 46 4 But if an inquiry has been held
in lieu of the preliminary investigation, there is a division of
opinion concerning the right to counsel during the judicial re-
view of the conclusion to indict. The R.S.F.S.R. Code of Criminal
Procedure states that "defense counsel shall be permitted from
the moment the accused is brought to trial" in cases in which a
preliminary investigation is not conducted. 465  Many Soviet jurists
maintain that the accused is not brought to trial until the court
has confirmed the conclusion to indict, meaning that the accused
enjoys no right to counsel until preparations are underway for the
trial.466 In practice, however, judges presiding over the bringing
to trial of cases in which an inquiry has been held do permit advo-
cates to assist an accused from the moment the court assumes juris-
diction over the case.46T Recently, several jurists have suggested
that this practice is in compliance with the Code if "the moment
the accused is brought to trial" is interpreted as meaning the mo-
ment the court assumes jurisdiction, rather than the moment the
court's decree to prosecute is rendered.468
1. COUNSEL'S FUNCTIONS DURING THE BRINGING TO TRIAL
Defense counsel's functions during the bringing to trial are nu-
merous, but statistics show that even the most important of these
duties are rarely performed by Soviet advocates. One purpose of
the bringing to trial is to allow an advocate to appeal the investi-
gator's denial of defense petitions. Yet less than 8 percent of these
appeals are presented at the bringing to trial; the remaining
92 percent are submitted for the first time at the trial.469 Like-
wise, counsel is entitled to present petitions eliciting supple-
mental evidence, challenging the judge or the court's jurisdiction,
objecting to procedural violations and irregularities in the conclu-
sion to indict, or requesting the termination of a case, a change
in the qualification of a crime, or a reduction in the measure of
restraint. 470  Such petitions are rarely presented, however, just
464 N. POLIANSKrI, VOPROSY TEORII SOVETSKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA
(Problems of the Theory of Soviet Criminal Procedure) 201 (1956);
Radzhabov, supra note 462, at 36; Shafir, supra note 231, at 47, 49; Tsypkin,
supra note 456, at 102.
465 R.S.F.S.R. ClM. PRO. C. art. 47.
466 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 116-17; V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at
133-34.
467 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at 140; Tsypkin, supra note 456, at
101.
468 Shafir, supra note 231, at 49-50; Tsypkin, supra note 456, at 102-03.
Contra, V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at 130-31.
469 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at 124, 138. These figures are for
Leningrad from 1962-1965.
470 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 51, 223; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII
400-01; Radzhabov, supra note 462, at 36; Tsypkin, supra note 456, at 101.
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as additional evidence is not often adduced by the defense during
the bringing to trial.471 It has been suggested that counsel's failure
to submit defense petitions is attributable to the fact that neither
counsel nor the accused receives a copy of the conclusion to indict
after it has been sanctioned by the procurator.4 72  If the proc-
urator has revised the investigator's conclusion to indict, this
makes it impossible for the defense to know the precise nature of
the charges until after the bringing to trial.4 73
2. SUGGESTED REFORMS
A more likely explanation for counsel's failure to present peti-
tions, however, is that he must be summoned by the court (within
its discretion) to support defense petitions submitted during the
bringing to trial, whereas he can present the same petitions at
the opening of the trial (where counsel is obligatory) and be as-
sured an opportunity to explain their content.474  This has led
numerous Soviet jurists to suggest that counsel's presence during
the bringing to trial ought to be mandatory under certain circum-
stances. Tsypkin has recommended that counsel's participation
be obligatory if the accused is a minor or unable to conduct his
own defense due to physical or mental defects.475  Lukashevich
believes that counsel should automatically be admitted upon his
request to explain defense petitions. 476  And Shafir carries this
concept one step further, suggesting that counsel's participation
be mandatory upon his request to attend an administrative session
(at which the procurator's presence is already obligatory) .477
Persons opposed to the adoption of such reforms maintain that
counsel's presence in the courtroom during the bringing to trial
is unnecessary because the procurator appears in his supervisory,
not his accusatory role, and he is therefore able to protect the ac-
cused's right to defense.4 7 8  But if there is reason to believe that
471 Ginzburg, Metodika zashchity v sudebnom sledstvii (Methods of
Defense in the Judicial Examination), [1964] 5 Soy. IUST. 20, 22; Shafir,
supra note 231, at 50.
472 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at 127-28. Lukashevich also criti-
cizes the failure of procurators to inform the accused of his right to present
evidence and petitions during the bringing to trial. He suggests that a
written explanation of the accused's right to defense be printed in dupli-
cate and signed by the accused, after which the accused should receive the
duplicate copy for future reference., Id. at 126-27.
473 Id. at 128. Lukashevich recommends that the accused be given a
copy of the revised conclusion to indict at the time the procurator refers
the case to court. Id. at 129.
474 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 223, 225, 276.
475 Tsypkin, supra note 456, at 103-04.
476 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at 144.
477 Shafir, supra note 231, at 50.
478 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at 110; N. POLIANSKII, supra note
397, at 146; R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 162.
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investigators occasionally show an accusatory bias, there is even
more reason to believe that the procurators themselves are influ-
enced by their dual role as prosecutors and supervisors of socialist
legality.479 For this reason alone, then, it would seem advisable
to make counsel's presence mandatory during the bringing to trial.
There are additional advantages to be derived from counsel's par-
ticipation in the courtroom, however. The bringing to trial ought
to represent a summation of the pretrial proceedings at which all
errors in the conduct of the preliminary investigation are corrected
before determining whether to send the case to trial.480 If the
presentation of appeals and petitions for supplemental evidence
is postponed until the beginning of the trial, the result may well
be the time-consuming and disruptive remand of the case for a
supplementary investigation at the end of which it is discovered
that the case should have been terminated at the end of the pre-
liminary investigation. Due to the perfunctory nature of the
court's review of the conclusion to indict, however, and due to
counsel's failure to request a termination of the case at the bringing
to trial, the grounds for termination were not discovered until
the trial in the court of first instance. Counsel's participation in
the courtroom during the bringing to trial would therefore be ad-
vantageous in that it would encourage an advocate to present ap-
peals and petitions prior to the trial and in that it would prompt
the court to conduct a less formalistic review of the conclusion to
indict.
C. Presumption of Innocence in the Soviet Criminal Process
The decision to bring the accused to trial is not a determination
of his guilt.4 1 The Code of Criminal Procedure does not explicitly
state that the accused is presumed innocent until he is proven
guilty. However, no inference of guilt may be drawn from the
mere fact of indictment; it is only the court of first instance that
can determine the question of guilt or innocence following the
presentation of evidence at the trial.48 2 The accused has no obli-
gation to present evidence, 488 and the court may not "assume"
479 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 132; see text accompanying notes 265-77,
supra.
480 V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at 125; Shafir, supra note 231, at 50.
481 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 221; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 397;
Tsypkin, supra note 456, at 93.
482 U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 102; U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE arts. 7, 43; R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 13, 303, 309; V.
LUKASHEVICH, supra note 455, at 56; N. POLIANSKII, supra note 464, at 192;
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 82.
483 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 14, 21;
R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 20 (no right to shift burden of proof to
the accused); Id. arts. 46, 70 (right, but not duty of accused to present evi-
dence); B. GALKIN, supra note 201, at 173; A. KOBLIKOV, supra note 223, at
15; N. POLIANSKII, supra note 464, at 191; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE 82.
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the accused guilty in the absence of positive proof.484  On the
other hand, the burden of proof is not solely upon the prosecution;
excepting the defendant, all participants in the trial, including the
judge, have an obligation to elicit or present evidence. 48 5  For
this reason, Berman has suggested that "Soviet law embodies the
presumption of innocence in the general sense of the phrase but
not in the technical meaning attached to it in English and Ameri-
can law."48 6
The accuracy of Berman's statement is illustrated by the out-
come of a public dispute in the Soviet press in 1964 over the
existence of a presumption of innocence in the 1958 Principles of
Criminal Procedure. Strogovich, a leading legal theorist, wrote
in the newspaper Literaturnaia Gazeta that the Principles should
be interpreted as follows: "Until the court . . . has finally decided
the case, the defendant is not considered guilty . . . no matter how
grave and convincing the evidence arrayed against him. '487 Fili-
monov, an investigator, took issue with Strogovich. Writing in
the same newspaper, he asserted that
[t]he law gives the investigatory agencies the right to
bring charges against someone and to interrogate him as
the accused, and hence to recognize him as guilty. And the
prosecutor brings to trial and, in criminal proceedings, ac-
cuses a person who is already guilty in the eyes of the
investigatory agencies, i.e., in the eyes of the authorities.
And the court merely verifies to what extent the individual
brought to trial and accused by the prosecutor is guilty
and whether or not this offender deserves criminal pun-
ishment.488
If Filimonov had said that the investigator must be convinced that
he has gathered sufficient evidence to support a conviction in
court, no one would have quarreled with his statement.489 How-
484 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 301 (judgment of court based only
on evidence considered at trial); Id. art. 309 (conviction may not be
founded on assumptions and shall be decreed only if defendant's guilt is
proven during trial). Shapiro, [1964] 2 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 44,
transl. in 1 Sov. STAT. & DEC. No. 4, at 28 (Crim. Div. Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.
1963); A. KORLIKOV, supra note 223, at 15; N. POLIANSKII, supra note 464, at
192; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 82.
485 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 83-85.
486 Id. at 87. In this respect, the Soviet system is not unlike the Con-
tinental European systems. Id.; Hazard, Soviet Socialism and Due Process,
48 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1068-69 (1950).
487 Literaturnaia Gazeta, Aug. 18, 1964, at 2, transl. in 16 C.D.S.P. No.
39, at 24 (1964). Article 7 of the U.S.S.R. 1958 Principles of Criminal
Procedure to which Strogovich was most specifically referring reads as
follows: "No person may be deemed guilty of committing a crime and
subjected to criminal punishment except by judgment of a court."
488 Literaturnaia Gazeta, supra note 487, at 24.
489 Soviet jurists emphasize the fact that the presumption of innocence
is a procedural safeguard permitting the accused to assert his innocence
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ever, by asserting that the investigator has the right to determine
the issue of guilt and that the court has no right to acquit once
the accused has been brought to trial, Filimonov drew the criticism
of Chaikovskaia in the newspaper Izvestia.49 0 Chaikovskaia ac-
cused Filimonov of espousing a theory which had its roots in the
Stalinist era "when they would come for a man in the night,
[and] by morning he would already be called an enemy of the
people. '491 Filimonov considered Chaikovskaia's statement libel-
ous, and filed a suit against Chaikovskaia and Izvestia to restore
his offended honor and dignity.492 The court ruled against Fili-
monov, indicating that his position was contrary to the Principles
of Criminal Procedure.493 To erase all doubt about the matter,
Gorkin, the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court, published
an article in Izvestia asserting that "only the court is competent
to say, in its verdict, whether or not the defendant is guilty of
the crime that has been committed. . . . It is clearly contrary to
legislation to assert that the prosecutor brings to trial 'a person
who is already guilty' . . . .-494 The presumption of innocence is
therefore firmly established in Soviet law although the principle
is not explicitly enunciated in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
D. Preparation for the Trial and the Accused's Obligatory
Right to Counsel
After a determination has been made to bring the accused to
trial, the judge or court in administrative session must determine
whether a state accuser (i.e., a procurator) will participate during
the trial and whether to permit as defense counsel the person
selected by the accused or whether to appoint an advocate for
the trial.495 If a procurator is to participate during the judicial
until the court's judgment has been decreed. It does not mean that the
investigator or procurator considers the accused innocent at the end of the
preliminary investigation. In fact, if they do consider the accused innocent,
the case should be terminated, not sent on to trial. V. LUKASHEVICH, supra
note 455, at 52-53, 56; Gorkin, On Socialist Justice, Izvestia, Dec. 2, 1964,
at 3, transl. in 16 C.D.S.P. No. 48, at 21 (1964).
490 Chaikovskaia, Dangerous Innocence, Izvestia, Sept. 10, 1964, at 3,
transl. in 16 C.D.S.P. No. 37, at 33, 34 (1964).
491 Id. Strogovich wrote a reply to Filimonov in which he noted the
similarity between Filimonov's theory and Vyshinsky's theory that "max-
imum probability" of guilt is sufficient for conviction. Strogovich, supra
note 422, at 23.
492 Strogovich, Truth, the Court, the Prosecutor, Literaturnaia Gazeta,
Dec. 17, 1964, at 2, transl. in 17 C.D.S.P. No. 4, at 11 (1965).
493 Id.
494 Gorkin, supra note 489, at 21. As Strogovich pointed out, the Code
of Criminal Procedure also explicitly states that a judge shall render a
decree to bring the accused to trial "without predetermining the question
of guilt." R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 221.
495 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRaM. PRO. C. art. 228. Failure to determine whether
a procurator will participate is reversible error. Filimonova, [1964] 6 Bull.
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examination, 496 counsel is obligatory for the accused.4 97  Counsel
is also obligatory if the accused is a minor, one of two or more
persons whose interests conflict and one of whom has defense
counsel, or if he is physically or mentally unable to conduct his
own defense, without command of the language in which the pro-
ceedings are conducted, or charged with a crime punishable by
death.4 98  In all of the above instances, the accused may retain
his own counsel. 499 If he is unwilling or financially unable to do
so, however, the court must appoint an advocate to represent
him during the trial.500 The accused may waive his right to coun-
sel, and presumably the privilege is exercised with some fre-
quency (although statistical information on this subject is unavail-
able), but the waiver must be voluntary."0 ' In this connection,
the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. has ruled that an advocate's
presence is an absolute prerequisite to the voluntary waiver of an
accused's obligatory right to counsel at the trial.5 0 2
Verkh. Suda R.S.F.S.R. 8, transl. in 1 Sov. STAT. & DEC. No. 4, at 20, 21-22
(Crim. Div. Sup. Ct. R.S.F.S.R. 1963). The court also sets the time and
place for the trial, determines which persons to summon as experts and
witnesses, and decides whether to consider the case in closed judicial ses-
sion. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CALM. PRO. C. art. 228.
496 "Judicial examination" is the Soviet term for a trial in the court of
first instance.
497 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 49(1). If an accused waives his
right to counsel without knowing that a procurator will participate in the
proceedings, the waiver is not considered voluntary and the case can be
remanded for a new trial. Filimonova, [1964] 6 Bull. Verkh. Suda
R.S.F.S.R. 8, transl. in 1 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 4, at 20, 22 (Crim. Div. Sup.
Ct. R.S.F.S.R. 1963).
498 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 49(2)r(6). Failure to appoint
counsel in any one of these situations is grounds for a new trial. Razbit-
kova, [1963] 5 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 33 (Mil. Div. Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.
1963); Kartinin, Zakharov & Sorokin, [1964] 7 Bull. Verkh. Suda R.S.F.S.R.
15 (Tul'skii Reg. Ct. 1964).
499 If retained counsel can appear within a reasonable length of time, it
is a violation of the accused's right to defense for the court to appoint a
substitute. Shaburov (Crim. Div. Sup. Ct. R.S.F.S.R. [no date]), in COL-
LECTION OF DECREES OF THE PLENUM AND PRESIDIUM AND RULINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL DIVISION FOR CRIMINAL CASES OF THE RSFSR, 1961-1963, at 333 (L.
Smirnov ed. 1964); A. TSYPKIN, SUDEBNOE RAZBIRATEL'STVO V SOVETSKOM
UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE (Judicial Examination in Soviet Criminal Proceed-
ings) 33 (1962); Nanikishvili, Ne dopuskat' narusheniia prava obviniaemogo
na zashchitu (Don't Permit Violations of the Accused's Right to Defense),
[1964] 11 SOTS. ZAK. 15.
500 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. C. art. 49. The fact that the accused is not
confined under guard, and therefore able to retain counsel, does not relieve
the court of its obligation to appoint counsel if none has in fact been
retained. Bukharin, [1963] 3 Bull. Verkh. Suda R.S.F.S.R. 11 (Crim. Div.
Sup. Ct. R.S.F.S.R. 1962) For a more complete discussion of the retention
and appointment of counsel see text accompanying notes 332-39, supra.
501 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CalM. PRO. C. art. 50. An accused's waiver of his
right to counsel does not prevent the continued participation of a procura-
tor. Aleshin, [1967] 5 Bull. Verkh. Suda R.S.F.S.R. 11 (Crim. Div. Sup.
Ct. R.S.F.S.R. 1966).
502 Karapetian, [1966] 4 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 26 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.
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VII. TRIAL
A. Description of the Trial.
The trial in the court of first instance is conducted by one judge
and two people's assessors.50 3 The judge is elected for a term of
five years, and he normally has a formal legal education. 504 The
people's assessors are laymen elected for a two-year term.50 5 They
serve on the trial bench no more than two weeks a year, and are
paid regular wages during the time they are discharging their du-
ties in court.50 6 These lay judges serve the same function as a
jury by relating legal theory to social environment.50 7  Unlike a
jury, however, they decide both questions of fact and law.508 Fur-
thermore, they exercise equal voting rights with the judge, making
it possible for them to overrule his position. 50 9 In practice, how-
ever, the people's assessors normally defer to the judge's pro-
fessional opinion, particularly since the judge instructs them on
the law and is present when the vote is taken on the verdict.510
The trial in the Soviet Union is perhaps the most adversary
phase of the criminal process in that a procurator normally appears
to support the accusation,51' and an advocate participates on be-
half of the defense.51 2 Nevertheless, the trial still retains certain
1966) (remanded for a new trial). A similar rule obtained under the 1924
U.S.S.R. Principles of Criminal Procedure. Bekeshko, Zashchita kak
protsessual'naia funktsiia v sovetskom ugolovnom protsesse (Defense as a
Procedural Function in Soviet Criminal Proceedings), in VOPROSY UGOLOV-
NOGO PRAVA I PROTSESSA (Problems of Criminal Law and Procedure) 248-49
(1958).
503 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 15; Law of Oct. 27, 1960, art. 10,
[1960] 40 Ved. Verkh. Sov. R.S.F.S.R. Item 593. People's courts, regional
courts, and republic supreme courts may all assume original jurisdiction
over a criminal case depending upon its importance. SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 102-03; Hulicka, The Judicial System in the U.S.S.R., 42 Sw.
SOCIAL SCI. Q. 162, 163-64 (Sept. 1961).
504 Law of Oct. 27, 1960, arts. 28, 33, 41, 49, [1960] 40 Ved. Verkh. Soy.
R.S.F.S.R. Item 593; G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 83-84; SOVIET CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 101; Hulicka, supra note 503, at 162.
505 Law of Oct. 27, 1960, art. 28, [1960] 40 Ved. Verkh. Sov. R.S.F.S.R.
Item 593; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 101; Hulicka, supra note
503, at 162.
506 Law of Oct. 27, 1960, arts. 15-16, [1960] 40 Ved. Verkh. Soy.
R.S.F.S.R. Item 593.
507 Scanlan, Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: "Star Chamber" or
Clinical Jurisprudence? 19 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 261, 271 (1947).
508 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 15; Law of Oct. 27, 1960, art. 11,
[1960] 40 Ved. Verkh. Soy. R.S.F.S.R. Item 593; Hazard, supra note 486, at
1066.
509 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 306; G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at
82.
510 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 81-82; Hazard, supra note 486, at 1066;
Hulicka, supra note 503, at 162.
51 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 248.
512 Id. art. 249.
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characteristics of an inquisitional proceeding, particularly since it
is the judge who conducts the presentation of the evidence.513
After reading the conclusion to indict and asking the accused
how he pleads, the judge interrogates the defendant, victim, wit-
nesses and experts, views real evidence, and publicly discloses docu-
ments and records.514  This eliminates the need for a rigorous
cross-examination, and it is often said that an air of informality
prevails during a criminal trial in the Soviet Union.5 15 The court's
judgment must be based upon evidence considered at the judicial
examination.51 6 The materials of the preliminary investigation
must therefore be examined directly by the court, and testimony
taken during the preliminary investigation cannot be considered
by the court in reaching its verdict unless substantial contradic-
tions exist between the testimony given during the preliminary in-
vestigation and that given by the same person at the trial.51 7 The
Soviet rules of evidence are not complex. The judge may exclude
evidence which is immaterial or irrelevant to the issues in the
case.518  He may also exclude evidence which has been obtained
in violation of the rules of criminal procedure. 519 There is no pro-
hibition on the use of hearsay, however, provided the source is
identified and there is no better evidence available.520
B. Functions Performed by Defense Counsel During the Trial
1. JUDICIAL EXAMINATION
Defense counsel performs several important functions during the
early stages of the trial. After the accused has been brought to
trial, he and his lawyer are permitted to become acquainted with
513 Id. art. 243.
514 Id. arts. 70, 240, 276, 278, 280, 283, 287, 288-89, 291-93. The court
must maintain an objective, impartial attitude in eliciting evidence and
interrogating witnesses. Id. art. 243; Anashkin, Sudeiskaia aktivnost' i
ob''ektivnost' (Judicial Activity and Objectivity), [1967] 7 Soy. IUST. 3, 4.
515 Scanlan, supra note 507, at 270.
516 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CmM. PRO. C. art. 301; Decree of March 18, 1963,
Strict Adherence to Law by Courts in Criminal Trials, [1963] 3 Bull.
Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 3, 8 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.), transl. in 2 Soy. L. & GOV'T
No. 2, at 17, 20 (1963).
517 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRaM. PRO. C. arts. 240, 281, 286; Decree of March 18,
1963, Strict Adherence to Law by Courts in Criminal Trials, [1963] 3 Bull.
Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 3, 8 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.), transl. in 2 Soy. L. & GOV'T
No. 2, at 17, 20 (1963). Apparently contradictions are frequently discov-
ered and, in practice, reference is often made to testimony given during
the preliminary investigation. G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 86.
518 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 243, 280, 283, 288; A. LEVIN, P.
OGNEV & V. ROSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 104; Hazard, supra note 454, at 231;
Scanlan, supra note 507, at 271.
519 Decree of March 18, 1963, Strict Adherence to Law by Courts in
Criminal Trials, [1963] 3 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 3, 8 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.),
transl. in 2 Soy. L. & Gov'T No. 2, at 17, 20 (1963); N. IAKUBOVICH, supra
note 320, at 138.
520 Hazard, supra note 454, at 231.
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the materials of the case.521 Counsel's primary duties in examin-
ing the case materials are to discover procedural errors made during
the pretrial stages and to determine what new evidence should be
presented on behalf of the defense at the trial. He therefore
checks to be sure that the written records of the pretrial proceed-
ings are complete and that they have been properly signed. 22
He compares the accusation and the conclusion to indict to deter-
mine whether new charges have been added in the latter. If
they have, counsel may request a supplementary investigation to
permit the accused to defend himself against the new charge
prior to the trial.523  Counsel then examines the sufficiency of
the evidence to determine whether a petition should be presented
to reduce the charges or terminate the case.5 24  Finally, he con-
sults with the accused to consider the possibility of submitting or
petitioning the production of additional evidence in favor of the
defense.52 5
Petitions to correct procedural errors, reduce the charges, termi-
nate the case, or reduce the measure of restraint, petitions to sum-
mon new witnesses and experts or to acquire real evidence and
documents, and petitions challenging the court, procurator, ex-
pert, or interpreter may be submitted at the beginning of the
trial.526  Complex petitions for supplemental evidence are often
postponed until that evidence becomes logically necessary to the
development of the defendant's case, 527 and complaints concerning
the court's procedural errors are always submitted during the
trial.528  Until recently, counsel tended to ignore the importance
of presenting such petitions. Advocates concentrated all their en-
ergies on composing a persuasive closing argument. 529 It is now
recognized, however, that a closing argument carries little weight
if it is not based upon a solid evidentiary foundation.530 For
this reason, advocates are being urged to play a more active role
in the presentation and evaluation of evidence during the early
521 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CaIM. PRO. C. art. 236.
522 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RossEL's, supra note 141, at 40-47.
523 Id. at 47.
524 Id. at 47-48.
525 A. TsYPKIN, supra note 499, at 26.
526 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRaM. PRO. C. arts. 258-60, 272, 276; R.S.F.S.R. KOM-
MENTAmI 496; A. TSYPKIN, supra note 499, at 26. All of these petitions may
be presented prior to the trial if the court has time to conduct a hearing.
R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 424. If a petition is denied at the beginning of the
trial, this does not preclude its resubmission later in the trial. R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 276; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 468.
For a discussion of the grounds for presenting a challenge see note 195,
supra.
527 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RoSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 91-92.
528 Tsubin, supra note 391, at 65.
529 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. ROSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 73.
530 Id.; E. MATVIENKO, supra note 134, at 77.
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stages of the trial.531  At the same time, judges are being cau-
tioned against rejecting well-founded petitions submitted by the
defense, a practice which has been all too prevalent in the past.
532
Since the trial is the most adversary phase of Soviet criminal
proceedings, with the procurator appearing in his accusatory ra-
ther than his supervisory role,533 it is essential that an advocate
present a vigorous defense. 534  If his client denies his guilt, he
should first develop the defense theory in questioning the accused
and then present real evidence and witnesses to support an ac-
quittal.535 If his client acknowledges his guilt, an advocate may
either argue for an acquittal on the grounds that the confession
was coerced or plead mitigating circumstances in an effort to ob-
tain a reduced sentence. 5316 In either case, he should make every
effort to disclose the weaknesses or inconsistencies in the prosecu-
tion's case.5 37  This may be done by cross-examining the victim,
experts, and other witnesses, challenging the sufficiency of the evi-
dence corroborating a confession, objecting to the admission of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or
alleging the failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the
crime.538  Since the burden of proof is not upon the accused, it is
5 31 Decree of March 18, 1963, Strict Adherence to Law by Courts in
Criminal Trials, [1963] 3 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 3, 8 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.),
transl. in 2 Soy. L. & GOV'T No. 2, at 17, 21 (1963); A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV &
V. ROSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 73-74; E. MATVIENKO, supra note 134, at 78;
Vatman & Kisenishskii, supra note 364, at 21.
For a discussion of the means by which an advocate may obtain evi-
dence see text accompanying notes 360-64, supra.
532 Izvestia, March 11, 1967, at 5, transl. in 19 C.D.S.P. No. 10, at 37
(1967); Perlov, Alphabet of the Law, Izvestia, Jan. 12, 1967, at 4, transl. in
19 C.D.S.P. No. 2, at 32 (1967).
533 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 40; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 248; A. TSYPKIN, supra note 499, at 20-22.
534 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 441, 450; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RoSSEL'S,
supra note 141, at 72; T. NEISHTADT, SOVETSKII ADVOKAT (Soviet Advocate)
23 (1958). An advocate is explicitly granted equal procedural rights with
a procurator. U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 38;
R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 245.
535 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 51, 249; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII
450-51, 510-11; V. KAMINSKAIA, supra note 428, at 140; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV.
& V. RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 101-02; Stetsovskii, Uchastie zashchitnika
v dokazyvanii po ugolovnomu delu (Participation of an Advocate in Pre-
senting Proof in a Criminal Case), 6 Sov. IUST. 14 (1967).
536 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 51, 249; R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII
450-51; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 101-02; Stet-
sovkii, supra note 535, at 14.
537 Stetsovskii, supra note 535, at 15.
538 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 280, 283, 287-89; T. NEISHTADT,
supra note 534, at 26-27.
The critical examination of an expert opinion is a very important func-
tion of defense counsel during the trial. An advocate must have sufficient
knowledge of an expert's field to pose supplemental questions, interrogate
the expert concerning his opinion, and to determine when it is necessary
to petition for the appointment of a second expert. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM.
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possible for an advocate to win a case solely on the basis of these
latter defense tactics without putting in any positive proof of his
client's innocence. 53 9
2. CLOSING ARGUMENT
After the judicial examination is completed, the court hears oral
arguments by the prosecution and the defense before retiring to
its chambers to reach a verdict. The oral arguments constitute a
summation of the judicial examination; no reference may be made
to evidence which was not considered at the trial.5 40  Defense
counsel's closing speech serves three important functions: it assists
the accused in exercising his right to defense; it assists the court
in decreeing a judgment based on the objective truth; and it as-
sists the Communist Party in educating the masses to live by the
precepts of Soviet criminal law.541 This third function is of par-
ticular importance when the trial is removed from the courtroom
and conducted at the headquarters of the collective whose mem-
bers have been charged with the commission of a crime. Feifer, an
American observer of Soviet courtroom practice, reports that ap-
proximately one-fifth of all criminal cases are conducted in this
manner, and notes that the crowds-often numbering in the hun-
dreds-express their opinion regarding the accused's guilt by utter-
ing loud boos and shouts throughout the entire proceeding.5 42
In carrying out the first of his duties-to assist the accused in
exercising his right to defense--counsel confronts certain problems
of an ethical nature. The procurator is permitted to withdraw
from the accusation in his closing speech if he becomes convinced
during the judicial examination that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction. (The procurator's withdrawal is not bind-
ing on the court and the trial proceeds as if this action had not
been undertaken. 543) The right of the procurator to withdraw from
the accusation has caused a few Soviet jurists to assert a parallel
PRO. C. arts. 288-90; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. ROSSEL'S, supra note 141, at
147-49, 152-53; T. NEISHTADT, supra note 534, at 27-28; A. TSYPKIN, supra
note 499, at 58-60.
539 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 43; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 309; E. MATVIENKO, supra note 134, at 76.
For a discussion of the presumption of innocence in Soviet law see text
accompanying notes 481-94, supra.
540 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 295; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V.
RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 165-67; E. MATVIENKO, supra note 134, at 74;
A. TsYPKIN, supra note 499, at 61.
541 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 171; E. MATW-
ENKO, supra note 134, at 4-5; Ekmekchi, Vospitatel'noe znachenie rechi
advokata v sude (Educational Significance of an Advocate's Speech at the
Trial), [1964] 10 SOTS. ZAK. 58, 60.
542 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 107-11.
For a discussion of the parental or educational aspects of Soviet law
see H. BERMAN, supra note 421, at 282-84.
543 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 248.
NUMBER 3]
HeinOnline  -- 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 889 1968
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
right of defense counsel to express his opinion on the issue of guilt,
even if it means renouncing his client's innocence. 544  That this
theory has been implemented in practice is evidenced by Feifer's
account of counsel's closing speech in the case of Kushelova and
Zharikova, tried for "theft by a group of persons in accordance
with a preliminary agreement" in a Moscow people's court:
Yes, Zharikova is guilty-truly guilty. She must be pun-
ished. She committed a crime and in our society no crime
can go unpunished. . . . But the punishment must be fair
and sensible ...
I must now touch briefly upon another aspect of this case
-the judicial aspect. My client has denied that she and
Kushelova made a preliminary agreement among them-
selves to commit their crime. I must tell you frankly that
I myself do not believe this. You have seen how mistrust-
ful I was when I questioned her about her intentions. I
simply cannot believe that she went to the Luzhniki market
with Kushelova without having reached an understanding
beforehand to take an illegal action.5
45
It is small wonder that the majority maintain that counsel may
not refute his client's plea of innocence, even if he believes him
guilty! Instead, they assert that he must remain silent on the issue
of guilt, disclose the weaknesses in the prosecution's case, and
plead mitigating circumstances.5 4 , Nor should counsel's strategy
change if the procurator withdraws from the accusation. Since
the procurator's decision is not binding on the court, counsel must
still present a vigorous defense in an effort to obtain a definite
acquittal for his client.5 47
A second problem confronting defense counsel concerns the
use of alternatives. Those who would have an advocate express
his opinion on the issue of guilt also assert that counsel should
not argue in the alternative. Instead, he should select a position
on the question of guilt and maintain that position throughout his
closing speech.548  Jurists who insist upon counsel's supporting
544 Iakubovich, supra note 362, at 45; Ekmekchi, supra note 541, at 59;
Kul'berg, Iuridicheskii analiz v zashchitet'noi rechi advokata (Juridical
Analysis in the Advocate's Speech for the Defense), [1965] 2 Soy. IUST.
17, 18.
545 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 242-43.
546 E. MATVIENKO, supra note 134, at 100; Stetsovskii, Otkaz advokata ot
zashchity obviniamogo (Withdrawal of an Advocate from the Defense of
an Accused), [1967] 7 SOTS. ZAK. 59, 60. The controversy concerning coun-
sel's right to express his opinion on the issue of guilt in the closing speech
is part of a larger controversy regarding the role of counsel in criminal
proceedings discussed in text accompanying notes 112-63, supra.
547 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RoSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 222; A. TSYPKIN,
supra note 499, at 65.
548 Kul'berg, supra note 544, at 19; Nanikishvili, Pozitsiia advokata v
ugolovnom protsesse (Position of the Advocate in Criminal Proceedings),
[1965] 6 SoTs. ZAK. 35, 37; Ul'ianova, 0 protsessual'nom polozhenii advokata
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the accused's plea of not guilty, on the other hand, do favor the
use of alternatives in the closing argument. If an advocate is not
convinced of the accused's innocence, they recommend that he nev-
ertheless urge the court to give careful consideration to the evi-
dence supporting an acquittal. He should then argue in the alter-
native that even if his client is found guilty, a light sentence
ought to be imposed on the basis of mitigating circumstances
which counsel should then proceed to enumerate in his closing
speech. 54 9 In the context of Soviet criminal proceedings, where
the verdict and the sentence are announced simultaneously, the
use of arguments in the alternative would seem to be quite logical.
Otherwise, counsel may devote his closing speech to a discussion
of the reasons for acquittal, only to have the court decide to con-
vict. The court may then impose a heavy sentence because it did
not take into consideration certain mitigating circumstances which
counsel could have emphasized had he argued in the alternative.
In assisting the court to achieve a just verdict, counsel analyzes
the facts, the law, and the defendant's personality.5 0 If he con-
siders the defendant innocent, he will argue for an acquittal on
the basis of the facts, asserting that the elements of the crime have
not been established or that the accused's participation in the
commission of the crime has not been proved.5 5' If he believes
that the crime has been misclassified, he will argue on the basis of
substantive law for a reduction in the charges. 5 2  And finally,
should neither of the above arguments prove tenable, he will seek
a light sentence by presenting mitigating circumstances based upon
the accused's personality and life history.5 3
i ego pozitsii po delu (On the Procedural Status of the Advocate and his
Position in a Case), [1966] 3 SOTS. ZAK. 60, 61. Contra, A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV
& V. RoSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 220.
549 Boikov, Eticheskie normy deiatel'nosti sovetskogo advokata (Ethical
Norms of the Activities of a Soviet Advocate), [1966] 10 Soy. IUST. 16, 17;
Sinaiskii, Advokat dolzhen zashchishchat' (An Advocate Must Defend),
[1966] 11 SOTS. ZAK. 64, 65; Stetsovskii, supra note 546, at 60.
550 A. TSYPKIN, supra note 499, at 61; Kul'berg, supra note 544, at 17;
Vatman & Kisenishskii, supra note 364, at 21.
551 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RoSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 204, 219; E.
MATVIENKO, supra note 134, at 80, 91-92; T. NEISHTADT, supra note 534, at
28-29; A. TSYPKIN, supra note 499, at 61; Gol'diner, Analiz dokazatel'stv i
ustanovlenie fakticheskikh obstoiatel'stv v zashchititel'noi rechi (Analysis
of Evidence and the Establishment of Factual Circumstances in the Speech
for the Defense), [1967] 14 Soy. IUST. 18-19.
552 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 219; E. MATV-
ENKO, supra note 134, at 80, 91; T. NEISHTADT, supra note 534, at 30; A.
TSYPKIN, supra note 499, at 61; Gol'diner, supra note 551, at 19.
553 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. ROSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 188; E. MATW-
ENKO, supra note 134, at 80, 102; T. NEISHTADT, supra note 534, at 30; Kul'-
berg, Analiz motiva prestupleniia v zashchitel'noi rechi (Analysis of the
Motives of the Crime in the Speech for the Defense), [1963] 24 Soy. IUST.
17; Kul'berg, Issledovanie lichnosti podsudimogo v ugolovnoi zashchite
(Examination of the Defendant's Personality in Criminal Defense), [1966]
22 Soy. IUST. 16.
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In fulfilling his obligation to the party, counsel devotes the
opening or closing paragraphs of his speech to a denunciation of
the crime committed (or not committed) by his client. If his client
has pleaded innocent, counsel merely comments upon the adverse
effect of criminal activity upon the development of a socialist
society's goals and institutions.554  If the accused has acknowl-
edged his guilt, however, an advocate is expected to dwell upon the
circumstances causing or facilitating the commission of the crime. 555
The hope is that the members of the audience will be spurred to
eliminate the causative factors in the process of building a socialist
society and that they will be deterred from engaging in similar
criminal activity in the conduct of their personal lives.550 The
courtroom is thus transformed into a classroom, and counsel be-
comes responsible for developing a sense of legal consciousness
among the members of the audience. 557
3. DECREE OF THE COURT'S JUDGMENT
After completion of the oral arguments, the defendant has the
right to speak the last word.58 The court then retires to the con-
ference room for a secret session at the end of which a judgment
of conviction or acquittal is decreed.559 In either case, a copy of
the decree must be handed to the defendant within three days,5 60
at which time the record of the judicial session must also be made
available to the defendant and his counsel for their signatures,
examination, and corrections.561 Since an appeal may be taken by
either the defense or the prosecution, it is important that counsel
examine the record carefully and request the addition or correc-
tion of any information favorable to the defense. 56 2 Such requests
are considered by the presiding judge alone, unless he disapproves
of the suggested change, in which case he calls two people's as-
sessors (at least one of whom was present at the trial) to assist
him in considering the request.563 When necessary, counsel may be
summoned to explain his petition for a change in the written
record of the trial.56 4 There are two critical defects in this pro-
554 E. MATVIENKO, supra note 134, at 6; Ekmekchi, supra note 541, at 58.
555 Ekmekchi, supra note 541, at 58-60.
556 Id. at 60.
557 H. BERMAN, supra note 421, at 281-84.
558 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 297.
559 Id. arts. 302, 309.
560 Id. art. 320.
561 Id. art. 264-65.
562 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 224; A. TSYPKIN,
supra note 499, at 71; Vydria, Protsessual'naia forma rassmotreniia del
sudom vtoroi instantsii i garantii prav lichnosti (Procedural Form For the
Examination of a Case by the Court of Second Instance and Guarantees of
the Rights of an Individual), in NoVOE SOVETSKOE ZAKONODATEL'STVA I
ADVOKATURA (New Soviet Legislation and the Advokatura) 47 (1960).
568 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRaM. PRO. C. art. 266.
564 Id.
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cedure: the panel of judges which presides over the trial is not
always the same panel that considers the suggested corrections;
and counsel is not permitted to attend the consideration of his re-
quested changes unless he is summoned at the court's discretion.
To eliminate these defects, it has been suggested that the written
record be corrected at the end of the trial prior to the court's
determination of its judgment.565 This would automatically en-
able counsel to attend the review of his suggested corrections
and would also ensure consideration of the requested changes or
additions by the panel of judges that presided over the trial.
VIII. APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Description of the Cassational And Supervisory Instances
There are two types of appellate review in Soviet criminal pro-
ceedings. The prosecution and the defense have one right of appeal
to the regional or republic supreme court immediately above the
trial court in the judicial hierarchy.56 6 This is termed a "cassa-
tional appeal" (if brought by the defense) or a "cassational pro-
test" (if brought by the prosecution).567 It is based upon the en-
tire trial record, and must be filed within seven days.568 At the
end of that time, the judgment decreed by the court of first in-
stance becomes final.5 69 A final judgment may only be reviewed
"by way of supervision," and then only upon request of the pro-
curacy or one of the presidents or vice-presidents of the regional
and supreme courts.570  Unlike the cassational instances, in
which there is a right of appeal to only one court, review by way
of supervision may take a case through a series of appellate
courts, culminating in the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. 571 It is
more limited than the cassational appeal or protest, however, in
.565 Shafir, supra note 231, at 50-51.
566 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 44; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 325-26; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 87-89,
103; Hazard, supra note 454, at 233; Ostrovskii, Obzhalovanie prigovora
vstupivshego v zakonnuiu silu (Appeal of a Judgment Which Has Taken
Legal Effect), [1966] 23 Sov. IUST. 19. There is no right of appeal from
verdicts of the republic supreme courts; appellate review must be by way
of supervision. U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 44;
R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 325. Extending the right of appeal to
the prosecution as well as the defense is a common practice in Continental
European legal systems. SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 87.
567 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 325.
568 Id. art. 328; Hazard, supra note 454, at 233.
569 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 356. If a cassational appeal or pro-
test is brought, execution of the judgment is suspended and the judgment
does not take legal effect until the case has been considered by the appel-
late court. Id. arts. 330, 356.
570 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 48; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 354, 371; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
88-89; Hazard, supra note 454, at 234.
571 SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 89, 103-04.
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that the parties are not permitted to appeal in their own names;
they must first persuade a member of the upper echelons of the
procuracy or a president or vice-president of a high court that
the final judgment is unfounded or illegal; the request for a re-
view by way of supervision is then brought in the name of one of
these public officials. 572 The theory underlying this dual system
of appellate review is that the parties are first given one oppor-
tunity to appeal the trial court's errors. Should they fail to take
advantage of this opportunity, however, or should the cassational
instance fail to correct the trial court's errors, the persons charged
with the supervision of legality in the Soviet legal system are
permitted to initiate a supervisory review in order to rectify the
lower court's mistakes. 57 3
In many respects, there is little difference between the two
types of appellate review. A panel of professional judges presides
over both the cassational and supervisory instdnces.5 7 4  In both
proceedings, the court reviews questions of fact as well as of law.57 5
In fact, the cassational appeal or protest is in essence a partial
trial de novo because new evidence may be submitted by the par-
ties.57 6 The court in each instance may leave the judgment un-
changed, vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new in-
vestigation or judicial consideration, vacate the judgment and ter-
minate the case, or change the judgment of the trial (or appellate)
court.577 To protect the accused, several limitations have been im-
posed upon the appellate courts by the 1958 Principles of Criminal
Procedure. Protests on the grounds of the lightness of the sen-
tence, termination of the case, or acquittal must be reviewed by
way of supervision within one year.578 A judgment of acquittal
may not be vacated by way of cassation except upon the prosecu-
tion's protest.57 9 A conviction may not be vacated in order to
apply the law for a graver crime or a more severe punishment
unless the prosecution has protested on these grounds.58 0 And al-
though the appellate court may reduce the charges or mitigate the
punishment, it may not itself increase the punishment or apply
572 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 371, 376; Ostrovskii, supra note
566, at 19.
573 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 205; Hazard, supra note 454, at 235.
574 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 287.
575 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 45; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 332, 380.
576 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 337; SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 88-89.
577 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 339, 378.
578 Id. art. 373; U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 48.
570 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 47; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 341.
580 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 46; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 340.
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the law for a graver crime. 58' Instead, it must remand the case
for a supplementary investigation or new judicial consideration. 82
B. Right to Counsel During Appellate Proceedings
The primary difference between the two appellate proceedings
lies in the accused's right to counsel. In the cassational instance,
"counsel may participate," 58 3 whereas in the supervisory instance,
the court summons defense counsel only "when necessary."58 4 In
practice, this has meant that counsel actively participates in the
cassational instance, but performs very few functions during the
supervisory review.5
8 5
1. COUNSEL'S FUNCTIONS DURING APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
Following the decree of a trial court's judgment, the first
problem confronting an advocate is often whether he should sub-
mit an appeal without his client's consent. There is a sharp divi-
sion of opinion on this subject. Those jurists who adhere to the
theory that an advocate is procedurally independent of his client
assert that counsel can submit an appeal in his own name over his
client's objections provided he first explains to his client his in-
tended course of action and gives him an opportunity to exercise
his right to change lawyers. 586  The opponents of this theory
maintain that counsel cannot submit an appeal unless his client is
in full accord. 587 It is difficult to assess which is the better position.
If an advocate is convinced of his client's innocence but his client
is too timid to appeal, it would seem desirable for counsel to appeal
over his client's objections. On the other hand, if the accused is
definitely guilty of committing a crime, and the question is one of
its classification, the accused might understandably be reluctant
to appeal on the grounds that a lesser crime should have been
charged. If the case is remanded for a new trial by the appellate
court and "circumstances are established in the new consideration
581 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 46, 48;
R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 340, 350, 380.
582 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 52; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 348, 353, 380, 382.
583 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 45; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 335.
584 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 377.
585 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 693; E. KUTSOVA, SOVETSKAIA KASSATSIIA KAK
GARANTIIA ZAKONNOSTI V PRAVOSUDII (Soviet Cassation as a Guarantee of
Legality in Justice) 16 (1957); Vatman & Kisenishskii, supra note 364, at
21.
586 E. KUTSOVA, supra note 585, at 50; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RoSSEL'S,
supra note 141, at 229-32; Grekov, Pozitsiia advokata v protsesse dolzhna
byt' osnovana na zakone (The Position of an Advocate in Legal Proceed-
ings Should be Founded in Law), [1965] 10 SOTS. ZAK. 55, 56; Vydria, supra
note 562, at 69, 73.
587 R.S.F.S.R. KOMMENTARII 585; R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 224.
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of the case which evidence the commission by the accused of a
graver crime," the punishment for the graver crime may be
applied and the accused will have worsened his position by sub-
mitting the appeal. 8 8  Under these circumstances, it might be
better for an advocate who is convinced that the judgment
is not well-founded to forego the appeal and direct his efforts
toward persuading an appellate judge or member of the pro-
curacy to initiate a supervisory review after the judgment has be-
come final.589
Assuming that a cassational appeal or protest is filed, the court
must inform counsel of the time and place for consideration of the
case.5 90 It is particularly important that counsel attend because
typically only one of the three judges has acquainted himself
with the materials of the case prior to the judicial session.5 91
He opens the session by reporting to the other members of the
court the substance of the case and the arguments of the appeal
or protest. The procurator then substantiates the protest or de-
fends the legality of the judgment.592 If counsel is not present to
verbalize his objections to the protest or his reasons for submit-
ting an appeal, his arguments (submitted in writing prior to the
judicial session) 593 are not apt to be considered. 94  This is par-
ticularly true since a cassational appeal or protest is frequently
processed in less than an hour, giving the two judges who have not
read the record little opportunity to evaluate counsel's written
brief.595
When an advocate appears to support an appeal, he must rest his
argument for changing or vacating the judgment on one of the
following grounds: (1) the inquiry, preliminary, or judicial in-
vestigation was one-sided or incomplete; (2) the court's findings
do not correspond to the factual circumstances of the case; (3) a
substantial violation of criminal procedure law has occurred; (4)
the substantive criminal law has been incorrectly applied; or (5)
the court's punishment does not correspond with the gravity of the
588 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 353, 382.
589 R. RAKHUNOV, supra note 104, at 225.
590 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 336. Failure to so inform counsel
constitutes reversible error. Zhdanov, [1964] 6 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R.
24 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R. 1964). Counsel must also be informed of any changes
in the time or place for consideration of the cassational appeal or protest.
Kichiev, [1963] 2 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 39 (Mil. Div. Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.
1962).
591 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 338; G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at
287.
592 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 335, 338.
593 Id. art. 327. It is reversible error for the court to consider a cassa-
tional protest before receiving defense counsel's written objections. Cher-
nysheva [1966] 3 Bull. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 29 (Mil. Div. Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R.
1965).
594 A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V. RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 311, 318.
595 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 287-88.
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crime or the personality of the convicted person. 96 If he bases his
appeal upon one of the first two grounds, he will devote most of
his time to analyzing the evidence presented at the trial or col-
lected during the preliminary investigation. 97 If he bases his
appeal upon the third ground, he can automatically obtain a re-
versal by showing that: (1) the case should have been terminated;
(2) the judgment was rendered by an illegally constituted court;
(3) the case was considered in absence of the accused or defense
counsel when their presence was obligatory; (4) the secrecy of the
judge's conference room was violated; (5) the judgment was not
signed by one of the judges; or (6) the case file lacks a record of
the judicial session.598 An appeal on the fourth ground requires
an analysis of substantive criminal law, 99 and an appeal on the
fifth ground normally entails the presentation of new facts char-
acterizing the accused's personality.69 0 If counsel attends the su-
pervisory review, he performs precisely the same functions.60'
Moreover, his participation in the supervisory instance would
seem to be just as important as in the cassational instance, because
the supervisory review is also conducted by three judges, only
one of whom has become acquainted with the materials of the
case in advance.60 2 In the absence of counsel, it has been reported
that the prepared judge often influences the vote of his colleagues.6 03
2. SUGGESTED REFORM
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that numerous
proposals have been advanced in recent years to strengthen the
right to counsel during the appellate stages of the Soviet criminal
process. Adoption of such reforms has been blocked by jurists who
maintain that counsel is not necessary to protect the accused's
right to defense during an appellate review because the procurator
appears in his supervisory, not his accusatory role. He may protest
596 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 49; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 342.
597 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 343-44; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV &
V. RosSEL'S, supra note 141, at 257, 264-65.
598 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 345. Any other substantial viola-
tion of criminal procedure law will also suffice as grounds for reversal.
Id.; Ostrovskii, Osobennosti uchastiia advokata v kassatsionnoi instantsii
po ugolovnym delam (Peculiarities. of an Advocate's Participation in the
Cassational Instance in Criminal Cases), [1965] 19 Sov. IUST. 14.
599 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 346; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV & V.
RoSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 270.
600 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 347; A. LEVIN, P. OGNEV &" V.
RoSSEL'S, supra note 141, at 285; Ostrovskii, supra note 598, at 15.
601 U.S.S.R. 1958 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 49; R.S.F.S.R.
1960 CRIM. PRO. C. arts. 377, 379.
602 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 CRIM. PRO. C. art. 377; Tupchiev, Poriadok rassmo-
treniia ugolovnykh del v nadzornoi instantsii (Procedure for the Examina-
tion of Criminal Cases in the Supervisory Instance), [1963] 23 Soy. IUST. 11.
608 G. FEIFER, supra note 182, at 291.
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the mildness of the sentence or the lightness of the crime charged,
but he may also recommend vacating or changing an unfounded
judgment.0 °4 The rebuttal is obvious. The procurator is actually
assisting the accused only when he seeks to reduce or mitigate the
judgment. When he protests the lightness of the sentence, he is
appearing as an accuser, and unless counsel is permitted to partici-
pate, the accused is left with no one to speak on his behalf. 0 5
It would therefore seem advisable for the Soviets to adopt Sha-
fir's proposal that counsel be made obligatory during the cassa-
tional and supervisory instance if: (1) the accused is a minor or
unable to conduct his own defense due to physical or mental
defects; (2) the accused has been sentenced to death; or (3) the
procurator has protested the mildness of the court's judgment.60 6
In all other instances, counsel should be permitted to participate
in the cassational or supervisory review upon the defendant's re-
quest, instead of upon the court's summons. 60 7  Such a reform
would adequately protect the accused's right to defense without
making counsel's presence mandatory in those instances when his
participation would not in fact be necessary in view of the pro-
curator's position that the sentence should be mitigated or the
charge reduced.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The role of defense counsel in the Soviet Union must be evalu-
ated within the context of Soviet criminal proceedings, which are
primarily inquisitional, rather than adversary in form. The in-
quiry, preliminary investigation, bringing to trial, trial, cassational
appeal, and supervisory review are all conducted by a figure whom
the law regards as neutral. This figure is empowered to elicit
evidence both for and against the accused's position as well as to
render a decree regarding the disposition of the case. His neutrality
has caused many Soviet jurists to conclude that the right to counsel
is not an essential element of the accused's right to defense. In
fact, they assert that counsel's services are superfluous because the
accused is empowered to present evidence, petitions, and appeals
and the investigator, judge, and procurator are legally obligated to
assist him in conducting his own defense. Furthermore, they main-
tain that counsel's presence would unnecessarily obstruct the con-
duct of pretrial and appellate proceedings.
604 Grun, K voprosu o predelakh pray nadzornoi instantsii (Concerning
the Problem of the Limits of Rights of the Supervisory Instance), [1961]
23 Soy. IUST. 8-9; Vydria, supra note 562, at 108.
605 N. POLIANSKII, supra note 397, at 165, 178-79.
606 Shafir, supra note 231, at 52-53. A similar proposal was made prior
to the passage of the 1958 Principles of Criminal Procedure, but was not
adopted. E. KUTSOVA, supra note 585, at 16-17.
607 Chetunova, supra note 394, at 19; Perlov, Nauka sovetskogo ugolov-
nogo protsessa i sovershenstvovanie zakonodatel'stva (The Study of Soviet
Criminal Proceedings and the Improvement of Legislation), [1967] 11 SOTS.
ZAK. 37, 39; Shafir, supra note 231, at 52-53; Tsubin, supra note 391, at 66.
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Significantly, the trend today is away from this restrictive inter-
pretation of the accused's right to defense. Soviet criminal pro-
ceedings have become increasingly adversary in form, a change
which has been marked by the introduction of the right to coun-
sel from the end of the preliminary investigation for all defendants.
Pressures are currently mounting to extend the right to counsel
to the beginning of the inquiry and preliminary investigation and
to strengthen the right to counsel at the appellate stages of the
criminal process. The adoption of the suggested reforms would
seem to be advantageous because the accused, who has no formal
legal training, would no longer have to rely upon the assistance of
the investigator and procurator-persons who frequently display
an accusatory bias in performing their duties during pretrial and
appellate proceedings.
An extension of the right to counsel to the pre- and post-trial
stages of the Soviet criminal process, however, would not auto-
matically strengthen the accused's right to defense. Certain limita-
tions currently placed upon counsel's participation in Soviet crim-
inal proceedings, such as the restrictions placed upon his right to
obtain evidence, would first have to be removed. Until counsel
is permitted to obtain real evidence from any source through
the consultation office of the advokatura, for example, it will
be difficult for him to conduct a vigorous defense. Likewise,
an advocate's presence will not appreciably enhance the accused's
right to defense unless the advocate feels a professional respon-
sibility to champion the interests of his client in the latter's
confrontation with the state. There are certain signs of the ad-
vokatura's increasing prestige, including the rising standards for
admission into the college of advocates with emphasis on solid
university training, the increased participation of advocates in
Soviet politics, and the rising rate of the advokatura's membership
in the Communist Party. This increased prestige has prompted
many Soviet advocates to give more serious throught to the nature
of their responsibility to the client versus their duty to the
state. The advokatura has thus become relatively independent of
the judiciary and the procuracy (the representatives of the state in
Soviet criminal proceedings) and the individual advocate has be-
come more closely allied with the procedural position of the ac-
cused. In fact, many advocates have begun to refer to the adver-
sary character of counsel's participation in Soviet criminal proceed-
ings, indicating that they now appreciate more fully the precise
nature of their professional responsibility to the client.
There is one limitation on the effectiveness of counsel's par-
ticipation in Soviet criminal proceedings which will probably
not be removed within the foreseeable future. Western com-
mentators have frequently noted that the concepts of due proc-
ess and individual civil liberties are not as highly valued in the
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Soviet Union as they are in the Western world. This necessarily
limits the effectiveness of the right to counsel, particularly during
political proceedings. Since the passage of the Principles of Crim-
inal Procedure in 1958, it has been customary for counsel to par-
ticipate during the trials of political dissidents, but more often than
not, counsel's presence has appeared to be a relatively insignificant
factor. The courts have routinely convicted the defendants despite
the persuasiveness with which counsel has refuted the accusation.
It is this aspect of Soviet criminal proceedings which has prompted
many Western observers to underestimate the usefulness of coun-
sel's defense, particularly when they have looked upon counsel's
performance at political trials as a gauge of his effectiveness during
nonpolitical proceedings. On the other hand, it is this same as-
pect of Soviet criminal proceedings which does indeed make the
right to counsel a somewhat tenuous guarantee of the accused's
right to defense. Because the protection of an individual's civil
liberties is not of primary concern during the conduct of political
trials in the Soviet Union, the right to counsel must essentially
be understood as a statutory right circumscribed by certain limi-
tations imposed in the interests of the state-limitations which
may fluctuate depending upon the tenor of the times and the
stability of the regime.
JEAN C. LOVE
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